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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis is dualistic: first, it will attempt to interpret and explain some fundamental 
thoughts and theories elaborated by the French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville. Secondly, 
its aspiration is to illustrate how Tocqueville’s elaborations and theories may contribute to an 
understanding of modern-day democracy. What, then, is the ‘social relevance’ of Tocqueville’s 
theories? Undoubtedly, contributing something genuinely new and relevant to the democratic 
debate seems overly ambitious; furthermore, one has to justify writing a thesis on a thinker of 
the nineteenth century. Why write a thesis on a thinker of former times? The view set forth here 
is that Tocqueville’s work has significant normative and explanatory power on a number of 
issues and challenges in present-day democracy. Although he is not widely debated in Europe 
(he is more acknowledged as an historical observer of the French revolution and the ancien 
regime), he remains a central figure in the political and academic debate in the United States. 
The groundwork of this debate is Tocqueville’s magnum opus Democracy in America, published 
in two volumes, in 1835 and 1840 respectively.  
The centre of attention here is not primarily the structural, institutional or judicial aspects of 
democracy. Rather, the points of departure for this thesis are certain sociological, cultural and 
psychological aspects of modern democratic society, and in this regard Tocqueville is perceived 
here as a far-sighted thinker who provided less a general theory of modern democracy than a 
set of perceptive psychological insights into the democratic mentality and democratic man. What 
Tocqueville describes is democracy’s impact on democratic man’s political mindset and his 
preferences, outlook and values, and the consequences that the principle of equality as a 
guiding moral principle exerts on modern society. By ‘political mindset’, this thesis emphasizes 
that the generally held political and normative conceptions of what is just and unjust, legitimate 
and illegitimate, right and wrong, are not arbitrary values randomly chosen at will, but based in a 
coherent and culture-bound ‘world-picture’, where certain behaviour and action are given 
meaning and purpose.  
Tocqueville has been described as the first political thinker that sounded a warning on some 
of the potential dangers of democracy, such as the pressure towards conformity, 
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standardization, and the dominance of public opinion. Furthermore, he was the “first political 
theorist to treat democracy as a theoretical subject in its own right.” (Wolin 2001:59) 
Tocqueville, an aristocrat, realized that the democracy he observed in the United States 
would inevitably spread to France and Europe, and that democracy as a modern political 
phenomenon differed fundamentally from pre-modern politics. The crucial difference is located 
in the fact that modern politics derives from two normative philosophical doctrines; first, every 
individual is a sovereign entity endowed with reason, and given the fact that they have reason, 
they should rely on their own rational judgement and not the opinions of others. This 
philosophical doctrine, labelled sovereignty of the people, represents in conjunction with the 
other doctrine – the principle of equality – the heart and soul of democracy. The United States of 
America was the first country that practiced these doctrines, and although Democracy in 
America provides noteworthy insights into the political system of the Americans, it is primarily 
Tocqueville’s reflections on democracy as a psychological and sociological phenomenon that is 
given attention here. What makes Tocqueville interesting as a thinker with continued theoretical 
relevance is, in my opinion, the fact that he was the first thinker who meticulously explored the 
manner in which the democratic principle of sovereignty of the people and equality function as 
the normative and philosophical primus motor in democratic societies. This includes not only 
these principles as the indispensable normative foundation of political justice, but also their 
effect on the political institutions in the West, “the customs, manners, and intellectual habits of 
the citizens.” (Zetterbaum 1987:761) Furthermore, Tocqueville was aware that the imminent 
democratic revolution was genuinely new, its nature and philosophy differed essentially from 
previous forms of democracy. It was the political regime of a new governing class – the 
bourgeoisie – and represented new interpretations of political and social legitimacy, justice, 
social organization, rights and sovereignty.1 Tocqueville contemplates upon the democratic 
organization of society and the rights of the individual, now thoroughly established in Western 
democracies, and his insights and comments upon the philosophical and theoretical foundations 
of modern democracy and their effects upon democratic man and democratic mentality are what 
this thesis will attempt to explain and analyse. 
                                                  
1 ‘Bourgeoisie’ is here understood as middle class. This class is perceived here as the social class that achieved predominant political 
importance in the transition from mediaeval to modern social organization. Furthermore, the understanding of middle class status in this 
thesis is not determined by occupation or social rank, but as a subject of outlook, mentality and values.  
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Tocqueville created from history and from his own observations certain hypothetical models 
of social and political actions in order to make comparisons among societies and cultures and to 
create hypotheses about larger social patterns. It is difficult to reconstruct a larger vision of 
Tocquevillian sociology, and his particular mix of sociology, history, politics and moral concerns 
points to the inevitable limits of any overarching theoretical perspective – social scientific or 
philosophical. An analysis of Tocqueville reveals his disregard for terminological consistency; 
certain phrases and terms reoccur frequently; ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘democracy’, ‘despotism’, 
‘tyranny’ and ‘centralization’ to name a few. These phrases do not carry a wholly stable set of 
meanings: they are context-dependent constructs. (Welch 2001:3) He wished to avoid an overly 
technical vocabulary, and though there is a singularity of vision behind his work, there is no 
systematic elaboration of interrelated theoretical categories. Rather he sought to analyze the 
complex links – institutional, intellectual, and above all psychological – between social and 
political institutions. ”What guides Tocqueville is not a quest for scientific clarity, but rather the 
desire to express his ideas in a form that will lead his contemporaries to see their own society 
with new eyes.” (Welch 2001:54) 
His insight and perception concerning the future of democracy were in some ways disturbing 
and even dramatic, but his concern was not to draw an overly pessimistic picture of the 
democratic future, but rather to portray the weaknesses and strengths of the democratic 
movement, which he perceived as inevitably moving forward. Furthermore, through civil 
associations, religion and intellectual freedom he prescribed a recipe that could act as an 
antidote against ”democratic despotism” and ”tyranny of the majority”, expressions that are 
central to his understanding of the embryonic predicament of modern democracy.  
Also of interest is the fact that he is widely quoted and referred to both by the political ‘Left’ 
and ‘Right’, particularly as a moral and insightful justification of their expressions. On the ‘Left’ 
he is the philosopher who supports community and civic engagement and who warns against 
the appearance of an industrial aristocracy and against the bourgeois or commercial passion for 
material well-being: in sum, he is for democratic citizenship. On the ‘Right’, he is renowned for 
his strictures on ‘Big Government’, and his affection for decentralized administration, as well as 
for celebrating individual energy and opposing egalitarian excess: he is a balanced liberal, 
defending both freedom and moderation. However, in my opinion, few outside academic circles 
have actually read his works meticulously and achieved a substantial and comprehensive 
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understanding of his theories and philosophy. Furthermore, the problems and dilemmas that 
Tocqueville brings into question cannot be categorized as leaning to the ’Right’ or ’Left’. His 
inquiries, his criticism, and his concepts of good governance burst the categories of political and 
scientific outlooks of thought; even today, they still illustrate new territory lying beyond the 
staked claims of schools of social science and political parties. Tocqueville’s liberalism is, in 
fact, of a different kind. With rare exceptions, he has not gained followers, either in social 
science or in politics. His fate has been to be “quoted more often than read and understood.” 
(Hereth 1986:10) His observations bypass the political polarities of the one-dimensional ‘left-
right’ axis. The contradiction and paradox of the fact that politicians and academics of various 
and often opposite political ideological standpoints use Tocqueville as a source of validation 
prove the complexity of his work. 2 
The decision to focus on Tocqueville as a relevant and significant political thinker in the 
contemporary democratic debate may seem peculiar. He has been long absent from the centre 
stage of democratic theory, but through an increasing number of publications the last decade he 
has regained his status in bringing certain political anxieties into sharper focus, as well as 
providing an alternative to a Marxist form of analysis. Tocqueville addresses a number of issues 
that are present in the current democratic debate: why is the publics interest in politics deflating, 
what is, and what should be the role of government, what is the role of public opinion, why is 
there a considerable apathy among the public concerning political and civic duties, are norms 
and virtues important in the preservation of a vital democracy? These questions are not 
restricted to a particular democratic nation, but widely present in virtually all democratic states in 
the West. My ambition is to display that a number of issues that Tocqueville discussed and 
contemplated upon are relevant in the current democratic debate. Tocqueville’s greatest 
strength was perhaps his description of the duality of democracy; inherently democracy – in its 
Western and pluralistic form - displays a number of potential flaws as well as vigour. 
Tocqueville’s observations are attention-grabbing because they were written at a time when 
modern democracy still was in its founding, he shows us the ambiguities of democracy and he 
points out that by itself it is not a miraculous prescription that effortlessly guarantees liberty, 
                                                  
2 Tocqueville was also aware of this: he wrote to Eugene Stoffels, February21, 1835, “I please many persons of opposite opinions not 
because they penetrate my meaning, but because, looking only to one side of my work, they think they find in arguments in favor of their 
own opinions.” (quoted in Welch, Cheryl (2001) De Tocqueville.) 
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freedom and happiness for all. The issue is not whether democracy is the supreme political 
regime or not; rather, it is what kind of democracy we choose to live in. To Tocqueville, 
democracy is not an abstract and static construction; there are various potentialities and 
outcomes of it. The potentially positive force of democracy consists of a society where 
individuals participate in the political environment, actively take responsibility for their own lives, 
and thus create a vibrant and dynamic political environment. However, democracy can also 
develop into an atomistic and indifferent society where individuals narrowly follow self-interest 
and lack any deeper sense of responsibility to the community. In order to live up to its fullest 
potential, democracy as a political regime demands active practise, political consciousness, 
enlightenment and responsibility by its citizenry. If these traits are neglected it can potentially 
develop into a materialistic, conform, indifferent and docile society. The issues Tocqueville 
raises are not easily categorized into the ‘Left’ versus the ‘Right’ or the customary discussion of 
the Individual versus the State.  
Tocqueville confronts us with problems and dilemmas that are largely absent from the central 
debates and discussions which today address the democratic inertia, as perceived by a 
significant number of scholars. There is a wide recognition of the fact that participation, both in 
regard to voting and active practice on the civic level, is dwindling in the West, faith and trust in 
politicians are diminishing, and grander visions and enthusiasm are to a large extent absent in 
politics. In this respect, Tocqueville provides an alternative outlook to the contemporary 
explanations that dominate political science. In the political language of the West, there is a 
common impression that the democratic regime we know is somehow natural for human 
society. This thesis claims that the conception of democracy, in its Western form, has become 
universalistic and detached from its historical, cultural and specific evolution. Tocqueville 
recognized the immense gravitational force of modern democracy, and he was conscious that 
modern democracy was not merely a political regime among others. It is not, like ancient 
democracy, one category in a general classification of political regimes, constituting one of the 
legitimate forms of human cohabitation, a form that is “eternally possible and eternally 
susceptible to degeneration and replacement by another. Modern democracy breaks with its 
natural cycle. It succeeds other political regimes.” (Manent 1996:XII) This distinction is essential 
in understanding modern democracy; a comprehensive analysis requires an amalgamation of 
the political and the social; its influence and consequences penetrates all aspects of the human 
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society. The democracy of today is not merely an administrative or a political phenomenon; it is 
intellectual, psychological, cultural, and economic as well. 
While the problems that are usually addressed concerning democracy in the West are very 
real and must be taken seriously, their explanatory power is, as perceived here, often somewhat 
inhibited by an overly structural, institutional and empirical outlook. A philosophical explanation 
that aims at a deeper and wider understanding of Western democratic society is more often 
than not disregarded as speculative, subjective and ‘unscientific’ outside academic circles. 
Tocqueville’s theories were written and developed at a time when contemporary political theory 
was, if not pristine, then still open-minded towards rhetoric, ethics, cultural history, philosophy, 
religion and humanism, and hence, I will claim, more intellectually reflective and qualitative in 
nature and outlook. 
The aspiration of this thesis is not to present an elaborate and complete presentation and 
analysis of Tocqueville’s works. First, there is a vast literature that has presented and 
interpreted his works in an excellent manner, and it would be exceedingly ambitious to 
contribute something significantly new in this regard. Secondly, as the title of the thesis implies, 
the focal point here is the psychological, philosophical and sociological aspects of his theories, 
and their validity in contemporary society, especially democracy’s impact and effect on 
democratic man and his mentality.  
 
Briefly on Democracy in America 
I confess that in America I saw more than America; I sought there an 
image of democracy itself, of its penchants, its character, its prejudices, its 
passions; I wanted to become acquainted with it if only to know at least 
what we ought to hope and fear from it. (DA I, introduction, p. 13) 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s main work was Democracy in America, published in two volumes, five 
years apart, in 1835 and 1840.3 The first volume was well received and made Tocqueville 
renowned, while the reception of the second volume was more differentiated and ambiguous. 
He complained that there was something problematic in the second volume “which contains 
something obscure and problematical not grasped by the masses,” and that he had wanted to 
                                                  
3 The references to Democracy in America in this paper will divert from the norm.  For instance, DA I, 1.5 p. 82 refer to Democracy in 
America, volume 1, part 1, chapter 5, page 82 in the publication by Mansfield and Winthrop. The reason for this is the large number of 
publications of Democracy in America, and verifying quotes may prove frustrating when the gap can be more that one-hundred pages, 
depending on which publication the reader holds.  
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portray the “general features of democratic societies, for which there is not yet a complete 
model.”4 The disparity between the two volumes has been described as where the first volume 
treats the forms of democracy, the second moves to the matter. (Mansfield and Winthrop 
2000:LV) 
Democracy in America contains an analysis and description of the political system in the 
United States, but the more interesting aspects of the book retain a normative and prescriptive 
dimension to them, that has remained politically and theoretically alive since its publication. The 
style resembles a written oration, which was more common in the nineteenth century than 
today. Although the subject at hand is the Unites States, the purpose was the illumination of 
France’s political destiny, and universally, the development of democracy itself. America serves 
only heuristically as a way of achieving this. He wrote to a friend about the aims of the book:  
 
To show people, so far as possible, what one must do to avoid tyranny and degeneration while 
becoming democratic. That is, I think, the general idea by which one can comprehend my book, 
and which will appear on every page of it I now am writing. To labour this sense is in my eyes a 
holy occupation, and for it one should spare neither his money, nor his time, nor his life. (December 
12, 1836, OC:431)  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations 
 
In this thesis, I have chosen in chapter two to fragment and dissect Tocqueville’s theory 
under key headings that I perceive as quintessential. After a short interpretation of some key 
terms, a more thoroughly examination follows of crucial terms deployed by Tocqueville. Such an 
approach has several drawbacks. Tocqueville himself did not present his theories, thoughts and 
reflections in a comprehensive or methodical way. Throughout his work different conceptions 
are intertwined and correlated, theory and practice are often treated simultaneously and the 
same subjects are treated a number of times in different contexts. By fragmenting and 
systematising the different conceptions there is a risk that connections and relations between 
them are lost or weakened, interrupting Tocqueville’s wide-ranging train of thought by artificial 
categorizations. That said, the incentive for choosing this approach is in some way to simplify 
the task the reader faces in understanding and criticising the conceptions as they are treated 
                                                  
4 Letter to John Stuart Mill, December 1840. Tocqueville’s frustration concerning the fact that “the success of the second part of 
Democracy has been less widespread than that of part one.” Furthermore, he writes, “of all the articles written on my book, yours is the 
only one where the author truly masters my thoughts and knows how to express them.” (Zunz and Kahan 2002: 213-14) 
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and presented here. Furthermore, it will hopefully ease the objective of examining the validity 
and relevance of the claims made in chapter 3, where some of Tocqueville’s conceptions are 
employed to understand and analyze certain aspects of modern democracy as mentioned 
previously.  
Evidently, by evaluating certain features of modern democracy and claiming that the 
premises of this assessment are Tocquevillian, the hazard of misinterpretation of theories and 
concepts is excruciatingly clear. In addition, though a large number of able scholars had 
commendably scrutinized Tocqueville’s theories, the different subjects I have chosen in the 
ambition to demonstrate the relevance of Tocqueville may diverge from the customary subjects 
of attention. The focus upon what I conceive as the influential ideas of democracy, such as 
tolerance, universality, virtue, mores, culture, equality and freedom, and the rationale behind 
these ideas – modernity, the Enlightenment and post-modernism – constitutes an incomplete 
and partial field within a complete explanation of contemporary democracy. Employment of 
these concepts as theoretically independent terms proves difficult, since they in many cases are 
interdependent and de facto variations of the same subject matter. I hope that a comprehensible 
and thorough description and constructive usage of these terms will illustrate the relevance of 
Tocqueville as an insightful observer of democracy today. It shall be added that the emphasis 
on culture and ideas are quite different from a Marxist understanding of social organization and 
hierarchy, in the sense that it is not the means of production that determines social structure, 
but the culture of ideas and notions of justice and rights.  
There are many schools of thought that study democracy as a theoretical subject, and these 
provide valuable and insightful understandings of democracy. There are a number of studies 
that employ Tocqueville as a starting point in investigating certain features of democracy, and 
there is a multitude of options in using Tocqueville in an examination of democracy. Perhaps the 
most obvious would be to show causality between the trend of decreasing participation in civil 
associations and an increasing apathy on political issues and voting-participance. Robert 
Putnam, Theda Schopol, and Francis Fukuyama are just a few examples of scholars that have 
used a Tocquevillian understanding in quantitative studies examining this aspect.5 Another 
                                                  
5 Literature that uses Tocqueville in a quantitative and comparative manner is for example (ed.) Edwards, Bob, Foley Michael W. and 
Diani, Mario (2001) Beyond Tocqueville. Civil Society and the Social capital in Comparative Perspective. Hanover, NH.: University Press of 
New England, (ed.) Putnam, Robert (2002) Democracies in Flux. The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. New York: 
Oxford University Press. Fukuyama, Francis (1999) The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the reconstruction of Social Order. New 
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possible field of study would be the thesis of the growing state and its mounting influence of 
responsibilities in the tasks that were once conceived as natural for the private sphere.  
I have chosen to concentrate on the metaphysical aspects of Tocqueville’s reflections, and I 
hope to present valid arguments, which illustrate that his description of democracy’s 
characteristics were principally predisposed by a concern for virtue and intellectual freedom. By 
this, I put forward that Tocqueville’s underlying intention in the depiction of equality and 
freedom, associations, self-interest well understood, religion, local democracy, democratic 
society and democracy’s effect upon democratic man and his mentalité, was primarily that 
democratic man ought to exercise and develop his virtuous capabilities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
York: Touchstone and Schopol, Theda (1997) “The Tocqueville Problem. Civil Engagement in American Democracy” in Social Science 
History. 21:4 (winter 1997) 
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Chapter Two 
 
Understanding Tocqueville; Methodology and Concepts 
 
2.1 Thesis: Structure and Interpretation 
 
The objective of this chapter is to present an explanation and analysis of Tocqueville’s 
theoretical subjects and work concerning his deliberations on certain aspects of democracy; his 
anthropology and views human character and virtue, the role of government and the state, civic 
virtue and associations, the relationship between liberal freedom and democratic equality, the 
role of religion, individualism and materialism, public opinion, tyranny of the majority and 
democratic despotism.  
Although he was a liberal, Tocqueville distinguished himself from the formal liberalism of 
John Locke and his followers (in his own time and ours). He did not think it necessary or wise to 
lay down absolute and all-encompassing universal principles to serve as the formal basis of 
politics. Even though he lays great emphasis to certain virtues, politics should be open-minded 
and pragmatic; he favoured leaving the actual exercise of those rights unstipulated, open to 
experience, and free to be as applied as circumstances permit. His political science is 
concerned with society that is essentially inspired by liberal principles and the nature and 
manner by which these are implemented. One of Tocqueville’s fundamental observations was 
the passion for equality in modern democracy, and his understanding of equality is the starting 
point of his theoretical framework. 
I find it also interesting to observe that Tocqueville distinguished himself from other liberal 
thinkers in the sense that he did not base his anthropological view upon the formal, universal 
rights of man or a ”state of nature” (as conceived by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel 
Kant or Benedict Spinoza). ”Tocqueville looks at the whole soul and at all of democracy. He 
considers individual, society, and government as involved with one another without the 
simplifying state-of-nature abstraction.” (Mansfield & Winthrop 2000:XXVIII) Unlike many 
thinkers, both contemporary and classical, he did not overly emphasize the importance of an 
institutional, representative government. His observational starting-point regarding politics is as 
it is lived and practiced, but what he seeks to understand are the deeper philosophical 
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commitments that political manifestations are based upon. No ideological principle is imposed a 
priori from the outside. Tocqueville does not discuss the best regime; he acknowledged the fact 
that democracy was an inevitable force on the verge of breakthrough in Europe, and was more 
occupied with understanding the changes and consequences that would follow. In this respect, 
one of the crucial reasons Tocqueville travelled to America, was to observe the future society of 
”almost complete equality of social conditions” toward which he believed Europe moving 
inexorably. (Mansfield & Winthrop 2000:XL) 
Categorizing Tocqueville’s method as ’inductive’ or ’deductive’, or as primarily empirical 
rather that theoretical proves difficult. Anthropologically, his observation of the political and 
social organization in the United States, where he analyses institutional and organizational 
aspects, is of an inductive character. At the same time, Tocqueville undertakes to reveal 
democracy’s effect as an ideological construct upon democratic man and society. By 
emphasizing mores, he bypassed institutional and judicial explanations, and instead tried to 
grasp the complex psychological mechanisms that sustain and compose a political culture.6  
 
His conception of the proper fit between society and the political gave primary place to the 
potentially creative activity of citizens, not to the constraining or directive laws of society. 
Democratic individuals could intervene successfully to create free institutions only if they first 
understood the ‘tendencies’ shaping their world, but tendencies and instincts were not social laws. 
(Welch 2001:22) 
 
Among Tocqueville scholars there are different ways of dealing with the ‘light of truth’ 
underlying many of his evaluative judgements and normative presuppositions. One is to ignore 
the issue as peripheral to what is of enduring importance in his work, namely the innovative 
contribution on comparative political sociology and cultural history. This view declines to discuss 
the more philosophical aspects of his thought. A variation of this strategy recognizes that 
Tocqueville often based his interpretations on unacknowledged moral pre-suppositions, but 
argues that such prejudices – or moral clichés - are merely the inevitable biases that make true 
impartiality impossible for any theorist. Their validity is therefore dismissed as unimportant and 
theoretically uninteresting.7 On the other hand, those who deliberately set out to give a wider 
and more complete picture of Tocqueville’s thought, or who are themselves more interested in 
                                                  
6 Webster’s dictionary defines mores as “the fixed customs or folkways of a particular group that are morally binding upon all members of 
the group and necessary to its welfare and preservation <the relationship between law and mores, between the decrees of courts and 
legislatures and the vast body of community beliefs which shape private action>”. 
7 For an in-depth analysis of this subject, see Jon Elster’s discussion in Political Psychology. 
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questions of moral and political philosophy, are obliged to include the philosophical outlook that 
Tocqueville omits.  
Tocqueville himself never explicitly presented a comprehensive methodology in his 
publications. Judging from his private letters, he displays an uncertain and ambivalent attitude 
towards his perceptions and the human ability to uncover universal truth.8 The rhetorical and 
philosophical language that characterized his writing sometimes blurs the structure of his 
arguments. “All discussions of the Tocquevillian ‘method’, then, are more reconstructions than 
critical engagements with a theorist self-conscious about the tools of his trade.” (Welch 
2001:101) Nevertheless, while there are methodological inconsistencies in Tocqueville’s 
theories, there is a set of explanations of the causes of social and political beliefs and behaviour 
in his work. There is wide agreement among Tocqueville scholars that he practiced ‘ideal-
typical’ analysis pre-dating Max Weber. ‘Democracy’, ‘Aristocracy’, the ‘Puritan mind’ are 
abstract types that accentuate certain features of reality, “rendering them internally more logical 
for the purposes of clarity in analysis.” (Welch 2001:102) He described the practise as seeking 
the ‘shape’ or ‘image’ or ‘model’ of a phenomenon; “Beginning from the facts furnished by 
American or French societies, I wished to paint the general traits of democratic societies of 
which no complete model yet exists.”9 Among the ‘general’ causes that explain attitudes and 
behaviour, a people’s mæurs (mores) are the most significant, and constitutes the analytical 
axis of Tocqueville’s examinations. Tocqueville was vigorously attracted to this Montesquieuian 
notion of the ‘spirit’ of the people, in this case the complex of basic attitudes that exist within a 
new democratic cultural formation. As Tocqueville tells us in the introduction, “I confess that in 
America I saw more than America; I sought there an image of democracy itself, of its penchants, 
its character, its prejudices, its passions.” (DA I, Introduction, p. 13) The concept of the social 
state as a significant methodological origin of analysis reflects his belief that in order to extricate 
the essence of democracy’s nature, the solution lays in “the legacies of particular histories and 
in deciphering new patterns of social and political psychology.” (Welch 2001:69)   
                                                  
8 ”When I first began to reflect, I believed that the world was full of demonstrated truths; that it was only a matter of looking carefully in 
order to see them. But when I sought to apply myself to considering objects, I perceived nothing but inextricable doubts […] It is not that 
there are not some truths that merit man’s complete conviction, but be sure they are very few in number.” (Tocqueville to Charles Stoeffels, 
October 22, 1831)  
9 Tocqueville to J.S. Mill,  December 18, 1840 
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Tocqueville never intended to present a general theory on democracy; rather, his works are 
attempts at clarifying concrete conditions of society. He explicitly expressed scepticism towards 
all-encompassing general theories and ideas;  
 
General ideas do not attest to the strength of human intelligence, but rather to its insufficiency, 
because there are no beings in nature exactly alike: no identical facts, no rules indiscriminately 
applicable in the same manner to several objects at once. General ideas are admirable in that they 
permit the human mind to bring rapid judgements to a great number of objects at one time; but on 
the other hand, they never provide it with anything but incomplete notions, and they always make it 
lose in exactness what they give in extent. (DA II, 1.3 p. 411) 
 
It is precisely because in democracies there is a tendency toward general concepts and a 
certain disdain for concrete details that this “practical prudence” is important.  
 
[W]hen there is a subject on which it is particularly dangerous for democratic peoples to indulge in 
general ideas blindly and beyond measure, the best corrective that one can employ is to have them 
occupy themselves with it every day in a practical manner; they will then be forced to enter into 
details, and the details will make them perceptive the weak sides of the theory. (DA II, 1.4 p. 416) 
 
   “The more general a statement and the greater the claim to general validity of a statement 
concerning social phenomena, the less is the probability that any specific phenomena are 
adequately described. In addition, systematic, closed, all-embracing abstract explanations and 
assertions of general laws must ignore the free person acting concretely, must consider him as 
only a cog in the running of a process that cannot be influenced.” (Hereth 1986:84). Tocqueville 
recognized that the political, social, cultural and economic environment exerts considerable 
influence upon the action of the individual. What he dismissed was the democratic tendency of 
historians and social scientists to overly emphasize the structural and historical determinacy 
upon the freedom of will and the leverage of the individual’s action and responsibility upon the 
society in which he operated. “For my part I hate those absolute systems that make all the 
events of history depend on great first causes linked together by the chain of fate and thus 
succeed, so to speak, in banishing men from history of the human race.” (Recollections, 
1970:62) Every important assertion, insofar as significant groups or classes of society take it 
seriously, becomes itself a part of the realm of opinions, ideas, and convictions that determine 
society. Thus, Tocqueville criticizes certain “views” that try to explain the actions of people and 
the fate of whole nations by causes lying outside the decisions of people. 
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2.2 Introduction to Some Important Conceptions 
 
2.2.1. The Influence of Aristotle and Montesquieu 
As Aristotle, Tocqueville understood democracy in contrast to aristocracy – not just as forms 
of government – but ways of life, values and social organization – and considered politics 
comprehensively in the regime in which it operates (politeia).10 Reminiscent of Aristotle, 
Tocqueville uses a classification of regimes, but they differ on an important facet in this regard. 
Aristotle assumed that monarchy, aristocracy and democracy were based on inclinations of 
human nature, and that any one of them may become dominant in certain circumstances. 
Tocqueville, following Montesquieu, particularizes those regimes, taking the circumstances 
rather than human nature as given, thereby setting aside human nature as a permanent 
potentiality beside those circumstances. 
The democracy that Tocqueville describes was foreseen by Montesquieu, but as 
democracy’s extreme and dissolute form: “Such is the difference between a well-regulated 
democracy and one that is not so, that, in the former men are equal only as citizens, but in the 
latter they are equal also as magistrates, as senators, as judges, as fathers, as husbands, or as 
masters.” (Montesquieu: Spirit of the Laws, book VIII, 3) Montesquieu’s descriptions of the “spirit 
of extreme equality” is a corruption of ancient democracy, whereas for Tocqueville this was the 
very principle of modern democracy.  
What distinguished Tocqueville from other political thinkers was that his focus was not the 
classical concept of ‘the best regime,’ or the more contemporary topic of describing and 
justifying a legitimate regime; in this respect, Tocqueville’s liberalism differs from both the 
Middle Ages and antiquity. Although he has tremendous respect and appreciated the classic 
authors, and welcomes the spiritualism and moral elevation of Plato, he does not accept them 
as authorities for modern times; he does not care for the best regime as they do. He cares little 
for ancient metaphysics, and was no supporter of ’the rule of the wise.’ The ancient philosopher 
most recognizable in his influence upon Tocqueville was Aristotle and his ideas on virtue. What 
Tocqueville emphasizes is not an enlightened upper class, but the idea that through an 
                                                  
10 However, there are some fundamental differences between the two; “while Aristotle argues that these two regimes offer an open choice 
ever present to human beings because each is rooted  and fixed in human nature, all human beings always being arguably equal and 
arguably unequal, Tocqueville describes them as distinct historical epochs, once there were aristocracy, now we have democracy 
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independent mind and the exercise of freedom, each individual – in an Aristotelian sense – 
reach an elevated state in the human soul. This observation is crucial in the understanding of 
Alexis de Tocqueville. His main concern was not the political arrangements and institutional 
structures per se, but the ability of each individual to exercise freedom as a form of self-
fulfilment and self-realization. 
 
2.2.2 The Social State 
The social state is ordinarily the product of a fact, sometimes of 
laws, but most often of these two causes united, but once it exists, 
one can consider it as the first cause of most of the laws, customs, 
and ideas that regulate the conduct of nations; what it does not 
produce, it modifies. (DA I, 1.3 p. 45) 
 
The theoretical frame of reference Tocqueville used to analyze and describe the political and 
social conditions of a nation, was the concept of the social state (état social), an analytical sum 
total which connects particular laws, customs, and mores prevailing in a democracy or 
aristocracy. He predicted that democracy, at least in Europe, would be the only social state. 
Analytically, Tocqueville employs three different concepts to describe a nation’s political and 
social system and structure. Initially drawing on Montesquieu’s thesis about the influence of 
geography and climate (this was a starting point for most nineteenth-century anthropologically 
minded voyagers), and the explanation of the American success, he first turned to particularistic 
or accidental causes. The national character, habits, customs, and geography were located in 
the terms circonstances or point de départ, a notion that included both physical factors (such as 
character, size, and location of the land) and historical factors (such as the English and Puritan 
character of the first settlers in the United States). The two other classes of phenomena are 
democratic laws (communal and federal institutions, constitutional forms, and the organization 
of the judiciary) and democratic mores. The laws and mores particular to the United States are, 
according to Tocqueville, different from those operating in England and is therefore an 
attribution of the democratization process itself. Of the three factors that regulate and direct 
American life, Tocqueville argues that  
 
It is therefore mores that render the Americans of the United States, alone among all Americans, 
capable of supporting the empire of democracy; and it is again [mores] that make the various 
Anglo-American democracies more or less regulated and prosperous […] one attributes too much 
importance to laws, and to little to mores. Without doubt, these three great causes serve to 
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regulate and to direct American democracy; but if it were necessary to class them, I would say that 
physical causes contribute less than laws, and laws less than mores. (DA I, 2.9 p. 295) 
 
Tocqueville cared most about contrasting the effects that democracy has produced in 
different settings. In Democracy in America, he argues that certain patterns of social behaviour 
and belief in America are inherent to democracy and hence potentially of great significance for 
pre-democratic France, rather than merely American and hence of only parochial interest. To 
make the argument plausible, he must of necessity ignore or downplay unique historical causes 
of those behaviours. 
Leaving aside the problems of the definition of democracy ‘itself’, how does Tocqueville 
move from a discussion of America’s point de depart, at once geographical and historical, to a 
discussion of those newer laws and mores from which the perceptive analyst may draw out the 
typical ‘shape’ of democracy ‘itself’? In Tocqueville’s analysis, he asserts that the underlying 
premise for understanding laws and mores is the study of a nation’s social state; this implies 
that legal arrangements of a state is the least important factor in the maintenance of a free and 
stable form of democracy. What must be studied and understood are the patterns of cultural and 
social behaviours that shape and are shaped by those laws. Theoretically, this reflects a causal 
point of view that the constitutional laws of a nation represent the formal manifestation of a 
nation’s culture and social state, rather than institutions and constitutions being determinant in 
shaping a nation’s political climate and culture. (This distinction is imperative, as it deals with 
causality and what constitutes a democracy; is it primarily culture or institutions?) This explains 
the comparatively little attention Tocqueville paid to the American constitution in Democracy in 
America; political institutions were of limited value either for good or evil compared to ideas and 
beliefs. Tocqueville comments when one of his friends managed to draw the opposite 
conclusion of his thoughts: “You know my ideas well enough to know that I accord institutions 
only a secondary influence on the destiny of men […] political societies are not what their laws 
make them, but what sentiments, beliefs, ideas, and habits of heart and the spirit of men who 
form them.”11 It follows from this that it is not a particular social or institutional situation that 
gives power to ideas and to the makers of ideas.12 An administrative or electoral structure, 
                                                  
11 Tocqueville to Claude-François de Cordelle, September 17, 1853. Boesche 1985:294 
12 What this implies, is that - in contrast to the classical view of political regimes - no matter how malignant and atrocious the constitution is, 
can it not by nature itself corrupt the citizen. Consequently, no matter how benign and well-meaning the constitution is, it can not “breathe 
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centralized or decentralized, is not in itself sufficient cause for change or the presupposition of 
certain ideas. The environment of opinion and ideas is the crucial factor. It is within the social 
state that the theoretical assumption of universal equality becomes practical reality;   
 
The democratic social state undoes the social bond and places individuals on the same level. Each 
is considered a basic unit of the social body, equal and similar to every other. If follows that what 
moves democratic man can be immediately generalized to the whole of the social body. What 
moves everyone else is immediately believed capable of moving any particular individual. The 
emotional motive in such a situation is the presumptive identification of each with all and all with 
each. (Manent 1996:62) 
 
The principle of equality is the principal normative modus operandi within the social state 
that consequently represents the philosophical nomos of democratic society; it defines the 
boundaries and guidelines of what is morally tolerable. All other conceptions of justice and right 
are subservient to its authority; it is the doxa of democratic mentality – constant, superior and 
righteous. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Enlightenment and the French Revolution 
Enlightenment was not only, or perhaps not even primarily, a scientific 
project, but a political one. The old order was founded on Christianity, and 
free use of reason simply could not be permitted within it, since reason 
accepts no authority above itself and is necessarily subversive. The right to 
freedom of thought is a political right, and for it to exist, there mist be a 
political order that accepts that right. (Bloom 1988:258) 
 
For Tocqueville, the rise of the absolute monarchy and centralization in the seventeenth 
century was linked to the transition to modernity. The general cause of the development of 
absolutism was the passage from one social stage to another, from feudal inequality to 
democratic equality. His standpoint towards this transition and the anthropological shift in the 
sentiment upon human nature and reason (the belief in reason that rested on beliefs about the 
goodness in human nature) expressed by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, was 
ambiguous.  The effects of the universalistic and anti-historical tendencies that distinguished the 
eighteenth century, was largely portrayed by Tocqueville in a concerned manner. ”While 
                                                                                                                                                           
life into liberty in a country where its flame had burned out.” (Kahan 1986:38) On the other hand, I suspect that Tocqueville’s emphasis on 
mores and the neglect of laws, was an deliberate choice to enhance a theoretical point. He spoke very highly of the founding fathers and 
their wisdom, and described Thomas Jefferson as “the most powerful apostle that democracy has ever had.” (DA I, 1.7 p. 249) 
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aristocratic nations, with their inherently restricted social mobility, tended to have overly limited 
ideas of human perfectibility, democratic ones tended to have overly generous beliefs about 
human nature.” (Kahan 2001:19).  
 
As castes disappear, as classes get closer to each other, as men are mixed tumultuously, as their 
usages, customs, and laws vary, as new facts come up, as new truths are brought to light, as old 
opinions disappear and others take their place, the image of an ideal and always fugitive perfection 
is presented to the human mind [… ] Thus, always seeking, falling, righting himself, often 
disappointed, never discouraged, he tends ceaselessly toward the immense greatness that he 
glimpses confusedly at the of the long course that humanity must still traverse. (DA II, 1.8 p. 427) 
 
 
2.2.4 The Democratic Revolution 
A great democratic revolution is taking place among us; all see it, but all do 
not judge it in the same manner. Some consider it a new thing, and taking 
it for an accident, they still hope to be able to stop it; whereas others judge 
it irresistible because to them it seems the most continuous, the oldest, and 
the most permanent fact known in history. (DA I, introduction, p. 3)   
 
Tocqueville stated that the impending modern democracy was a “providential fact” – unlike 
most previous political philosophers, he refrained form joining the search for the single 
legitimate regime that would change the political question from what is best to what is 
universally attainable. The “great democratic revolution” was inevitably unfolding, and “to wish to 
stop democracy would […] appear to be to struggle against God himself.” (DA I, Introduction, p. 
7) The democratic revolution was not defined or understood in political terms, rather his focus of 
attention was the historical and social currents in the democratic torrent; there are no other 
future political regimes but democracy. Throughout Democracy in America, particularly the 
second volume, he is not merely describing and predicting its development, but also examining 
the virtues and defects of democracy. His political philosophy examines the idealistic constructs 
that democracy is built upon, without a normative a priori standpoint whether the democratic 
regime is superior or inferior.  He recognized the immense universal appeal of democracy, and 
his interest was how it would alter men’s thoughts, sentiments and mores, and thus politics and 
governments, not solely in America, but everywhere. Tocqueville’s gravest fear was that 
democracy would evolve into a tyranny of the majority or a democratic despotism; these 
conceptions seem somewhat unintelligible in the pluralistic and open democratic society of 
today. His reflection upon this matter hardly fits well within contemporary democratic political 
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theory, where the attention is predominantly institutional, and a critical normative perspective on 
the democratic regime is per se somewhat inconceivable and susceptible.  
However, though he deemed democracy as an inevitable and irresistible force in the West, 
his concern is what kind of democracy that would characterize the future states of Europe. As 
noted, he believed in the idea that the people are to some degree free to decide its own futures 
and destiny, and that this freedom of choice will best be upheld through the active exercise of 
civil and political liberties. For him, freedom for the individual as a goal in itself was not 
satisfactory; freedom must be applied in conjunction with the exercise of moral agency. “Political 
freedom is, in truth, a sacred thing. There is only one other that deserves the name; that is 
virtue. Yet what is virtue if not the free choice of what is good?” The Tocquevillian liberty 
encompasses not just a guarantee of civil rights and a metaphysical approach to man’s free will, 
but also “some dimension of duty and loyalty to a larger whole, under modern social conditions 
this element grows into full-blown and active participation in collective self-government.” 
(Voyages en Angleterre, quoted in Welch 2001:3)  
The emerging democratic regime was something that distinctly broke with the past, a new 
social order that would profoundly affect society and state. Tocqueville was one of the first 
observers that acknowledged this fact, and although he lacked a complete set of analytical tools 
to describe the full contents of this development, he stated that “a new political science is 
needed for a world altogether new.” (DA I, introduction, p. 7) The new generality has to do with 
aristocratic or democratic man, and only indirectly with man simply.  
 
2.2.5 Liberty 
There is nothing more prolific in marvels that the art of being free, but 
there is nothing harder that the apprenticeship of freedom. (DA I, 2.6 p. 
229) 
 
Tocqueville never defined liberty, much less developed a theory of it.13 When he wrote to 
John Stuart Mill that “I love liberty by taste, equality by instinct and reason”, he was being 
                                                  
13 Tocqueville connected love of freedom to morality and politics in the following manner; “I have always loved freedom instinctively, and all 
my reflections lead me to believe that no moral and political greatness is possible for long without it. I am therefore as strongly attached to 
freedom as to morality, and I am ready to lose some of my tranquillity to achieve it”. Letter to Eugène Stoeffels, July 24, 1836. (Zunz 
2002:153) 
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literally truthful.14 Tocqueville never elucidates upon liberty, or why nations pursue liberty in the 
first place, liberty is simply a value that does not need to be justified. What needs explanation, 
are the attractions of equality in the modern democratic age:    
 
Please note that what I blame is not that we have destroyed the Old Regime, it is the manner in 
which we have demolished it. I am not the adversary of democratic societies […] What saddens me 
[…] is that the inherited vices of our ancestors and our own vice are of such nature, that is seems 
to me very difficult to introduce and animate an ordered liberty among us. But, I confess, I know 
nothing more miserable than a democratic society without liberty. (Letter to Pierre Frelson, 
September 11, 1857, quoted in Kahan 2001:31) 
        
In Tocqueville’s mind, people’s freedom and responsibility are not the result of the working of 
hidden forces or an invisible hand that intervenes if, for example, one gives free reign to the 
passions of self-interest and pursuit of wealth. On the contrary, an important prerequisite of 
freedom is the citizenry’s consciousness of their responsibilities and the worship of freedom for 
its own sake. Opinions and convictions of the citizens that pervade actions and habits are the 
basis of a liberal order.  
Tocqueville’s notion of freedom implies the ‘traditional’ conception of the individual’s rights to 
determine their own lives and providence, but what separates him from most liberal thinkers, is 
the idea that individual freedom alone is not sufficient; in order for freedom to have a purpose, it 
must be exercised within a legal and ethical framework. If freedom is reduced to the private 
sphere of ‘doing what one wants to do’, freedom will become amputated and without a deeper 
sense of purpose. This implies that, in order for a democracy to be vibrant and a fully functional 
political regime, an Aristotelian sense of active practice and participation of freedom in the 
social and political realm is required. For freedom to have a valuable meaning and function, it is 
not sufficient that it is merely an option; it must be practiced and upheld. 
Perhaps the deep-seated ambiguity of liberal theory is the antagonism between the 
individual’s freedom – the sphere of activity where the individual is free to pursuit its goals – and 
the state, which was necessary to supervise and enforce a common set of rules that limited the 
“arbitrary power of individuals over individuals”, in the form of a constitution. (Lively 1962:14) 
The ambiguity lies within the two-pronged perception that the state, which is required to uphold 
order and provide basic needs in order for a society to function, also could evolve into a 
                                                  
14 Tocqueville to J.S. Mill, June 1835. (Boesche 1985:100) 
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coercive apparatus that would constantly cross and contest the desires and ambitions of the 
individual, “a perpetual conflict which in each victory for power involved the frustration of 
individual desires, the imposition of actually felt constraints.” (ibid.) The focus of attention for the 
liberal thinkers would therefore concentrate upon “the methods of restraining power, either by 
constitutional devices – separation of powers, constitutional declarations of rights, parliamentary 
or electoral responsibility – which would make its exercise more difficult, or by theoretical 
principles – natural rights; self-regarding actions – which would mark its legitimate limits.” (Lively 
1962:15) 
To demonstrate what distinguished Tocqueville from mainstream liberalism, this subject 
needs further elaboration; he accepted that the theoretical construction of individual rights and 
equality in the state of nature formed the inclusive normative basis in the universality of 
democracy. He also believed that there was a common recognition of a particular set of basic 
moral standards; all men perceived these as morally valid and binding. However, if these moral 
standards were - in a teleological sense – to fulfil their purpose as guidelines to citizens 
identification and  affirmation of themselves as responsible agents, they had been recognized 
by each citizen individually, as a result of choice, and not because they had been imposed by 
government or society as moral standards. Tocqueville greatest fear, I think, was that 
individuals refused to accept the burden of freedom and choice, since this would drain energy 
and attention from the search for material well-being; 
 
Neither the growth of state activity nor the strengthening grip of public opinion was the root 
problem, for both were sympthiomatic of a more fundamental tendency, the refusal by the 
individual to accept the responsibility of decision. It was a miss-statement of the danger to picture 
government or society as squeezing the individual into a smaller and smaller area of free activity; it 
was nearer to the truth to say that the individual would withdraw into that field allowing government 
to fill the vacuum. The treat to liberty lay as much in men refusing freedom (and its responsibilities) 
as in their being refused it. (Hereth 1986:52) 
 
The growth of the strong centralized state and the abdication of free will to public opinion was 
not necessarily the result of a power which independently arose to infringe upon the freedom of 
the individual; it did not necessarily represent the conquest of government or society over the 
individual; rather, it may signify the voluntary resignation of freedom by individuals themselves. 
This is what haunts Tocqueville throughout his writings and symbolizes the concept of ‘tyranny 
of the majority’ and ‘democratic despotism’; that “the Leviathan that might emerge from social 
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democracy would not be repressive; it would grow not on frustration but in satisfaction of men’s 
psychological needs.” (Lively 1996:15-16) 
 
2.2.6 Rights: Liberty Continued 
After the general idea of virtue I know of none more beautiful than that of 
rights, or rather these two ideas intermingled. The idea of rights is nothing 
other than the idea of virtue introduced in the political world. (DA I, 2.6 p. 
227) 
 
   The relationship between liberty and rights was inseparable in Tocqueville’s mind; they were 
mutually interdependent. His conception of rights and liberty may differ from some of the 
contemporary perceptions of this relationship; in our time, citizens, interest groups and 
politicians emphasize foremost the right of freedom from something. We face different nuances 
in this regard; the freedom from unemployment, from poverty, from sexual harassment, from 
discrimination, while others thinks of the sanctity of the individuals’ private sphere. In the 
Tocquevillian sense, this is not freedom in itself.  
What is imperative to authentic sovereignty of the people is that citizens practice the political 
virtues of open-mindedness and moderation. We shall later examine in depth Tocqueville’s 
notion that rights are defined politically, not socially or economically. This distinction is 
important, since it differs from the notion of rights in modern democracies, which incorporates a 
wider understanding of the term. There are two distinctions which initially comes to mind: first, 
modern rights are not exclusively tied to the individual, but extended to – self-proclaimed or 
politically defined – minorities; on the one hand there are minorities whose characteristics are 
more or less unchangeable; women, children, the disabled, ethnic groups. On the other hand, 
since these rights are associated with changeable and non-discriminating circumstances – 
environmental and health-related risks, the workplace, social security – they primarily centre on 
security, freedom from risk. Secondly, what is common to this modern notion of rights is the fact 
that their implementation does not necessitate active participation of the citizen. Rather, rights in 
the contemporary Western democracy is more likely than not perceived as entitlements, and the 
implementation of these rights usually relies on programs organized by the state and pubic 
expenditure. 
   Freedom and rights consist of more than the formal institutional sphere that grants privileges; 
“he intends more than a sum of legal guarantees or constitutional articles that guarantee 
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protection of the individual from harm, or that set forth the authority of the legislature, the 
executive, the courts, parties or other institutions, and the limits of their power to act and 
decide.” (Hereth 1986:14) Although constitutional guarantee of freedom and rights are vital to 
the provision of the citizen’s acquisition of a free life, it is not synonymous with freedom itself.  
   Tocqueville accentuated that freedom was a practical matter, a certain way of life, and that 
constitutions and legal arrangements merely facilitated the foundations of practicing freedom. 
He was sceptical towards the Enlightenments postulation of universal and natural rights in the 
sense that they were abstract and did not reflect the concrete reality of culture-laden society and 
the necessity of practicing rights. In this regard, Tocqueville resembles Edmund Burke in the 
sense that respect for rights and law-abidingness is the consequence of traditional continuity. 
Nevertheless – believing that democracy was predestined – he differed from Burke by 
supporting equal admission to political rights. Tocqueville’s study on the ideological and 
psychological foundations of democracy persuaded him that inclinations towards individualism 
and materialism was intrinsic features of Western democracy, but that consciousness of virtue 
and exercise of rights might serve to combat and stem this trend.  
   What mattered was the exercise of freedom and rights in conjunction with other individuals; 
what is “transcendentally valuable is not any particular set of rights, but the very capacity to form 
the idea of right and to abide by it.” (Welch 2001:187) Tocqueville was ambiguous towards the 
Enlightenment’s abstract spirit, and it is difficult to detect any comprehensive and consequential 
use of the natural rights jargon in his works. However, there are notions of natural justice, in the 
sense that there exist absolute boundaries to which no legislation can surpass, no matter the 
sovereign’s claims, because higher law “forms the boundary of each people’s right.” 
 
I regard as impious and detestable the maxim that in matters of government, the majority of a 
people has the right to do every thing, and nonetheless I place the origin of all powers in the will of 
the majority. Am I in contradiction with myself? 
A general law exists that has been made or at least adopted not only by the majority of this or that 
people, but by the majority of all men. This law is justice. Justice therefore forms the boundary of 
each people’s right. 
A nation is like a jury charged with representing the universal society and with applying the justice 
that is law. Ought the jury that represents society have more power than the society itself for which 
it applies the laws? 
Therefore, when I refuse to obey an unjust law, I do not deny to the majority the right to command; 
I only appeal from the sovereignty of the people to the sovereignty of the human race. (DA II, 2.7 p. 
240) 
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   This resembles the Lockean notion of the right to disobey unjust laws, based on a 
transcendent idea of the divine or/and natural rights of man. The Tocquevillian notion of 
freedom is the freedom for political citizens to act and perform by self-government, in 
cooperation with citizens in a political community. In order for democracy to reach its fullest 
potential, the motivation for citizens acting together, must be based in the aspiration of 
maintaining their political institutions, i.e. that political activity is perceived as an end in itself. 
Therefore, freedom is not freedom from politics, but with politics. The implementation of political 
freedom provides opportunity to shape one’s own providence, but this is simultaneously done in 
conjunction with other individuals in the society. Man is a social being, and if he so autonomous 
that he is detached from society, he is either an animal or a god.15 
 
2.2.7 Mores 
The more I study […] the cause of changes in this world, the more I remain 
convinced that everything in politics in nothing but consequence and 
symptom, except for the ideas and sentiments reigning among a people, 
which are the true causes of everything else. (Tocqueville in letter to Louis 
Bouchitté, September 23, 1853) 
 
It is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigour. A 
degeneracy in these is a canker which soon eats to the heart of its laws and 
constitution – Thomas Jefferson16 
 
An essential term in Democracy in America is mæurs or mores, patterns of social thought 
and behaviour that reinforce each other – or pull against each other – and settle into cultural 
practices. Initially, it may be constructive to present what Tocqueville meant by mores: 
 
I understand here the expression mæurs in the sense the ancients attached to the word mores;      
not only do I apply it to mores properly so-called, which one could call habits of the heart, but to the 
different notions that men possess, to the various opinions that are current in their midst, and to the 
sum of ideas of which the habits of the mind are formed. I therefore comprehend under this word 
the whole moral and intellectual state of a people. (DA I, 2.9 p. 275) 
 
The world of politics itself turns out to have a culture, history, and sustaining mæurs. 
”Tocqueville, then, attempted to fathom the intricate psychological mechanisms that sustain a 
political culture and to assess the weight of these practices on contemporary action.” (Welch 
                                                  
15 This follows from Aristotle’s notion of the state and the individual; “It follows that the state belongs to the class of objects which exist by 
nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. Any one who is by nature and not simply by ill-luck has no state is either too bad or too 
good, either subhuman or superhuman…” (The Politics 1253 a1-5) 
16 Quoted in Hunter 2000:6 
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2001:22) The liberalism of Tocqueville is not based on law or on the sovereignty of the 
legislator, as does that of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Partly derived from Montesquieu, 
who feared that relying solely on institutional laws could be as hostile to freedom as was the 
devotion to virtue in ancient times, “both the fearfulness of law and self-sacrifice in virtue are too 
demeaning on men. By asking so much, law and virtue humiliate those whom they are 
supposed to empower or ennoble.” (Mansfield & Winthrop 2001:XXXV) Tocqueville claims that 
democracy is potentially hostile to individual rights, which are aristocratic in origin and character 
(DA II 4.4), yet the great theorists of rights – Hobbes, Locke, and Kant – were all explicitly 
against aristocracy. How can this be explained? 
Now, Tocqueville recognized that a political culture solely based on morality or virtue – 
particularly his aristocratic conception – was implausible in the democratic social state, given 
the particular features of it. However, this is not to say that morality was absent from his political 
thinking, as he links rights not to interest but to virtue:  
 
It is with the idea of rights that men have defined what licence and tyranny are […] There are no 
great men without virtue; without respect for rights there is no great people: one can say that there 
is no society; for, what is a union of rational and intelligent beings among whom force is the sole 
bond? (DA I, 2.6 p. 227) 
 
Tocqueville’s concern was then; what genus of morality is feasible in a democratic society? 
He acknowledged that the desire for material well-being was a determinant force in 
democracies. How, if possible, can one prevent this craving from becoming excessively 
dominant? Likewise, what is required for avoiding extreme individualism developing into political 
apathy? 
Mores form the basis of all social and political institutions; essentially, the customary 
conventions, patterns of expectation, ‘habits of the heart,’ principles of justice and order; these 
constitute social institutions. Beyond the formal procedures that constitute the legal and 
constitutional system of a state, the authoritative power that is embodied in it needs to 
correspond to the general principles of justice and common standards which is held in society: 
otherwise the formal structure of power will not be perceived as fully representative and 
legitimate by the people. Tocqueville’s centre of attention in order to ‘understand’ a society, 
then, was not the constitutional and institutional arrangements, but the generally held ideas and 
 
 
26
standards, “that common language by virtue of which alone men can be said to form a society.” 
(Lively 1962:236)  
Methodologically, there is another important aspect of his conception of mores, its 
resemblance to the Aristotelian notion of human nature, which was teleological. In this sense, 
Tocqueville’s liberalism can be interpreted as teleological: 
 
[b]ecause its values of liberty, individuality, and diversity were based on an idea of human nature in 
which these values were fundamental human needs. Embodied in this concept of human nature 
was the idea that certain kinds of needs had to be fulfilled for a human being to teach his or her 
highest and fullest expression, and that such fulfilment was a factual criterion for defining the good 
and the virtuous. Since among these needs was participation in society, political participation was 
thus a good in itself. (Kahan 2001:83). 
 
However, in the emerging modern democracy Tocqueville recognized that the traditional 
notion of liberty within Liberalism would be challenged by the most archetypal of all democratic 
principles: the principle of equality.  
 
2.3 Equality 
 
The gradual development of equality of conditions is therefore a providential 
fact, and it has the principal characteristics of one: it is universal, it is 
enduring, each day it escapes human power; all events, like all men, serve 
its development (DA, introduction, p. 6) 
 
Men will be perfectly free because they will all be entirely equal; and they will 
all be perfectly equal because they will all be entirely free. This is the ideal 
toward which democratic peoples tend. (DA II, 2.1 p. 479) 
 
2.3.1 The Enlightenment and the Equality of Reason 
It was during the French Revolution that the Enlightenment project of a ‘science of man’ 
began its transformation into the nineteenth-century search for a meta-social science. “The term 
‘science sociale’ […] referred to a body of knowledge that would allow one to identify the natural 
needs of society – for freedom or equality or rights or property – that had been ignored or 
despised by allegedly unnatural aristocratic governments.” (Welch 2001:13-14) Essential to the 
aristocratic system was the degree of individual freedom determined by hereditary authority of 
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one person over another. Democracy replaced this tradition by the “idea of individual consent.” 
(Gregg 2000:39) 
Although never explicitly postulated, the logic of the connection between a universal set of 
truths about human psychology and the desirability of universal equality in rights seemed 
obvious from the very definition of all people as conscious creatures endowed with reason. In 
‘the state of nature’, the principle of equality is a theoretical design in a hypothetical theory, 
where man as a solitary being rationally chooses to form a political society. This principle has 
become praxis in the democratic reality, and has produced the doctrinaire argument; “since 
individuals are judicially equal, they should be regarded as equals and have equal results to 
show for equal exertions and from the mere fact of equal existence. The kind of equal result 
that most recommends itself to most democrats is in material well-being or comfort”. (Mansfield 
& Winthrop 2000:LXVII) 
Tocqueville distinguished between the theoretical liberal principles, formal by design in order 
to protect each individual in his own right, and real-life liberal society, where the liberal principle 
of freedom inescapably must be subjected to the principle of equality. Traditional liberalism 
declares that all men are created equal, but they are only equal in the state of nature before 
they have consented to civil society and its inevitable inequalities. Tocqueville’s objection is that 
the theoretical justification of equality in the state of nature tends to become a practical 
justification of equality in society as well, where the formal principle of equality has a constant 
uniforming and conforming effect. Formal liberalism relies on institutions and a legalistic 
understanding of duty and rights – in which Immanuel Kant is the ultimate proponent - instead of 
civic virtue and mores.17 Tocqueville believes that the working of institutions requires virtue, not 
lofty virtue, but the virtue available in democracy ranging from raw intractability to active self-
interest to moderate ambition. The modern liberalism of John Rawls or Robert Nozick does not 
recognize, or at least not emphasize, that formal practices and institutions in a democracy have 
to be defended against the idleness and indifference of a democratic people, or that the 
                                                  
17 “It only remains for men to create a good organisation of the state […] the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation 
of devils (as long as they possess understanding).” (Kant, Perpetual Peace, First Supplement: On the Guarantee of a Perpetual Peace. 
1991:112) However, the argument above is not employed to illustrate some degree of ‘immorality’ or ‘utilitarianism’ of this particular 
pedigree of liberalism. On the contrary, Immanuel Kant and the political thinkers influenced by him are highly moral in their theoretical 
postulations. In this regard, I interpret Tocqueville as adherent of formal rights and duties in order to guarantee the individual from arbitrary 
law and state. Nevertheless, Tocqueville sternly believed that formal rights were insufficient by their own force in order to create/maintain 
liberal society; as frequently pointed out during this thesis, a deeper understanding of virtues and their practice are fundamental to support 
successful formal liberalism.   
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implementation and maintenance of constitutional arrangements is dependent upon a political 
culture that supports it. Tocqueville’s concern in this regard is not primarily economically 
motivated, but of an intellectual and moral nature, as his main worry was that deficient exercise 
of political liberty would degrade and deflate the independence of man and his potential to be an 
active and virtuous political citizen. Tocqueville feared that this was particularly a hazard in 
democracies, since the principle of equality would exert greater attraction to democratic man 
than freedom:  
 
Freedom has manifested itself to men in different times and in different forms; it is not attached 
exclusively to one social state, and one encounters it elsewhere than in democracies. It therefore 
cannot form the distinctive characteristic of democratic centuries. 
The particular and dominating fact that makes those centuries unique is equality of conditions; the 
principal passion that agitates men in those times is the love of this equality. (DA II, 2.1 p. 480) 
 
Following the logic of equality of conditions as a dominant normative aspiration, individuals 
are theoretically positioned in the equal judicious and political echelon in the democratic social 
state. Every individual is considered a basic entity of this social body, theoretically equal and 
equivalent to every other. As a result, the social bonds between citizens are hypothetically 
disengaged, in the sense that all hierarchies are dissolved and all obligations are voluntary. The 
only natural social bonds exist within the family, and even these bonds have become 
increasingly redundant, particularly the notion that a child naturally grows up with a mother and 
father. As equal beings, there is no natural point of reference for the democratic man to identify 
himself with, except the society that is comprised of those like him:  
 
If follows that what moves democratic man can be immediately generalized to the whole of the 
social body. What moves everyone else is immediately beloved capable of moving any particular 
individual. The emotional motive in such a situation is the presumptive identification of each with all 
and all with each. Everything that prevents or appears to prevent, hinders or appears to hinder, this 
identification is a source of anxiety. What threatens this identification is inequality and all that calls 
it to mind or anticipates it. (Manent 1996:62) 
 
2.3.2 Equality as Justice 
Tocqueville’s understanding of the equality of conditions was complex; he understood that for 
liberty to prevail in a democratic society, some answerability and sense of responsibility to one’s 
related peers in society is required. A functioning democratic state – as a single dominion that is 
a theoretical, ideological and political construct – is dependent upon the allegiance and loyalty 
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of the citizenry. If significant constellations of the citizenry is adherent toward some ethnic, 
religious or tribal faction whose loyalty and culture is distinctive by their exclusiveness in relation 
to other beliefs, groups or individuals, the premises for a democratic state beyond institutional 
and formal structures are feeble and improbable. 
Tocqueville’s emphasis on the equality of conditions reflects his understanding of 
democracy: modern societies have a ”principle” to which everything that characterizes them 
must be referred, and equality of conditions is not a single characteristic among others, it is the 
”generative fact” from which other normative principles are deduced.18 The principle of equality 
is the normative epicentre of democratic societies, and it prevails in them all, more or less.  
 
The gradual development of equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact, and it has the 
principal characteristics of one: it is universal, it is enduring, each day it escapes human power; all 
events, like all men, serve its development. (DA I, introduction, p. 6) 
 
Yet, why is this necessarily so? This perception of equality originates from Tocqueville’s 
interpretation that the democratic social state comprises those like oneself (semblables), which 
is the general and inclusive theoretical abstract idea of mutual classification and recognition of 
democratic individuals through the principle of equality. With the notion of semblables, the equal 
and sovereign individual of ‘the state of nature’ transmutes from philosophical abstraction to 
political fact. The universalistic nature of democratic humanism renders equality of conditions 
not defined or constricted by social groups or national borders; if one’s countrymen are like 
oneself, so too are persons in all countries.  
 
Since all individuals in a democracy regard themselves and are accepted as equal, other 
individuals are not really different form oneself but similar. They are not really other in the deep 
sense implied by the dichotomy of self-other to be found in Hegel’s theory or it’s variants […] The 
democrat considers others to be like himself, and of they are truly different, he sees them to be 
himself regardless. He ignores or flattens out any differences that might call equality into question. 
(Mansfield & Winthrop 2000:XLVII)  
 
What truly separates democracy from other political regimes and makes it unique and 
incomparable, is democracy’s primary principle of unlimited inclusiveness; it lacks a “principled 
justification for exclusion.” (Wolin 2001:61) Every human being, regardless of race, gender, age, 
social status, any discriminating feature, is entitled to a basic set of human rights. This is the 
                                                  
18 Undeniably, this may seem as an inflexible and somewhat ‘exaggerated’ argument. What is implied here, is that no argument can in its 
consequence normatively legitimize inequality as a guiding principle of justice.  
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essence of the semblable; it encompasses everyone, and given its abstract nature, it has no 
logical end-point. There can never be sufficient equality; there will always be new inequalities to 
condemn, always some group (‘minority’) who can claim injustice referring to prior historical 
discrimination and appealing to the principle of equality. Its movement is perpetual, and the 
greater the level of measurable equality becomes (measured in economic terms that is, which is 
the democratic currency of just distribution), the more will trivial and minor inequalities be 
considered agonizing and excruciating.  
 
The hatred that men bear for privilege is increased as privileges become rarer and less great, so 
that one would say that democratic passions are more inflamed in the very times they find the least 
nourishment […] When all conditions are un-equal, there is no inequality great enough to offend 
the eye, whereas the smallest dissimilarity appears shocking in the midst of general uniformity; the 
sight of it becomes more intolerable as uniformity is more complete. It is therefore natural that the 
love of equality grows constantly with equality itself; in satisfying it, one develops it. (DA II, 4.3 p. 
644-45) 
 
Given the eternal discovery of new inequalities, it entails an escalating system of rules that 
aims to regulate and supervise the equalization of inequalities. Jack Lively asserts that “For it is 
only within such systems, as rule-following or rule-obeying units, that men can hope for 
equality.”19 (Lively 1962:241) The only acceptable supervisor that democratic man can 
subordinate himself to in following these regulations, is the common representative of the 
people – the central state – that grows proportionately to the institutionalization of righteous 
equality.  
Concerning the theoretical principle of the sovereign individual, Tocqueville maintains that 
this principle is practically unsustainable; the premise that each individual can judge everything 
for himself is simply artificial. Nevertheless, given the appeal that the rationality of the 
democratic doctrine wields, individuals are trapped by a contradiction; since democratic man is 
presumed equal and equally competent of rationally calculating how to live one’s life, everyone 
is also equally incapable of approaching any common, transcendent moral authority for 
directional assistance.20 Thus, the paradox that arises is that in the modern democratic state, 
where everyone theoretically is equally free to implement choices of his own, and the 
                                                  
19 In a Weberian sense, the scientific method and bureaucratic rationality that characterizes Western democracies enables minute and 
detailed regulations that will be executed in a disciplined manner without commotion by the majority of the citizenry.  
20 The only legitimate sources of authority, which will be examined later, is either public opinion – the general expression of opinion held by 
the greatest numbers of sovereign individuals, and the central state – the general expression of political will held by the greatest number of 
sovereign individuals.  
 
 
31
abundance of choices is wider than any one time in history, modern democratic man has fewer 
guiding principles for making moral choices. This follows from the assumption that since I am a 
sovereign being with equal rights, and these rights are equal to all, and my choices are the 
result of my sovereignty, no one has the right to criticise my choices by any moral standard, this 
would be an infringement on my sovereignty as an equal and free being. Objectively, there is no 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ way of life, there are only different ‘lifestyles’, which are ‘selected’ according to 
subjective measures; all ‘lifestyles’ – the voluntary choice of the independent individual – are 
equally tolerable and hence any criticism of them are tantamount to the cardinal vice of 
democratic societies: intolerance. 
 
Men who live in democratic times of equality are therefore only with difficulty led to place the 
intellectual authority to which they submit outside and above humanity. It is in themselves or in 
those like themselves that they ordinarily seek the sources of truth. (DA II, 1.2 p. 408) 
 
“All human bonds are politicized at the same time that the political bond is naturalized. To 
say the same thing more precisely, the influence of one individual over another (in whatever 
kinds of relationship) can be exercised legitimately only if it conforms to the principles that 
govern relations between equal citizens.” (Manent 1996:9) The gravitational centre of the liberal 
rights tips to the side of equality. To affirm the equal liberty of all citizens amounts to affirming 
equality first;  
 
One can imagine an extreme point at which freedom and equality touch each other and intermingle. 
Let me suppose that all citizens concur in the government and that each has an equal right to concur 
in it.  
Then with none differing from those like him, no one will be able to exercise a tyrannical power; men 
will be perfectly free because they will all be entirely equal; and they will be perfectly equal because 
they will be entirely free. This is the ideal toward which democratic peoples tend. (DA II 1.1 p. 479) 
 
It follows that, in Tocqueville’s eyes, the ideal of democratic liberty is simultaneously fulfilled 
and put in danger in democratic society. It is fulfilled regarding its strongest inclination, equality, 
and it is put in danger regarding its weakest, liberty. 
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2.3.3 The Classless Society? 
The proletariat was the logical extension of the bourgeoisie, and its 
demand for the abolition of the last remaining in equality, the inequality of 
property, is simply the logical extension of the struggle against other 
inequalities. (Kahan 2001:54) 
 
The principle of equality in the West has established rules that by ambition are universally 
applicable, and a central state whose vital function is to enforce these rules justifiably. The 
arrangement and assortment of formal rules and regulations that aims at implementing equality 
of conditions in Western democracies is unprecedented in human history. In this sense, 
Tocqueville visualized a ‘classless’ society. However, this visualization is dissimilar to a Marxist 
interpretation, where the notion of class renders that disparity in outlook and manner is 
determined and explained by economic function. What Tocqueville perceived as inherently 
democratic, was that democracy, based on the principle of equality, would demolish the 
hierarchical society that was separated into factions with distinguishable and distinct outlooks 
and mores. Tocqueville acknowledged that democratic society would advance general 
economic prosperity and equality, but this was not what caused the evaporation of classes. In 
the democratic society there would still be differentiation regarding economic and social 
position, there would still be privileged and disadvantaged stratums; “what would go would be 
the division of society into groups with distinctive mores.” (Lively 1962:244) A comprehension of 
Tocqueville’s insight concerning this subject requires acknowledgement of pre-democratic 
society, where the separation between classes was located in an idiosyncratic difference in 
areas such as manners, hereditary social positions, sense of obligation, social influence, 
identification and perception of rights. Hence, although there are economic differences, 
economic ownership in its own right does not constitute explanans in the explanandum of what 
defines and characterizes ‘class.’ Tocqueville deducts empirically from a comparative analysis 
between feudal classes, and between feudal and democratic times.  
 
Feudal institutions rendered one very sensitive to the ills of certain men, but not to the miseries of 
the human species. They gave generosity rather than mildness to mores, and although they 
prompted great devotion, they did not give birth to genuine sympathy; for there is real sympathy 
only among people who are alike; and in aristocratic centuries, one sees those like oneself only in 
the member’s of one’s caste.21 (DA II, 3.1 p. 536) 
                                                  
21 Tocqueville comments that members of a class lacks genuine comprehension of the difficulties of other classes; there is no real sense of 
identification with other individuals if they belong to another class: “When the chronicles of the Middle Ages, who all belonged by their birth 
to or their habits to the aristocracy, relate the tragic end of a noble, it is with infinite sorrow; whereas they recount the massacre and 
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   Equality of conditions as a normative understanding of justice comprises the common 
identification and understanding between democratic citizens; yes, there are rich and poor 
people in Western democracies, but these do not constitute a separate class in the sense that 
they have normatively different outlooks and sense of justice from that of the middle class, 
which forms the substantial majority of all Western democracies. There is virtually a unanimous 
consent in the West that all citizens are entitled to equal political rights, and that every human 
being has the right to be equally treated as a sovereign being independently of any 
discriminating feature. This common perception is what Tocqueville identifies as inherently 
democratic and distinct. Furthermore, equality of conditions fosters a common understanding 
and identification between citizens (semblables) and enables men to feel compassion for others: 
 
When ranks are almost equal in a people, all men having nearly the same manner of thinking and 
feeling, each of them can judge the sensations of all the others in a moment: he casts a rapid 
glance at himself, that is enough for him. There is therefore no misery that does not conceive 
without trouble and whose extent a secret instinct does not discover for him. It makes no difference 
whether it is a question of strangers or of enemies: imagination immediately puts him in their place. 
It mixes something personal with his pity and makes him suffer himself while the body of someone 
like him is torn apart.  
In democratic centuries, men rarely devote themselves to one another; but they show a general 
compassion for all members of the human race. (DA II, 3.1 p. 538) 
 
Now, it can be argued that numerous social groupings in democratic society does not match 
the ‘classless’ democratic society, i.e. on one side ‘subcultures,’ radical ‘protest-groups’ 
(environmentalists, feminists, ‘anti-globalists’) and wealthy, productive clusters on the other are 
perceived and characterized as a class (given the fact that there is an wide acceptance within 
Western democracies that wealth is an significant determinant in measuring social status and 
individual merit). However, this is beside the point; Tocqueville himself described through the 
concept of individualism that democratic mentality facilitates for democratic man to “establish 
themselves in some form of immediate social community, in circles whose very value lays in 
their exclusiveness.” (Lively 1962:244) Tocqueville rejected the notion that groupings of this 
nature constituted “classes properly so-called,” or that “the prestige given to wealth simply 
reconstructed an old hierarchy on new standards.” (Lively 1962:245) Wealth as a sole criterion 
                                                                                                                                                           
tortures of men of the people all in one breath and without frown. It is not that these writers felt a habitual hatred or a systematic scorn for 
the people. War between the various classes had not yet been declared. They obeyed an instinct rather that a passion; as they did not 
form a clear idea for themselves of the sufferings of the poor man, they had a weak interest in his lot. (DA II, 3.1 p. 536) 
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does not involve social or political responsibilities, or by design alter political consciousness and 
conduct.  
A coherent group that has similar normative, political, social and economic outlooks in 
common defines the Tocquevillian perception of class. Further, recognition entails assessment 
of public status and function, identifiable power and duties.22 Coherency implies that a class 
does not appear or disappear conditioned by fluctuating taste and opinion. To do so, would be 
to equalize the definition of ‘class’ and ‘political movement.’  
To conclude that we live in a classless society would be a misinterpretation of Tocqueville; 
although the middle-class in Western democracies is predominant, perhaps even constitutes the 
‘democratic class,’ Tocqueville’s ‘classless society’ is first and foremost a warning of the 
dangers of exaggerated equality and sameness:23  
 
It was through the egalitarian insistence that men are alike and that this likeness should be 
recognized in similar political, legal and economic treatment and in similar social behaviour that the 
classless society should arise. And it was this pressure towards conformity that constituted the root 
danger to liberty. (Lively 1962:245) 
 
Exaggerated democratic equality could also cause a phenomenon that at first hand seems to 
be the antonym of equality: individualism. Conceptually these terms at first glance seem 
contradictory; the modern notion of individualism incorporates both the liberal perception of the 
free individual (in relation to the state), and the radical view of an overly egoistic individual. 
However, Tocqueville sees individualism in light of the enlightenments emphasis of the rational 
and sovereign individual - fully capable of making its own decisions – and the democratic 
principle of equality.  
 
                                                  
22 The mainstream entertainment establishment, by making them widely accessible to consumers and thereby making them profitable, 
usually quickly absorbs the so-called sub-cultures that continuously emerge in ‘opposition’ to ‘conventional’ society and ‘the system’. The 
‘hippie’ movement, punk-rock, hip-hop, house, etcetera have all become non-provoking, streamlined and acceptable to the consuming 
masses. It is noticeable that the fashionable ‘sub-cultures’ of every young generation is increasingly consolidated in or associated with the 
entertainment industry. Young people are rarely involved with an independent political movement that questions the politically acceptable 
values (governed by the principle of equality and egalitarianism). On the contrary – and almost without exception – the loudest and most 
radical movements (before becoming consumers an masse) appeal for more equality, based on justice and ‘fairness’ while declaring that 
individual freedom and manoeuvrability should wield as much importance as equality is generally considered ‘unjust’ and associated with 
‘egoism’, greed and lack of ‘solidarity’.  
23 Tocqueville commented in Recollections that in France after 1830 the “triumph of the middle class was decisive and so complete that the 
narrow limits of the bourgeoisie encompassed all political powers, franchises, prerogatives, indeed the whole government, to the exclusion, 
in law, of all beneath it and, in fact, of all that had once been above it. Thus the bourgeoisie became not only the sole director of society, 
but also, one might say, its cultivator. It settled into every office, prodigiously increased the number of offices, and made a habit of living of 
the public Treasury almost as much as from its own industry.” (Recollections, p. 5)   
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2.4 Individualism and Materialism 
 
Materialism is a dangerous malady of the human mind in all nations; but 
one must dread it particularly in a democratic people because it combines 
marvellously with the most familiar vice of the heart in these peoples.  
Democracy favours the taste for material enjoyments. This taste, if it 
becomes excessive, soon disposes men to believe that all is nothing but 
matter; and materialism in turn serves to carry them toward these 
enjoyments with an insane ardour. Such is the fatal circle into which 
democratic nations are propelled. (DA II, 2.15 p. 519) 
 
2.4.1 Individualism 
Equality is a presupposition of individualism, because everyone, 
regardless of social status or group identity, is held to reason well enough 
about his own affairs. (Mansfield & Winthrop 2000:LXVI) 
 
I consider this topic as one of the principal subjects in the discussion on Tocqueville. 
Especially in volume II of Democracy in America Tocqueville contemplates on how democracy 
will continue to transform men’s thought and sentiments and virtues, and thereby politics and 
government, not just in America, but everywhere. The term ‘individualism’ signifies the 
ambiguity of democracy; its principle of individual sovereignty contains both the potential of the 
independent and politically engaged ‘lawgiver-citizen’ and of the narrowly self-centred citizen 
who lacks any sense of communal responsibility. The latter is a result of individualism, which 
represents democracy’s latent, shattering consequence on civil life.  First, it is important to 
underline the fact that when Tocqueville uses the term “individualism”, it must be distinguished 
from selfishness: 
 
Selfishness is a passionate and exaggerated love of oneself which brings man to relate everything 
to himself and to prefer himself to everything. Individualism is a deliberate and peaceful sentiment 
which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellow men and withdraw apart 
with his family and friends. In such a way, after having created a small society for his convenience, 
he voluntarily abandons society at large to itself […] Selfishness is a vice as old as the world. It 
scarcely belongs more to one form of society than to another. Individualism is of democratic origin, 
and it threatens to develop as conditions become more equal. (DA II, 2.2 p. 482-483) 
 
Individualism is a particular feature and constant potential of the democratic social state in 
which individuals are sovereign and consequently theoretically independent of one another on 
the societal level. “It is the reflection and affirmation in the soul of each of his social condition. It 
is the affirmation by the individual of his self-sufficiency.” (Manent 1996:54) Ideologically, 
individualism is a progeny of the Enlightenment’s notion of man’s autonomy, which constitutes 
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the sovereignty of every individual. Hence, as ‘individualism’ is not synonymous with selfishness 
or egoism, but rather the democratic man’s inward focus and the cause of a society of atomized 
individuals, it must be understood in light of the philosophical heritage of Descartes. In this view, 
democratic man is rationally disposed to “reject any obligation or article of faith that has not 
been subjected to personal inquiry.” (Zetterbaum 1967:60)  
 
In the sixteenth century, the reformers submit to individual reason some of the dogmas of the 
ancient faith; but they continue to exclude all others from discussion. In the seventeenth, Bacon, in 
the natural sciences, and Descartes, in philosophy properly so-called, abolish the received 
formulas, destroy the empire of traditions, and overturn the authority of the master. 
The philosophers of the eighteenth century, finally generalizing the same principle, undertake to 
submit the objects of all beliefs to the individual examination of each man. (DA II, p. 404-405) 
 
    However, Tocqueville’s concept of individualism must not be confused with individuality, 
which asserts a self-governing and self-conscious individual. Tocqueville’s concept of 
individualism has two dimensions; first, it is actually intertwined with the principle of equality; it 
is the description of a society in which “each individual perceives himself as the basic unit of 
society, similar and equal to all other basic units.” (Manent 1996:54) Second, in a democratic 
society where individualism is a salient feature, it does not insinuate ‘egoism’, but an atomistic 
society, comprised of socially ‘detached’ individuals with voluntary and casual social bonds to 
other individuals. Atomism signifies the retreat from social responsibility by the individual, 
where he “becomes the centre of a tiny private universe consisting of himself and his 
immediate circle of family and friends.” (Zetterbaum 1987:765) Secondly, it incorporates 
Tocqueville’s fear that within this private sphere the democratic individual’s passion for private 
well-being will become dominant in the perception of ‘the good life,’ and hence neglecting the 
political responsibility of the democratic citizen, which connotes apathy and disinterest. 
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2.4.2 Materialism and the Passion for Well-being 
We shall see that among all the passions that equality gives birth to 
or favours, there is one that it renders particularly keen and that is 
sets in the hearts of all men at the same time: the love of well-
being. The taste for well-being forms the salient and indelible 
feature of democratic ages. (DA II, 1.5 p. 422) 
 
What attaches the human heart most keenly is not the peaceful 
possession of a precious object, but the imperfectly desire to 
possess it and the incessant fear of loosing it. (DA II, 2.10 p. 506) 
 
The philosophical doctrine of democratic society, as developed by Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke, presumes that in order to deliver man from the evils that belonged to differences of 
opinion (religious opinion, above all), it was “necessary to ground social maxims on a principle 
that no man could deny, which would escape doubt and contradiction because it would not be 
based on an opinion of man and the world, but a passion, the strongest and most universal 
passion, the preservation of one’s life, and preferably in the most comfortable way possible.” 
(Manent 1996:55) This doctrine paves the way for the passion of well-being. What is distinctive 
of the search for well-being and materialism in democratic nations is not its presence; the 
“desire for well-being is universal”, and thereby not a particular feature of democracy, rather, it is 
the intensity and the nature of materialism which takes place. (DA II, 2.18 p. 525) 
 
I seek a passion that is natural to men who are excited and limited by the obscurity of their origin or 
the mediocrity of their fortune, and I find none more appropriate than the taste for well-being. The 
passion for material well-being is essentially a middle-class passion; it grows larger and spreads 
with this class, it becomes preponderant with it. From there is reaches the higher ranks of society 
and descends within the people. (DA II, 2.10 p. 507) 
 
Two threads intertwine and reinforce each other in Tocqueville’s arguments: first, the now 
universal pursuit of material self-interest, and second, the pervasive psychological effects of the 
passion for equality itself. He observes that the desire for well-being, present in every human 
society, takes on a cultural and social preference in democratic times that is unprecedented.  
Tocqueville’s scepticism towards materialism was not an aristocratic condescension of profit, 
nor did he find it morally ‘debasing’ to aspire for material well-being. His warning is that 
materialism in democratic societies is potentially disposed to – and inclined to – becoming the 
primary attraction in the hierarchy of goals for human activity. Its threat lays in the perception of 
an exclusive predominance of materialism in democratic times, which “makes individual 
advantage the citizen’s guiding rule and society’s dominant principle,” and thereby fosters a 
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narrow self-interest and a rigorous attentiveness in the accomplishment of status by wealth. 
(Hereth 1986:60) Constricted to achieve this goal alone, citizens are left with “little time or 
inclination for deliberating about shared long-term interests, such a focus saps for the mental 
energy necessary for political engagement.” (Welch 2001:75) 
 
When the taste for material enjoyments develops in one of these people more rapidly that 
enlightenment and the habits of freedom, there comes a moment when men are swept away and 
almost beside themselves at the sight of the new goods they are ready to grasp. Preoccupied with 
the sole care of making a fortune, they no longer perceive the tight bond that unites the particular 
fortune of each of them to the prosperity of all. There is no need to tear from such citizens the 
rights they posses; they willingly allow them to escape. The exercise of their political duties 
appears to them a distressing contretemps that distracts them from their industry. If it is a question 
of choosing their representatives, of giving assistance to authority, of treating the common thing in 
common, they lack the time; they cannot waste their precious time in useless work. (DA II, 515) 
 
 
This passage further illuminates the connection between individualism and materialism; 
individualism is the psychological prerequisite of the de-politization of society, where the citizen 
withdraws into the private sphere and materialism, the ideology that reigns within it. The 
connections to politics are primarily determined by self-interest, which – logically shaped by 
materialism – are of an economic nature. The politically detached citizen is not a new 
phenomenon; the portrayal fits the idiots described by Plato and Aristotle, the private man who 
has nothing to do with politics. It is important to bear in mind that Tocqueville’s notion of 
materialism represents more than the desire of physical possession of goods, it contains a 
metaphysical dimension; the belief that “nothing other than physical matter exists,” and this 
extends into ideological hedonism or “philosophical materialism.” (Manent 1996:54) 
Yet, what are the theoretical preconditions that explain individualism and materialism in 
democratic societies? To comprehend Tocqueville’s thesis, we must connect it to the equality of 
conditions and the unique role the middle-class and its values that dominates the Western 
democracies: the equality of conditions renders that citizens are no longer interdependently 
connected in the manner that characterized aristocracies, “by a host of duties, obligations, and 
legal relations of a specific kind, determined by tradition.” (Hereth 1986:61) One owes “nothing 
to anyone, they expect so to speak nothing from anyone; they are in the habit of always 
considering themselves in isolation, and they willingly fancy that their whole destiny is in their 
hands.” (DA II, 2.3 p. 484) 
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2.4.3 The Democratic Middle Class and Commerce 
I know of nothing more opposed to revolutionary mores than commerce. 
Commerce is naturally the enemy of all violent passions. It likes even 
tempers, is pleased by compromise, very carefully flees anger.  (DA II, 3.21 
p. 609) 
 
I have shown how Americans are unceasingly impelled towards commerce 
and industry. Their origin, their social state, the political institutions, the 
very place that they inhabit, carry them irresistibly in this direction. (DA II, 
3.18 p. 593) 
  
   The simultaneous and interrelated progress of democratization, industrialization, social 
mobility and equality of conditions, and an increasingly dominant middle-class (the 
manufacturing and financial class) altered the hitherto conception of hierarchy and individual 
identification and belonging within a distinct class with a familiar set of norms and rules. 
According to Tocqueville, the acknowledgement of principle of equality as a just principle 
disentangled and levelled the rigid social hierarchy, opened the doors to greater material 
prosperity (in conjunction with capitalism) and laid the foundation of middle-class materialism, a  
  
[p]assion that is natural to men who are exited and limited by the obscurity of their origin or the 
mediocrity of their fortune, and I find none more appropriate than the taste for well-being. The 
passion for material well-being is essentially middle-class passion; it grows larger and spreads with 
this class; it becomes preponderant with it. Form there is reaches the higher ranks of society and 
descends within the people. (DA II, 2.10 p. 507) 
 
What is interesting with Tocqueville’s observation is not materialism’s strong existence in 
democratic nations. Given the historical, economic culture of the middle-class and its traditional 
role as the commercial and financial class, they transmitted their values and way of thinking into 
the political system which would grant them dominance – democracy – and coupled with the 
superlative economic system of production that corresponded to their culture – capitalism – it 
was evident  that democratic society would lay greater emphasis on trade and industry.  
 
It seems to me that among the free governments, government of the middle class will be, I shall not 
say the most enlightened, but the most economical. (DA I, 2.5 p. 200) 
 
According to Tocqueville, the dynamics of democratic nations is to be found in their 
economic system; education and science principally serve to enhance efficiency and 
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productivity, while the flexible hierarchy within society is not determined by heritage, but by 
meritocracy.24  
 
Most men who compose these [democratic] nations are very eager for present material 
enjoyments; as they are always disconnected with the position they occupy and always free to 
leave it; they dream only of the means of changing their fortune or of increasing it. For minds so 
disposed, every new method that leads to wealth by a shorter path, every machine that shortens 
work, every instrument that diminishes the cost of production, every discovery that facilitates 
pleasures and augments them seems to be the most magnificent effort of human intelligence. (DA 
II, 1.10 p. 436) 
 
In the contemporary debate, ‘materialism’ is by and large used in a negative manner, 
frequently in concurrence with an ‘environmental’ and ‘politically correct’ criticism of capitalism 
and its ill effects. The perpetual source of torment for the most ardent supporters of a state-
regulated undertaking to guarantee justifiable equality, is that while capitalism is held to be 
utterly competitive and creates unjust social difference (measured financially) and debasement 
of the individual, they are simultaneously dependent upon an effective economic system that 
can provide cover for the high financial expenditure their venture demands. Tocqueville 
predicted that democracy, which would annihilate the rigid social class-system of feudal times, 
would introduce a time of “the competition of all” and that this would be a source of conflict since 
the “constant opposition reigning between the instincts that equality gives birth to and the 
means that it furnishes to satisfy them is tormenting and fatiguing their souls.” (DA II, 2.11 p. 
513) 
What Tocqueville undertakes to portray, is that materialism is a natural feature of Western 
democracy: 
 
In democracies, there is nothing greater not more brilliant than commerce; it is what attracts 
the regard of the public and fills the imagination of the crowd; all energetic passions are 
directed toward it. (DA II, 2.19 p. 528) 
 
The mores and values of the predominantly middle-class majority favour scientific rationality 
and method, productivity, efficiency, cooperation, regulations, uniformity, and ‘work-ethic;’ 
actually, these features corresponds to a substantial segment of the mores that constitutes the 
outlook of the middle-class. Nowhere is this more apparent in the largest democracy in the 
                                                  
24 “If democracy does not bring men to cultivate the sciences for (the sciences’) sake, on the other hand it increases immensely the 
number of those who cultivate them.” (DA II, 1.10 p. 437) 
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West, which has no historical experience with aristocracy, and where the middle class has been 
predominant since its foundation:  
 
It is not that there are no rich in the United States as elsewhere; indeed, I do not know a country 
where the love of money holds a larger place in the heart of man and where they profess a more 
profound scorn for the theory of the permanent equality of goods. (DA I, 1.3 p. 50) 
 
The Western democratic states represent the most productive economic system in world 
history, and its middle class outlook delineates the fundamental ingredient in this system, not 
the ownership of raw-goods such as precious metals, oil or agricultural products, or high-tech 
production facilities.  Furthermore, little indicates that Tocqueville considered capitalism other 
than in the strict sense: as a mode of economic production where the relationship between 
employer and employee is determined by wages and contract, as opposed to the feudal system. 
Although Tocqueville was aware and explicitly sceptical to aspects of the industrial age and the 
conditions of the industrial worker, he believed – contrary to Marx and Engels – that their 
condition would gradually improve; “one can say that the slow and progressive rise in wages is 
one of the general laws that regulate democratic societies. As conditions become more equal, 
wages rise, and as wages go higher, conditions become more equal.” (DA II, 3.7 p. 556) 
Another aspect concerning materialism is the fact that its strong presence in the current 
democratic society has been explained as a product of capitalism itself.25 However, Tocqueville 
would probably disagree with this notion, as he conveys that the Western middle class is 
historically productive, materialist and commercial by disposition; “It is not commerce and 
industry that prompt a taste for material enjoyments in men, but rather this taste that brings men 
to industrial and commercial careers, where they hope to satisfy themselves more completely 
and more quickly.” 26 (DA II, 2.19 p. 527) 
The productive efficiency of capitalism has been attributed to a free market, but this does not 
necessarily entail that other forms of freedom – such as intellectual, political, or religious – is a 
crucial prerequisite for capitalism to thrive; Tocqueville accentuates the demand and preference 
                                                  
25 This conjures with the view that capitalism is something more than just a mode of production; it has been attributed an ideological 
dimension. This is of course the socialist interpretation, where capitalism reflects the subjugation of ‘the people’ by the class that own and 
controls the means of production; in the historical epoch which we are in according to the Marxist view on historical development this 
means the capitalists.  
26 Tocqueville elaborates further in the same passage that the democratic, middle-class notion of equality supports the strong existence of 
materialism in democracies; “All the causes that make love of the goods of this world predominate in the human heart develop industry and 
commerce. Equality is one of these causes. If favors commerce not only directly in giving men a taste for trade, but indirectly fortifying and 
generalizing the love of well-being in their souls.” (DA II, 2.19 p. 527) 
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for order and stability as the main ingredient that supports the desire of material well-being of 
the middle-class.27  
 
The particular taste that men of democratic centuries conceive of material enjoyments is not 
naturally opposed to order; on the contrary, if often needs order to be satisfied. Nor is it the enemy 
of regular mores; for goods mores are useful to public tranquillity and favour industry. Often, 
indeed, it comes to be combined with a sort of religious morality; one wishes to be the best 
possible in this world without renouncing one’s chances in the other. (DA II, 2.11 p. 509) 
 
Tocqueville understood that democracy’s principle of equality and democratization of 
property would marginalize revolutionary politics and alter the social structure by levelling 
income and wealth.28 In the chapter Why Great Revolutions Will Become Rare, he foresees that 
modern democracies would be comprised of “a multitude of similar men who, without being 
precisely either rich or poor, possess enough goods to desire order and do not have enough of 
them to excite envy.”29 (DA II, 3.21 p. 607) The democratic materialism is moderate, determined 
and yet restricted; its purpose is 
 
[m]aking life easier and more comfortable at each instant, preventing inconvenience, and satisfying 
the least needs without effort and almost without cost. These objects are small, but the soul clings 
to them […] What I reproach equality for is not that it carries men away in the pursuit of forbidden 
enjoyments; it is for absorbing them entirely in the search for permitted enjoyments. Thus there 
could as well be established in the world a sort of honest materialism that does not corrupt souls, 
but soften them and in the end quietly loosens all their tensions. (DA II, 2.11 p. 509) 
 
What is of importance to democratic man, then, is that the political system that he lives in 
provides security that ensures comfort and welfare. Politically, few subjects outside the realm 
that addresses these areas of priority will arouse his attention or engagement.30 This is of 
course the psychological prerequisite for the intellectual ideology of materialism: the satisfaction 
                                                  
27 As I interpret Tocqueville, he would probably agree that the higher the degree of all freedoms in a society, the higher the overall 
economic prosperity. However, capitalism is not necessarily dependent upon political and individual freedom, the state-capitalism of China 
or the cartel-capitalism of 18th century Germany are examples of this.  
28 Tocqueville’s contemporary and friend John Stuart Mill stated that under the dominion of middle-class opinion, “the general tendency of 
things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind.” (Mill 1991:81). Indeed, the natural effect of 
democracy was to “give everyone the desire of changing places without suggesting to anyone the idea of going much farther; to make 
personal ambition a universal feeling and to diminish the number of great ambitions,” a tendency that was encouraged by the increasing 
specialization of modern life. (Tocqueville to Louis de Kergolay, February 2, 1838, quoted in Kanan 2001:49) 
29 Resembling both Kant and Montesquieu, Tocqueville asserts that the middle class are “naturally enemies of violent movements” and 
that “there is no revolution that does not more or less threaten acquired property […] there is none in which the passions to which property 
give rise are more fierce and more tenacious than in the middle classes.” (DA II, 3.21 p. 607-08) 
 
30 Later in life, during the despotism of Napoleon III, Tocqueville indignantly commented upon the bourgeoisie’s submissiveness in political 
matters: “It is quite a amusing spectacle to observe these men who find despotism good for everything except regulating their material 
interests: they regard the confiscation of all liberties with pleasure; but when one comes to touch their liberty of enriching oneself, they give 
vent to loud cries.” (Tocqueville to Corcelle, December 17, 1852, quoted in Kahan 2001:56) 
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of the self by material matter. Also of interest is Tocqueville’s idea that the affection for 
democracy among its citizenry is not founded in an admiration of its officials; “In the eyes of 
democracy, government is not a good; it is a necessary evil. Officials must be accorded a 
certain power; for without this power, what use would they serve?” (DA I, 2.5 p. 194) 
Tocqueville’s description of government officials illustrates them as somewhat mediocre; “the 
most remarkable men are rarely called to public offices.” (DA I, 2.5 p. 188) Given the status of 
the material in democracies, what attracts democratic man in his ambition for recognition and 
public status is achieved through the commercial sector, not the public sector. 
 
Great talents and great passions generally turn away from power in order to pursue wealth; and it 
often happens that one takes charge of directing the fortune of the state only when one feels 
oneself barely capable of conducting one’s own affairs. (DA I, 2.5 p. 195) 
 
The ‘rich’ do not constitute a distinct class in the conventional sense of the term ‘class’, 
rather, it is an economically successful extension of the middle class, its values are basically 
very similar to those the middle class claims as its own; its characteristics and status are based 
in economic terms, not as a distinct class with a coherent, exclusive and separate system of 
values and culture, nor does it transcend a political or social agenda on its own different from 
the middle-class, as did its pre-democratic upper-class predecessor; the aristocracy.31 The ‘rich’ 
are simply what the term describes: rich.  
 
[t]his aristocracy does not resemble those that have preceded it  […] although they are rich, the 
class of the rich does not exist; for the rich have neither a common spirit nor objects, neither 
common traditions, nor hopes. There are then members, but not corps […] there is no genuine 
association.  (DA II, 2.20, p. 531-32) 
 
How can narrow-minded individualism and excessive materialism be constrained within 
democracy? Tocqueville recognized that democracy’s natural and dominant class would be the 
productive, rational, scientific and meticulous middle-class, and that order, tranquillity and 
equality of opportunity and rights was imperative. Yet, democratic man could be ‘attached’ to an 
appreciation of liberty through ‘enlightened self-interest’ and ‘the art of association’. 
 
                                                  
31  “The rich in democracies never form a corps that has its own mores and policing; the particular ideas of their class do not stop them and 
the general ideas of their country push them ahead.” (DA II, 2.19 p. 528) 
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2.5 Self-interest Well Understood and Associations.  
  
After the freedom to act alone, the most natural to man is that of 
combining his efforts with the efforts of those like him and acting in 
common. The right of association therefore appears to me to be almost as 
inalienable in its nature as individual freedom. (DA I, 2.4 p. 184) 
 
There is nothing, according to me, that deserves more to attract our 
regard than the intellectual and moral associations of America. (DA II, 2.5 
p. 492) 
 
2.5.1 Self-interest Well Understood 
The validity of the concept ‘individualism,’ which comprises an assemblage of self-
consciously timid individuals, appears fragile considering the de facto corporation that takes 
place between individuals. How can this be explained? The doctrine of ‘self-interest well-
understood’ answers this question according to Tocqueville, who was struck by the high level of 
civil engagement of the Americans through associations of political, economic, social and 
intellectual character (both permanent local associations as well as provisional political and civil 
groups created freely by citizens). The principle of this doctrine is that democratic citizens 
submit some of their private interests to public interests. The rationale behind this is not a 
virtuous disposition of the citizens, but the usefulness regarding such associations. “In the 
United States it is almost never said that virtue is beautiful. They maintain that it is useful and 
they prove it every day.” (DA II, 2.8 p. 501) It is the moral doctrine best suited to democratic 
times - neither complete nor self-evident – but it is “clear and sure”; and since “it of all 
philosophic theories the most appropriate to the needs of men in our time [...] marvellously 
accommodates to the weaknesses of men, it obtains a great empire with ease.” (DA II 2.8 p. 
502) 
 
The doctrine of self-interest well understood does not produce great devotion; but it suggests little 
sacrifices each day; by itself it cannot make  man virtuous, but if forms a multitude of citizens who 
are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves; and if it does not lead 
directly to virtue through the will, it brings them near to it insensibly through habits. (DA II, 2.8 p. 
502)  
 
The concept does not generate “extraordinary virtues,” but nevertheless harmonizes with 
democracy since it is within reach of everyone and serves as a guide to rational behaviour that 
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amends both individual interest and public interest; “Consider some individuals, they are 
lowered. View the species, it is elevated” (DA II 2.8 p. 502) 
“Tocqueville adopts this utilitarian language to describe a crucial self-equilibrating principle of 
American Democracy, recapturing it first as égoisme intelligent and then as intérêt bien-
éntendu. (Welch 2001:89) What Tocqueville argues, is that the Americans pursuit of self-interest 
(which is consistent in democratic societies) through associations, benefits the interests of the 
whole community. Since the search for material well-being is the chief motive of democratic 
individuals, associations serve a utilitarian purpose in this sense. “Associations make 
transparent to individuals the link between public purposes and private well-being; they allow for 
the transference of the habits of responsible action back and forth between civil and political 
spheres.” (Welch 2001:89)  
   Even though Tocqueville’s doctrine resembles utilitarianism, there is a crucial distinction that 
separates the two; Tocqueville viewed the convenient synthesis of private and public interest as 
a “complex social and psychological artefact, rather than as the automatic result of individual 
pleasure-seeking,” and furthermore the doctrine examined the means which causes citizens to 
pursue and aspire what is in their long-term interest. (Welch 2001:89) The doctrine of self-
interest well understood and its appeal to the proper interest of democratic man is not so much 
recognition of Hobbes’ naturally selfish individual as it is an effort from Tocqueville to remind his 
readers that despite the inevitable effects of individualism and materialism that democracy 
produces, there are remedies that can counteract them. There is cause to be cognisant of the 
fact that the idea of the sovereign individual as a universal principle was still novel and in its 
founding in Tocqueville’s time, and that he, rightly in my opinion, anticipated a greater focus 
upon the individual and his rights in the coming democratic times.  
 
There is no power on earth that can prevent the growing equality of conditions from bringing the 
human spirit toward seeking for the useful and from disposing each citizen to shrink within himself. 
One must therefore expect that individual interests will become more than ever the principal if not 
the unique motive of men’s actions; but it remains to be know how each man will understand his 
individual interest. (DA II, 2.8 p. 503) 
 
   Hence, if some part of this interest can be diverted to participation in political associations – 
not solely restricted to political parties, but in the widest sense of the term – and vigorous local 
self-governing groups, they supply the milieu where citizens discover the utility of corporation, 
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and, most importantly; develop an understanding of the union connecting private and social 
interest, where the fate and condition of the whole community is attached to and dependent 
upon the citizen;  
 
Only with difficulty does one draw a man out of himself to interest him in the destiny of the whole 
state, because he understands poorly the influence that the destiny of the state can exert on his lot. 
But should it be necessary to pass a road through his property, he will see at first glance that he 
has come across a relation between this small public affair and his greatest private affairs, and he 
will discover, without anyone’s showing it to him, the tight bond that here unites a particular interest 
to the general interest. (DA II, 2.14 p. 487) 
 
   The crucial element in this argumentation – and this is a recurrent theme throughout 
Democracy in America – is that association and corporation are necessary for the 
development and maintenance of freedom. Not a limited meaning of freedom as ‘doing as one 
pleases,’ but primarily freedom of the mind, which enables individuals to take an active 
responsibility for their lives and protects them “from being overwhelmed by their needs and 
succumbing to dependence on a schoolmaster government that might otherwise be 
understood as serving them.” (Mansfield & Winthrop 2000:LXXXI) When citizens become 
accustomed to practising politics in common, it facilitates a participatory culture in civil and 
political life:  
 
The more the number of these small common affairs increases, the more do men, even without 
their knowing it, acquire the ability to pursue great ones in common. Civil associations therefore 
facilitate political associations; but, on the other hand, political association singularly develops and 
perfects civil association […] politics generalizes the taste for and habit of association; it makes a 
crowd of men who would otherwise have lived alone desire to unite, and teaches the art of doing it. 
(DA II, 2.7 p. 496) 
 
  In this manner Tocqueville starts from a seemingly utilitarian viewpoint, where he 
acknowledges that people are calculating and rational beings, to the concept of enlightened 
self-interest where people choose to associate, and finally to the metaphysical notion of virtue 
and freedom as the results of this process. What Tocqueville tries to achieve by this argument, 
is that notwithstanding the societal structure surrounding a given individual – in democracy’s 
case that of individualism and materialism – it is possible to fulfil one’s interests through the 
public sphere, and that it is possible for democratic man to understand “the influence that the 
well-being of the country has on his own, […] and he interests himself in the prosperity of his 
country at first as a thing that is useful to him, and afterwards as his own work.” (DA I, 2.6 p. 
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225) Therefore the unintentional consequence of participation can serve as an education in the 
practice of freedom, and thus the development of the virtues necessary to appreciate this 
freedom. 
 
2.5.2 Associations 
In much as the same way as Hobbes envisioned the modern polity as an 
artificial leviathan made up of the strength of many individuals, Tocqueville 
saw the democratic polity as a mass of associations. Artificial constructs 
combining the force of their individual members for offensive and defensive 
actions. (Welch 2001:95) 
 
Civil society was both the repository of Tocqueville’s hopes for political 
vitalization and the source of his fears. The idea of association, in which 
the practise of civic ideals would be preserved and the despotic tendencies 
of egalitarianism resisted. (Wolin 2001:343). 
 
Tocqueville’s observations of this topic are well known, but of interest here is not so much 
associations themselves, but why they are of importance and the consequences they generate. 
Again, Tocqueville uses the concept of associations to demonstrate the inherent and conflictual 
nature of liberty and equality, and displays the “art of association” as a remedy against the 
negative aspects of equality, individualism, materialism, and an overly centralized government. 
What one must bear in mind is that Tocqueville’s arguments are of a civic rather than 
administrative character; he emphasized the civic and intellectual benefits rather than efficiency 
and productivity. Tocqueville distinguished clearly between the motives and purposes that 
comprise the rational foundation for associations. In a democracy, associations that have their 
progeny in financially viable interests will come about naturally through democratic materialism, 
and through democratic compassion, social associations will emerge. These associations do 
provide genuine needs, but their existential rationale is often based on an immediate and 
functional foundation. 
Those who serve moral and intellectual ends are the type of associations which Tocqueville 
defined as decisive to the protection of liberty and the practical political education of democratic 
man; “In bringing to the public eye new, uncommon sentiments and ideas, individuals influence 
one another, persuade others, perhaps even change mores and ultimately laws” (Mansfield & 
Winthrop, p. 73, 2000)  
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   What Tocqueville accentuates, is that the most significant purpose of association is not 
formally political (as functional political parties) or financial, but educational; the development of 
man’s political intellect and the creation of ideas arises from voluntary cooperation; “Political 
association can therefore be considered great schools, free of charge, where all citizens come 
to learn the general theory of associations.” (DA II, 2.4 p. 497) The importance of association 
was not that they were sacrosanct or miraculous devices that guaranteed the safety of liberty, 
but that they pushed men to contemplate and articulate the substance of freedom; in other 
words, they were a mechanism that shaped popular mores which counterweight the political 
passivity that dominated the individualistically orientated private sphere. (Lively 1962:67) 
   The embryonic, destructive consequences of narrow self-interest (individualism) are 
subsequently counter-balanced by participation in local institutions and associations. “Voluntary 
association with others presents itself as an obvious an efficacious remedy to the limitations of 
individual action. The patterns themselves become instinctual and internalized; they eventually 
form new mæurs.” (Welch 2001:92) Initially, democratic man act out of self-interest, but can 
gradually develop a deeper sense of insightfulness; 
 
One is occupied with the general interest at first by necessity and then by choice; what was a 
calculation becomes instinct; and by dint of working for the good of one’s fellow citizens, one finally 
picks up the habit and taste of serving them. (DA II, 2.4 p. 488) 
 
   Maintaining the citizen’s interest in public affairs and actively engaging them in political 
matters, would contribute to the acceptance of the duties that freedom inheres. The freedom to 
choose is essential to the exercise of freedom, and the loss of freedom to choose is not by 
definition negatively and exclusively confined to the external prevention of choice, but also 
positively and inclusively to the internal rejection of choice. Why this is a potential danger in 
democratic nations, is by Tocqueville attributed to the distinction between equality, which is a 
natural sentiment in democracies, and liberty, which is not. Freedom has been a feature of 
societies throughout history, and “it is not attached exclusively to one social state.” What is 
unique to democracies however, is “equality of conditions; the principal passion that agitates 
men […] is the love of this equality.” (DA II, 2.1 p. 480) According to Tocqueville, the effects of 
freedom and equality do not correspond similarly: 
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The evils that freedom bring are sometimes immediate; they are visible to all, and all more or less 
feel them. The evils that extreme equality can produce become manifest only little by little; they 
insinuate gradually into the social body; one sees them only now and then, and at the moment 
when they have become most violent, habits has already made them no longer felt.  
The goods that freedom brings show themselves only in the long term, and it is always easy to fail 
to recognize the cause that gives birth to them. 
The advantages of equality make themselves felt from now on, and each day one sees them flow 
from their source. (DA II, 2.1 p. 480-81) 
 
Thus, the principal menace innate in democratic society is the deteriorating will of its citizenry 
to burden itself with the practice of liberty in the public sphere. Participation in local political and 
civic associations proves the ideal antidote to it. However, the predicament that riddles social 
scientists is how such discernment is to be implemented into civic practice, and postulating its 
necessity almost becomes a tautologous statement, in the sense that the theoretical is 
discouragingly disconnected from the practical. In aristocratic times, according to Tocqueville, 
there is a perception of duty as a moral imperative, but this is absent in democracies, where “the 
idea of acting for personal benefit has become socially respectable.” (Lively 1962:198) 
Appealing to an ‘altruistic’ and righteous nature of humankind in democratic times may sound 
politically correct, but its effects are probably unsuccessful:  
 
Rather, they [moralists] had to show that men’s personal advantage lay in acting for the general 
good, to discover and publicise the instances where self-interest and the general interest 
coincided, to nourish the view that men best served themselves in serving others. In other words, 
the morality of democratic society should be based in the idea of enlightened self-interest. (Lively 
1962:198) 
 
   That ‘enlightened self-interest’ should form the basis of moral action in a democratic 
society seems to reveal a certain lack of confidence in the democratic man as a moral being 
capable of acting out of disinterest and virtue; “One must therefore expect that individual interest 
will become more than ever the principal if not the unique motive of men’s actions; but it 
remains to know how each man will understand his individual interest.”32 (DA II, 2.8 p. 503)  
Tocqueville seems to regretfully accept that democratic man by temperament is homo 
economicus, but his hopes are that through public exercise of freedom he can cultivate an 
                                                  
32 Tocqueville described his impressions upon arriving in America in a letter to his friend Ernest de Chabrol; “people having different 
languages, beliefs, opinions: in a word, a society without roots, without memories, without prejudices, without routines, without common 
ideas, without a national character yet a hundred times happier than our own; more virtuous? I doubt it. That is the starting point: What 
serves as the link among such diverse elements? Interest. That is the secret. The private interest that breaks through at each moment, the 
interest that, moreover, appears openly and even proclaims itself as a social theory.” (Letter to Ernest de Chabrol, June 9, 1831) (Italics 
added) 
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interest in political liberty and evolve, if not completely, then at least to some extent  into homo 
politicus. (Wolin 2001:214) 
   Yet, there are glimpses of optimism situated in his work; the utilitarian and interest-based 
advantages of association are obvious in his arguments, but there is something more, I think. By 
using his understanding of freedom, one can see that associations are vital in creating in society 
multiplicity and diversity, a differentiation of opinions and beliefs. It is by practicing our right to 
argue and converse, and by defending our viewpoints, that we develop and understand the 
necessity of freedom of speech and association; they become more than democratic slogans 
and abstract rights, they become praxis. These are the apparent advantages of association, but 
association also thwarts something else; the negative consequences of individualism and 
materialism. If democratic society is dominated by excessive individualism and materialism, they 
are likely to engineer an atomistic society of politically isolated individuals, where the primary 
links of interaction to the civic sphere is public opinion and the centralized state. In this sense, 
Tocqueville is trying to illustrate that this state of isolation robs men of the will to freedom and 
adds to the modern symptom of purposelessness (this topic will be further examined in Chapter 
3). Jack Lively has interpreted and expressed this state in the following manner:  
  
Isolation robbed men of that contact with others, that mutual co-operation, that feeling of 
involvement and personal responsibility, which nurtured intellect and character. Subservience to a 
monolithic public opinion bred a combination of arrogance and timidity, arrogance in enforcing the 
commonplace and timidity in opposing it. It was false to hope that the state could be the source of 
moral and intellectual improvement. Such development came through controversy, through the 
clash of opinions and values, through the posing in life of real intellectual and moral problems. But 
the state was fitted to establish rules not to create controversy. It could provide a system of 
education, but once it started aiming more positively at intellectual or moral improvement it was 
bound to fail. For it was not in the nature of political authority to improve men as men. It could give 
them the means of self-improvement such as education. Any more positive attempt to moralise 
men meant only that the state would throw its weight behind some one doctrine or attitude, and this 
would kill the social dialectic on which moral improvement depended. It was through voluntary 
organised associations alone that variety and diversity of opinion could be created.” (Lively 
1962:130) 
 
Lively’s view transcends the classical perception of the free man as a self-governing and 
vigorous contributor to the local sphere of civic and political interaction. The premises for such a 
perspective is the distinction between the good man and the good citizen; the Aristotelian 
concept that accentuates that “politics in the widest sense was the condition of the individual’s 
realisation of himself as a social being whose full potentialities could be brought to fruition only 
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in a world of public assertion and not in a life of private retreat.” (Lively 1962:227) The 
prerequisite for political activity is diversity and voluntary obligation, and although municipal 
politics indisputably is minor politics, it is perhaps the most important sphere of activity. Given 
the precondition that involvement may actually influence results outside or through the purely 
administrative sphere, local politics can stimulate the citizen’s ethical and political abilities, as 
well as a deeper awareness of political rights and duties. “Men could see that their political 
involvements made a difference. Because communal politics drew men out of the confines of 
the household and economy, and, above all, because it encouraged them to work together, 
politics became the single most important force in combating the disconnectedness of modern 
life.” (Wolin 2001:215) 
Therefore, one must distinguish between associations whose primary objectives are material, 
in the sense that their existence is based on profit, political or financial. Given the freedom of 
association, and the incitement to material growth which is inherent in Western democracies, 
associations of this nature will naturally manifest itself in the domains of private and economic 
life as an effect of this freedom. However, this is not necessarily synonymous with freedom 
itself; it is only when citizens cluster and participate in associations whose motivation is political 
activity itself, that a sense of community and civic responsibility can be developed; “freedom is 
freedom for political citizens to act and perform.” (Hereth 1986:21)  
Given the critical observations by Tocqueville concerning a “centralistic concentration of 
power” and his preference and fondness for local democracy and distribution of power, it is easy 
to categorize him as a rather traditional, conservative critic of the state. However, as noted 
previously, he does not easily fit the nexus of the classical liberal view of ‘the individual versus 
the state’ conflict, or the significance of separation of powers. Questions concerning separation 
and distribution of public power in a democratic society transcends more than institutional 
aspects of the formal, juristic structure of a given constitution. Tocqueville comprehends that 
democracy’s true characteristics are not definable by institutions per se, but needs to be 
diagnosed on the level of civic participation and activity conducted by the citizens. It is the 
quality and vitality of the political surroundings in which the citizen dwells in daily life that 
determines whether the rationality and purpose behind the state of affairs is predominantly 
motivated by politics and civic responsibility, or administrative effectiveness and bureaucratic 
rationality. This is what forms the background of Tocqueville’s argumentation for genuine power 
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on the communal level, not primarily because it is financially effective in the short-term 
perspective, but because man as a political being can mature if he actively practices his political 
duties, as well as rights. However, this is in practice a difficult task; the combination of 
materialism and a strong central state that provides welfare without any demands regarding 
political partisanship by the citizens hardly provides for a voluntary milieu of participation:  
 
Why should a person develop a sense of civic responsibility for public affairs, when experience tells 
him that public and common concerns of his city or region are decided by civil servants, who 
answer to the central authority and not to him? How should dwellers in a community learn the 
political virtues of justice, prudence, adherence to reality, love of freedom, and regard for the 
common cause, if the practice of these virtue are impossible? (Hereth 1986:30) 
 
For this reason, a genuine sense of identification, responsibility and community by the 
citizens in a democratic state is in a Tocquevillian sense inadequately satisfied through 
representative government and elections alone; an understanding of self-interest well 
understood and the importance of local associations and individual practice contribute to a 
common sentiment of loyalty to the republic and a remedy for indifference and 
disconnectedness towards their political system. Only when citizens wish to maintain their free 
institutions, for the sake of political activity itself, do their basic attitude and practical activity 
correspond with order in the republic, whose purpose for Tocqueville lies in freedom of political 
activity. The lesson to be learnt from the Americans, at least in the past, is an understanding of 
delegating authority to the local communities, because this will include the citizens in the 
political process:  
 
The legislators of America did not believe that, to cure a malady so natural to the social body in 
democratic times and so fatal, it was enough to accord the whole nation as a whole a 
representation on itself; they thought that, in addition, it was fitting to give political life to each 
portion of the territory in order to multiply infinitely the occasions for citizens to act together and to 
make them feel every day that they depend on one another. (DA II, 2.4 p. 486-87) 
 
   Tocqueville’s theory on the importance of associations enjoys a prominent status within the 
academic society, and has been employed as an inspirational guide to examine institutional and 
associational patterns in modern society. The next topic that Tocqueville emphasised as an 
imperative remedy against excessive individualism and materialism is – as an academical 
subject – more delicate and disputed. Where associations and self-interest well-understood 
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deals with the physical and concrete aspects of democracy, religion deals with its metaphysical 
and intangible features.  
 
2.6 Religion 
 
One must recognize that equality, which introduces great goods into the 
world, nevertheless suggest to men very dangerous instincts […] it tends to 
isolate them from one another and to bring each of them to be occupied 
with himself alone. It opens their souls excessively to the love of material 
enjoyments. The greatest advantage of religions is to inspire to wholly 
contrary instincts. (DA II, 1.5 p. 419) 
 
Initially, there is cause to remind ourselves that Tocqueville’s considerations upon religion did 
not constitute a theological discussion, in regard to the validity of ‘objective truth‘ in Christianity 
itself; “one must distinguish very carefully the principal opinions that constitute belief and that 
form what theologians calls articles of faith.” (DA II 1.5 p. 422) What is at stake is not the truthful 
substance of religious dogmas, but the social and intellectual influence it can exert on the 
democratic social state. Incorporating religion as a potentially positive factor in an explanation 
and understanding of democracy’s normative foundations may seem archaic and speculative in 
the secular and rational political science of today, the secularity of science being per definition 
opposite to the spirituality of religion. Furthermore, religion, being by a bearer of values and 
norms, is in the tolerant Western democracies usually considered a private matter, and outside 
the sphere of politics. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to exclude religion as a factor that 
influences politics, society, culture, and norms. Categorically denying a priori that Christianity 
has been a significant influence on Western culture and thought seems unfruitful, and this 
influence should be dealt with in an objective manner, to comprehend the social, psychological 
and normative assessment of religion without necessarily believing in its spiritual truth. The 
secular development – particularly in science and political thought – and the tight bond between 
the church and the state in pre-democratic Europe, is a disadvantage for religion as an 
academic subject within political theory. In America - where religion has tighter cultural relations 
to the formal political structure, and yet separated from the state institutionally - religion as an 
 
 
54
academic subject is more accepted in the discussion of Tocqueville particularly and political 
philosophy generally.33 
Among Tocqueville scholars, there is an ongoing debate whether Tocqueville’s analysis on 
religion was solely sociologically utilitarian in its approach to religious faith. Now, it has been 
argued that this argument is of purely academic interest, and bears no imperative importance 
regarding his theories. However, judging from his private letters, I believe that Tocqueville’s 
sincerity about the necessity for religious belief in democracies is genuine, and that the need for 
religion is closely connected to the concepts of virtue, materialism and pantheism. Even though 
he belongs to the tradition of modern, liberal and humanist thinkers, there is throughout 
Democracy recurring references to the importance of mores and virtue, which are reminiscent of 
Aristotle and the teleological notion of man.34 I think Tocqueville’s concern is rooted in the belief 
that democratic politics – if dominated by individualism, materialism and pantheism – represents 
a threat to the moral virtues he deemed indispensable to the active, reflective and independent 
political citizen, and that religion can combat these effects (defined as negative by 
Tocqueville).  
 An accurate understanding of Tocqueville’s view on the relationship between religion and 
democracy is of importance. Religion, essential to the prospects of democracy, concerns 
matters outside of its definition and its nature. Religion lies outside democracy and is its limit.35  
“Among all dogmatic beliefs, the most desirable seem to me to be the dogmatic belief in matters 
of religion […] When religion is destroyed in a people, doubt seizes the highest realms of 
intelligence and half-paralyzes all others.” (DA II 1.5 p. 417-418)   
 
 
 
 
                                                  
33 “Religion, which, among the Americans, never mixes directly in the government of society, should therefore be considered as the first of 
their political institutions.” (DA I, 2.9 P. 280) 
34 In Democracy, there is an almost distanced and objective relation to religion and its utility by Tocqueville. Privately, he struggled with 
questions on religion and faith, but gradually became a religious believer.  
35 There is a continual debate among Tocqueville scholars as whether he simply view religion in an utilitarian sense, meaning as an social 
utility, or if he was a truly religious man. Part of the explanation lies in the ambiguous statements from Tocqueville concerning this matter. 
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2.6.1 Religion and Democratic Man 
If the doctrine of self-interest well understood had only this world in view, it 
would be far from sufficient, for there are a great number of sacrifices that 
can find their recompense only in the other world; and whatever effort of 
mind that one makes to prove the utility of virtue, it will always be hard to 
make a man who does not wish to die live well. (DA II, 2.9 p. 504) 
 
Despotism can do without faith, but freedom cannot. (DA I, 2.9 p. 282) 
 
Religion serves as a valuable prospect for moderating the passion for material well-being 
and “the theoretical possibility of securing access, in the framework of a democratic society, to 
an outside, to a thing other than democracy, to pure nature, but by naturally religious man, free 
from all convention, even the convention of equality.” (Manent 1996:106) Although he was 
somewhat evasive, I interpret Tocqueville’s recommendations on religious practice as a remedy 
against ‘spiritual’ humanism, that is, the belief in the innate goodness and innocence in man. 
Accompanied by secular scepticism about divine authority, then, according to Tocqueville, it is 
rational that man finds meaning by material satisfaction, a sort of ‘materialistic hedonism.’ 
(Zetterbaum 1967:63) What it boils down to, is man’s primordial source of authority. Rousseau’s 
famous statement that “man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains”, exemplifies the faith in 
the innocent man that was typical of the ideas behind the French Revolution. If man is an 
innately innocent being, capable of moral insight by the use of rationality, but corrupted by 
‘sanctimonious’ society and its artificial conventions, then to realize the goodness of man, it is 
society that must be altered back to its natural state of the classless and un-dogmatic society of 
complete equality and without authorities that suppresses man’s true potential, as later 
described by Friedrich Engels in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.  
This is very much the philosophical principle from which Marxism, an artefact of the radical 
Enlightenment, derives its rationale to alter social, political and economic structure. However, 
Marxism is only the most explicit elocution of this philosophical doctrine; scientific secularism is 
a prevailing faith in modern democracy, and Tocqueville treated the subject in Democracy under 
the heading How Equality Suggests to the Americans the Idea of the Indefinite Perfectibility of 
Man; 
 
One cannot believe how many facts naturally flow from this philosophic theory according to which 
man is indefinitely perfectible, and what prodigious influence it exerts on those who, always being 
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occupied only with acting and not thinking, seem to conform their actions without knowing it. (DA II, 
1.9 p. 428) 
 
Contrasting this notion is Aristotle’s and Christianity’s view that what is to be improved and 
developed for man to realize his potential are the virtues of man.36 Given the immense appeal 
that the principle of sovereignty of the individual exerts on democratic man, Tocqueville’s hope 
was that religion could serve as a transcendent source of authority, since “all religions draw 
from man himself an element of strength that can never fail them, because it depends on one of 
the constituent principles of human nature.” (DA I, 2.9 p. 284) Religion may therefore diminish 
the threat of mild despotism by reminding citizens of the significance of life outside the busy 
search for material well-being in democratic society, as there “is no religion that does not place 
man’s desires beyond and above earthly goods and that does not naturally raise his soul toward 
regions much superior to those of the senses.” (DA II, 1.5 p. 419) However, when religion loses 
its authority as a moral source, when there is no longer a coherent source of moral authority 
outside the independent and sovereign democratic man, then the validity of morality is either left 
to Kant’ seemingly optimistic notion of the enlightened rational man, or to the fluctuating and 
arbitrary expression of public opinion. Nevertheless, no one can discipline democratic man in 
the education of virtues on a moral basis, since he is sovereign and independent and the 
principle of equality renders all individuals the right to express their interpretation of what is 
morally just. As a result, in its uttermost consequence, morality is progressive, subjective and 
relative.  
Religion is mutually similar and dissimilar to democracy; Christianity’s perception of the 
equality of all believers coincides with the principle of equality, yet it is not similar to democracy 
because of its otherness; religious man is free from the beliefs in individualism and materialism 
in democratic society, religion offers a spiritual alternative:  
 
The principal business of religions is to purify, regulate, and restrain the too ardent and too 
exclusive taste for well-being that men in times of equality feel; but I feel that they would be wrong 
to try to subdue it entirely and to destroy it. They will not succeed in turning men away from love of 
                                                  
36 Tocqueville uses the terms ‘religion’ and ‘Christianity’ simultaneously, but he clearly – and somewhat ‘politically incorrect’ in the present 
vocabulary of political science – distinguished between Christianity and Islam as of their prospects in corresponding successfully with 
democracy; “Mohammed had not only religious doctrines descend from Heaven and placed in the Koran, but political maxims, civil and 
criminal laws, and scientific theories. The Gospels, in contrast, speak only of the general relations of men to God and among themselves. 
Outside they teach nothing and oblige nothing to be believed. That alone, among a thousand other reasons, is enough to show that the 
first of these two religions cannot dominate for long in enlightened and democratic times, whereas the second is destined to reign in these 
centuries as in all others.(DA II, 1.5 p. 419-20) 
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wealth; but they can still try to persuade them to enrich themselves only by honest means. (DA II, 
1.5 p. 422) 
 
   Accordingly, while religion exerts a positive influence on mores, Tocqueville underlines that 
religion can never serve as a political alternative to democracy as such. It can remedy some of 
democracy’s negative aspects, but not replace democracy as the source of authority in the 
temporal world; “As men become more and more equal, it is more important that religions, while 
carefully putting themselves out of the way of the daily movement of affairs, not collide 
unnecessarily with the generality accepted ideas and permanent interests that reign among the 
mass.” (DA II, 1.5 p. 422-23) In fact, Tocqueville explicitly warns that the stabilizing effects of 
religion can only come into function when it is liberated from state sponsorship; a strict 
separation of church and state is necessary because if the religious doctrine is amalgamated 
with secular power, the appeal will diminish; religion must be perceived as immutable and 
eternal, in “allying itself with a political power, religion increases its power over some and loses 
the hope of reigning all.” (DA I, 2.9 p. 284) 
 
2.6.2 American Puritanism and Universal Christianity 
In Puritan America, in effect, religion ruled over the details of social 
life. But insofar as the power of religion was exercised by all 
members of the social body on each and each on all, it could be 
described not as the power of religion over society but, more 
judiciously, as that of society over itself by means of religion. 
(Manent 1996:94) 
                                                  
Tocqueville considers that the character of its Puritan founding, with its distinctive blend of 
religion and politics, in the main determined the nature of the American Revolution. “Puritanism 
was not only a religious doctrine; it also blended at several points with the most absolute 
democratic and republican theories.” (DA I, 1.2 p. 32) In his description of the Puritan founding, 
he invites readers to see “the key to almost the whole work” (DA I 1.2 p. 28). The New England 
township, with its practice of local democracy, was the political extension of the Puritan 
movement. The township was an indispensable factor in the practice of political freedom, where 
the “legislator are above all preoccupied with the care of maintaining moral order and the care of 
maintaining the good mores of society.” (DA I, 1.2 p. 38) Furthermore, Tocqueville emphasises 
the character and strong position of local democracy in America by pointing out that “the 
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institutions of a township are to freedom what primary schools are to science” (DA I, 1.5 p. 57) 
and the unique influence it exerted on the organizational structure of America since “the 
township had been organized before the country, the country before the state, the state before 
the Union.”37 (DA I, 1.2 p. 40) 
What distinguishes American democracy is the amalgamation of “two perfectly distinct 
elements” that in the emerging period of Enlightenment in Europe would come at odds with 
each other, but which defined the very essence of the political and societal system of the 
Americans:  
 
I have already said enough to put the character of Anglo-American civilization in its true light. It is  
the product (and its point of departure ought constantly be present in one’s thinking) of two 
perfectly distinct elements, that elsewhere have often made war at each other, but which, in 
America, they have succeeded in incorporating somehow into one another and combining 
marvellously. I mean here the spirit of religion and spirit of freedom. (DA I 1.2 p. 43) 
 
Where religion was in the main perceived as a reactionary and suppressive representative of 
the ‘Old Europe’ by the Enlightenment thinkers, Tocqueville was inspired by the American 
experiment, where “religion […] leads to enlightenment; it is the observance of divine laws that 
guides man to freedom.” (DA I, 1.2 p.42) Foreshadowing Max Weber’s sociological thesis on 
how Protestantism advanced the rise of modern capitalism, Tocqueville considers the puritan 
movement as a distinct contribution – and as conditional – to American democracy. However, 
he distinguishes between the unique Puritanism of the Americans and Christianity in its 
universal appearance; Tocqueville’s promotion of the necessity of faith in democracies lies in its 
capacity to promulgate values and an understanding of virtue which facilitate beliefs that act as 
contraceptives to excessive materialism: 
 
The principal business of religions is to purify, regulate, and restrain the too ardent and too 
exclusive taste for well-being that men in times of equality feel, but I believe that they would be 
wrong to try to subdue it entirely and to destroy it. They will not succeed in turning men away from 
love of wealth; but they can still persuade them to enrich themselves by honest means. (DA II 1.5 
p. 422) 
 
                                                  
37 Tocqueville continuously compared political culture between France and America throughout the first volume of the Democracy; “In 
France, the tax collector of the state levies the taxes of the commune; in America, the tax collector of the township levies the tax of the 
state. Thus, among us, the central government lends its agents to the township; in America, the township lends its agents to the 
government. That alone makes understandable the degree to which the two societies differ.” (DA I, 1.5 p. 63) 
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Religion, then, can serve as a deterrent against materialism. Moreover, as I perceive to be 
the principal concern for Tocqueville, religion can be a valuable ally in the practice of freedom; 
“the reign of freedom cannot be established without that of mores, nor mores founded without 
beliefs.” (DA I, introduction, p. 11)  
 
2.6.3 The Universality of Democracy and Christianity 
Indeed, in democratic times, there is a special need for individual minds to 
compensate for the total lack of structure – the frightening immensity of 
limitless desires within and unlimited choice without – by gravitating 
towards some set of beliefs that are transcendentally based and beyond 
dispute. In this way they way they find a haven that allows them to function 
in a heartless world. (Welch 2001:98) 
                                                  
Tocqueville clearly emphasized the universal appeal of democracy, and in The Old Regime and 
the Revolution he explored more deeply the causes of its nature. The French revolution 
distinguished itself from all previous political revolutions, and the reason for this was the 
universal nature of its appeal to mankind; it 
 
[d]id not have a territory of its own […] It has unified or divided people despite their laws, traditions, 
characters, and languages, turning compatriots into enemies, and strangers into brothers; or rather 
it established, above all particular nationalities, a common intellectual homeland where men of all 
nations could become citizens. (The Old Regime, p. 99) 
 
The universal appeal of Christianity lay in the same reasons:  
 
Religions usually consider man in himself, without regard for what the laws, customs, and traditions 
of a country have added to the common base […] The rules of conduct which religions prescribe 
relate less to the man of a particular country or time, than to the son, the father, the servant, the 
master, the neighbour. These rules are based on human nature itself; they can be equally 
accepted by all men and they are equally applicable everywhere. (The Old Regime, p. 100) 
 
Finally, Tocqueville compares the similarities of the two:  
 
The French Revolution operated, with respect to this world, in precisely the same manner that 
religious revolutions have acted respect to the other world. It considered the citizen in an abstract 
manner, outside of any particular society, the same way that religion considers man in general, 
independently of time and space. The Revolution did not only ask what the particular rights of 
French citizens were, but what were the general political rights and duties of men […] itself became 
a new kind of religion, an incomplete religion, it is true, without God, without ritual, and without a life 
after death, but one which nevertheless, like Islam, flooded the earth with its soldiers, apostles, and 
martyrs. (The Old Regime, p. 100–01) 
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Now, what I have attempted to illustrate in this thesis, regarding  Tocqueville’s observations 
of democratic man and democratic mentality, is that democracy - as an ideal conception - is an 
all-encompassing system of values, morality, order, and outlook. As noted earlier, it is not 
simply a political regime among others; its effect is effectively cultural, social and normative as 
well. One of Tocqueville’s chief concerns, was that equality of conditions paves the way for 
individualism and uniformity; these are features which in turn endangers the liberty; i.e. the will 
to freedom and intellectual diversity. Religion offers an alternative, not to democracy per se, but 
to some of the features inherited in democracy, particularly the ‘sacrosanct’ aspects of its 
universality:  
 
The idea of unity obsesses [the mind]; it seeks it on all sides, and when it believes it has found it, it 
willingly wraps it in its bosom and rests with it […] If I encounter a philosophic system according to 
which the things material and immaterial, visible and invisible that the world includes are 
considered an no more than diverse parts of an immense being which alone remains eternal in the 
midst of the continual change and incessant transformation of all that composes it, I shall have no 
trouble concluding that such a system, although it destroys human individuality, or rather because 
it destroys it, will have secret charms for men who live in democracy, all their intellectual habits 
prepare them to conceive it and set them ion the way to adopting it. (DA II, 1.8 p. 426) 
 
     While the principle of the sovereign individual stipulates that democratic man is rationally 
capable of moral insight and directing oneself as an autonomous being in a society comprised 
of those like him, it proves insufficient as man is dependent upon identification and meaning in 
the value-laden reality he navigates in. Tocqueville feared that democratic man would turn to an 
increasingly uniform majority of opinion as guideline of thought and conduct.  
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2.7 Public Opinion and the Will of the Majority  
 
The moral empire of the majority is founded in part on the idea that there is 
more enlightenment and wisdom in many men united than in one alone, in 
the number of legislators than in their choice. It is the theory of equality 
applied to intellects. (DA I, 2.7 p. 236) 
 
A cause vast enough to be applied to millions of men at once and strong 
enough to incline all together in the same direction easily seems 
irresistible; after having seen that one yields to it, one is quite close to 
believing that one cannot resist it. (DA II, 1.20 p. 471) 
 
2.7.1 What is Opinion? 
The present-day usage of the term ‘public opinion’ brings to mind specific preferences of 
attitude or conviction in a population on a specific matter conducted through a quantitative 
examination or survey, and whose data are expressed statistically. It is necessary to be aware 
of the fact that Tocqueville’s term opinion differs significantly from the familiar usage and 
understanding; it represents the profound fundamental currents of thought and conceptions that 
govern a society, indicators of what is perceived as ‘right and wrong,’ ‘just and unjust,’ and 
‘politically correct’, and acceptable expression concerning the democratic ideals. In other words, 
‘opinion’ reflects the generally accepted ideas of a society’s philosophical, normative and 
political foundation.  It is the faith or ideas that reign within the democratic society and 
resembles religious conviction in its character; opinion is the particular preferences by which a 
majority of a society’s citizenry relates to in matter of a comprehensive understanding of society 
and by which its actions and values transcends meaning and purpose. 
While the concept of ‘tyranny of the majority’ will be examined later in the thesis, it might be 
useful to ponder what Tocqueville meant by ‘majority,’ since the term also is of relevance in the 
discussion of ‘public opinion.’ Now, ‘majority’ in the Tocquevillian sense does not typically refer 
to a specific faction composed of either fixed or temporary acknowledgeable political interests. 
What ‘majority’ refers to is in effect more of a conceptual and felt entity, which transcends the 
central outlook of social accordance; ergo the public opinion. “For Tocqueville, the majority in its 
most essential guise was a commanding moral authority.” (Schleifer 2000:270) So what 
Tocqueville sets out to accomplish in his elaboration on public opinion, is to unveil the source of 
influence and force on shared beliefs that composes the democratic mentality and raison d’etrê. 
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It is something more than political ideologies; it echoes the common set of ideas that all 
Western ideologies agree upon as legitimate; sovereignty of the people. 38 
 
There are a great number of theories on matters of philosophy, morality, or politics that everyone 
thus adopts without examination, on faith of the public, and if one looks very closely, one will see 
that religion itself reigns there much less as revealed doctrine than as common opinion. (DA II, 1.2 
p. 409) 
 
An example of a strong democratic opinion is the principle of equality; the once revolutionary 
concept of men having equal political rights has changed from a liberating dynamic to a 
reflection considered ‘natural’. It has been established as a normatively undisputable truth, and 
analogous to justice. It is not an opinion that is explicitly ‘held’, but implicitly operative in the 
undertakings of politics and taken for granted as truthful. (Wolin:2001:125)  It logically correlates 
with the Enlightenment’s maxim on reason; “A general belief in equality and the similarities of 
temperament and opinion if a society without caste divisions were necessary for a general faith 
in the supremacy of the individual reason.” (Lively 1962:54)  
What Tocqueville sought to describe was the powerful democratic combination of its 
captivating ideas of equality and individual assessment, and the immense passions with which 
democratic people hold these ideas. What Tocqueville refers to as tyranny of the majority over 
thought, is ideologically based on the belief in intellectual equality; it logically follows that if all 
can equally discover the truth, then truth must correspond with the belief of the greatest number. 
“As the truth’s arbiter, the majority tends to shape what democrats feel, think, and honour.” 
(Kessler  2000:XXXI) 
 Being  a strong advocate of intellectual freedom of mind, his gravest fear was in this regard 
democracy’s potential for self-censorship, a collective state of mind where unpopular assertions 
and criticism would be subdued, particularly those that contradicted the majority; 
 
The moral empire of the majority is founded in part on the idea that there is more enlightenment 
and wisdom in many men united than in one alone, in the number of legislations than in their 
choice. It is the theory of equality applied to intellect. (DA I, 2.7, p. 236) 
 
                                                  
38 National Socialism and Bolshevik Socialism diverts in some respect from this perspective, but only to a certain degree; even these 
extreme ideologies – whose being would have been unattainable without the Enlightenment’s notion of equality and universalism – sought 
to justify its existence and authority by claiming to represent the general will and good of the people. 
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The voluntary transfer of free will and sovereignty of the individual to the majority are 
contrary to the ideas of communism, which stipulate a collectivism (initially state-regulated prior 
to the classless society) logically and ontologically preceding individual emancipation. 
Democracy’s reverse progression is collectivism rising out of excessive material individualism, a 
flock-mentality where democratic man blissfully mimics public opinion.39  
Tocqueville is sociologically aware that societies are functionally dependent upon common 
beliefs and symbols. He points out the fact that there is no society that can prosper without such 
beliefs (common dogmatic beliefs), for without common ideas there is no common action, and 
without any common action men still exists, but a social body does not.” (DA II, 1.2 p. 407). 
Tocqueville is speaking less of religious articles of faith, than of beliefs (croyances) in a broader 
sense of common parlance, and means that what people commonly think is true and right.  
 
If each undertook himself to form all his opinions and to pursue the truth in isolation down paths 
cleared by him alone, it is not probable that a great number of men would ever unite in any 
common beliefs. Now it is easy to see that there is no society that can prosper without such beliefs; 
or rather there is none that could survive this way; for without common ideas there is no common 
action, and without common action men still exists, but a social body does not. (DA II, 1.2 p. 407) 
 
Therefore, given the fact that individuals have limited time and resources, they are simply 
incapable of contemplating upon all the consequences and truthfulness of the majority’s wisdom 
or justice, and are therefore inclined to capitulate to its pressure in addition to the liberation it 
brings from the demanding burden of intellectual independency. and Tocqueville recognized the 
impracticability of each man verifying the truth behind every assumption. 
 
If man were forces to prove himself all the truths he makes of every day, he would never finish; he 
would exhaust himself in preliminary demonstrations without advancing; as he does not have the 
time because of the short span of his life, not the ability because of the limits of his mind, to act that 
way, he is reduced to accepting as given a host of facts and opinions that he has neither the leisure 
not the power to examine and verify by himself, but that the more able have found or the crowd 
adopts. (DA II, 1.2, p. 407-408) 
 
                                                  
39 Though Tocqueville dreaded the terror of the French Revolution, his anxieties concerning democracy was not revolution and brutality, 
but intellectual stagnation and docility. As he explains in the chapter Why Great Revolutions Will Become More Rare: “Violent passions 
have little hold on men who have so attached their whole soul to the pursuit of well-being. The ardour they put into small affairs calms them 
in great ones [...] I do no claim that men who live in democratic societies are naturally immobile; I think on the contrary, that an eternal 
motion reigns in the heart of such a society and that no one knows repose in it; but I believe that men in it are agitated within certain limits 
that they scarcely ever exceed. They vary, alter, or renovate secondary things every day; they take great care not to touch the principal 
ones. They love change, but they dread revolutions.” (DA II, 3.21 p. 609-10) 
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The legacy of the Enlightenment is in this regard internally conflictual; while upholding the 
individual’s rights, ostensibly supporting dissimilarity and variety, it also creates a “difference-
denying culture of equality. The power of the ideology lies in this double creation: the democrat 
acts as though he was wholly self-centred, yet he is, at the same time, a fervent believer of 
collectivities.” (Wolin 2001:352) Public opinion offers a relief to the burden of choice in an 
increasingly complex society where orientation and verification of a rapidly changing 
environment for many seems progressively difficult. The principle of equality provides logically 
that a majority (composed by sovereign and independent individuals) in a given issue supports 
the credibility of public opinion, which serves as indicators of direction and adaptable 
convictions. Likewise, public opinion cannot be attributed to be the responsibility of a single 
person; therefore, nothing is at stake in adopting and approving them. The inclination according 
to which man submits to anonymous public opinion, the generalization of politics through ‘de-
ideologization’, and the vulgarization and simplification of political language where the principal 
objective is to please the electorate in a ‘sellable’ manner, provides for a uniform and atomistic 
society: 
 
In times of equality, because of their similarity, men have no faith in one another; but this same 
similarity gives them an almost unlimited trust in the judgement of the public; for it does not seem 
plausible to them that when all men have the same enlightenment, truth is not found on the side of 
the greatest number.  
When the man who lives in democratic countries compare himself individually to all those who 
surround him, he feels pride that he is the equal of them; but when he comes to view the sum of 
those like him and places himself at the side of this great body, he is immediately overwhelmed by 
his own insignificance and his weakness. 
The same equality that makes him independent of each of his fellow citizens in particular leaves 
him isolated and without defence against the action of the greatest number. (DA II, 1.2 p. 409) 
 
Subsequently, what the democratic man values or recognizes is not a given quality of 
opinion, but that he holds an opinion in conjuncture with the social body as a whole.  Democratic 
man has more choices than anyone in history has ever had, yet he has fewer guidelines and 
points of reference for making choices. A resolution for this predicament is by seeking sanctuary 
in public opinion, where the anonymity of the mass ensures both a course of action and freedom 
from the risk of actually reflecting upon commonly held truths. This tendency, characterized as 
’pantheism’ by Tocqueville, where not only the particularness and the intellectual sovereignty is 
lost from sight by individual men, but by mankind as well: 
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As conditions become more equal and each man in particular becomes more like all the others, 
weaker and smaller, one gets used to no longer viewing citizens so as to consider only the people, 
one forgets individuals so as to think of only the species. 
In these times the human mind loves to embrace a host of diverse objects at once; it willingly seeks 
to enlarge and simplify its thoughts by enclosing God and the universe within a single 
whole…[S]uch a system, although it destroys human individuality, or rather because it destroys it, 
will have secret charms for men who live in democracy, all their intellectual habits prepare them to 
conceive it and set them on the way to adopting it […] Among the different systems with whose aid 
philosophy seeks to explain the universe, pantheism appears to me one of the most appropriate to 
seduce the human mind in democratic centuries. (DA II 1.7 p. 426) 
 
The concept of individualism claims that the democratic man is inclined to retreat to a closed 
circle in the private realm consisting of friends and family, while pantheism claims that 
democracy is neglecting the individual. “The individual described under ‘individualism’ has, in 
his weakness and vulnerability, lost his individuality. He seeks his identity in the very universal, 
mass forces to which he regards himself as subject. Democracy creates individuals, then 
leaves them unprotected so that, abetted by pantheism and ‘democratic historians’, they easily 
fall into individualism.” (Mansfield & Winthrop 2000:LXV) As a community, the danger of an 
overly strong emphasis on equality of conditions can cause democracy to be anti-social; it 
severs individuals from one another by pronouncing each of them equally free, equally 
independent and equally similar.40 Where sovereignty of the people was intended to express 
politically the common will of the greatest number, but where the individual was protected 
physically – both life and property – from its arbitrariness through constitutional guarantees, its 
modern version has been transformed into the intellectual authority of the greatest number, but 
where its expression is primarily societal and where the individual enjoys little psychological 
protection from its attraction and pressure upon the independent mind. 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
40 John Stuart Mill, who was influenced by Tocqueville and a great admirer, echoed Tocqueville in On Liberty: “Comparatively speaking, 
they now read the same things, listen to the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed 
to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties and the same means of asserting them […] All the political changes of the age 
promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings 
people under the same influences. Improvement in the means of communication promotes it […] Increase of commerce and manufacture 
promotes it […] The ascendancy of public opinion […] forms so great a mass of influence hostile to individuality (88-89) [that] in this age 
the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service.” (Mill 1991:82-83) 
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2.7.2 Democratic Man’s Lack of Faith in Himself 
Obedience to the power of majority is the only thing that allows men to 
entertain the illusion that they are obeying their own will. (Manent 1996:22) 
 
The paradoxical result of the liberation of reason is greater reliance on 
public opinion for guidance, a weakening of independence. Although every 
man in democracy thinks himself individually equal of every other man, this 
makes it difficult to resist the collectivity of equal men. If all opinions are 
equal, then the majority of opinions, in the psychological analogy of politics, 
should hold sway. It is very well to say that each should follow his own 
opinion, but since consensus is required for social and political life, 
accommodation is necessary. (Bloom 1998:247) 
 
To Tocqueville, the power of public opinion is a form of the sovereignty of the people – 
unregulated, wild, but effective. He acknowledged that social power in the American democracy 
was unprecedented compared to the still rigid and formal power structure that dominated 
Europe. The power of public opinion is also a result of the more psychological consequences 
the passion for equality imposes on the human mind. Tocqueville described the democratic man 
as weak and isolated (everyone is the same; hence none are better or worse than one is). ”He 
can believe only in himself, but has no faith in himself. It follows that he does not trust himself or 
another, but a third that they form together, at one with all others. They trust in the masses.” 
(Manent 1996:40) 
 
As citizens become more equal and alike, the penchant to each to believe blindly a certain man or 
mass decreases […] Not only is common opinion the sole guide that remains for individual reason 
among democratic peoples; but it has infinitely greater power among these peoples than among any 
other. In times of equality, because of their similarity, men have no faith in one another; but this same 
similarity gives them an almost unlimited trust in the judgement of the public; for it does not seem 
plausible to them that when all have the same enlightenment, truth is not to be found on the side of 
the greatest number. (DA II, 1.2 p.409) 
 
There are common opinions in all societies, but in democratic societies it prevails in the main 
unopposed, for other potential providers of opinions have lost their validity and credibility. 
“Society is not simply a reality and force external to thought. Rather, it tends to become the 
constitutive theme, the texture of thought itself. The democratic social state transforms the very 
substance of ideas that occupy the spirit of men. It produces new and particular ideas and 
modifies the rule and the matter of men’s intellectual activity” (Manent 1996:42)  
Tocqueville asserted that the apparatus that was best suited for commissioning the will of the 
majority was the political expression of the sovereignty of the people; the centralized state.  
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2.8 Administrative and Governmental Centralization 
 
The government centralizes its action at the same time that it increases its 
prerogative: a double cause of force. (DA II, 4.5 p. 655) 
 
Considering the government their own, they can allow it to extend its power 
indefinitely as long as it treats them equally and promotes their economic 
well-being. The more dependent the people become on government, the 
more willing they are to sacrifice their rights to its political designs. (Kessler 
2000:XXXII) 
 
Tocqueville theoretically distinguished between two categories of centralization. 
‘Governmental centralization’ is the indispensable and necessary aggregation of the state’s 
authority; the affairs that are “common to all parts of the nation.” (DA I, 1.5 p. 82) This includes 
foreign relations and legislation on a national level.41 However, what is unnecessarily subject to         
central governance, are politics that are distinctly local, as “the undertakings of the township.” 
(ibid.) Conversely, ‘administrative centralization’ was a phenomenon that worried Tocqueville, 
since in combination with governmental centralization it could render the citizenry inert in 
political practice, compliant in thought and conform in manner. 
 
It is understood that governmental centralization acquires an immense force when it is joined to 
administrative centralization. In this manner it habituates men to make a complete and continual 
abstraction from their wills; to obey not once and on one point, but in every thing and every day. It 
then not only subdues them by force, but it also captures them through their habits; it isolates then 
and afterwards fastens them one by one onto the common mass […] I think that administrative 
centralization is fit only to enervate the peoples who submit to it, because it constantly tends to 
diminish the sprit of the city in them. Administrative centralization, it is true, succeeds in uniting at a 
given period and in a certain place all the disposable strength of the nation, but it is harmful to the 
reproduction of strength […] and it diminishes the power in the long term. (DA I, 82-83). 
 
Furthermore, given the attraction that the principle of equality exerts in the democratic social 
state, egalitarian inclinations among the democratic citizenry supports and promotes 
centralization as a means to achieve equality, while centralization as an organizational principle 
itself encourages equality.  
 
I am convinced […] that no nations are more at risk of falling under the yoke of administrative 
centralization than those whose social state is democratic […] The permanent tendency of these 
nations is to concentrate all governmental power that directly represents the people, because 
beyond the people one perceives no more than equal individuals confused in common mass (DA I, 
1.5 p. 91-92) 
                                                  
41 “To concentrate the power to direct the first [foreign policy, legislation] in the same place or in the same hand is to found what I shall call 
governmental centralization.” (DA I, 1.5 p. 82) 
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Theorists of civil society are inclined to hold the centralized state responsible for the deflation 
of free associations and the declining interest of participation. Nevertheless, this is a diagnosis 
that merely treats the symptoms, not the cause. Tocqueville’s cause of distress was not located 
in the state itself; the democratic state’s source of power was society, and if the citizenry desired 
protection from the state – in the form of security and welfare – then it was the psychological 
and ideological underpinnings of these desires that needed attention. What the citizenry could 
not, or overlooked to foresee, was that a society where the principle of administrative 
centralization was the foremost standard of political organization, security and welfare could 
only be achieved at a price; the gradual and almost unnoticeable evaporation of freedom.42 Not 
that freedom is in any way forcefully and brutally deprived from the citizenry, it just little by little 
becomes unnecessary to fight for, to practice, and to think of. Tocqueville was alarmed by the 
growth of centralized administration in his own time;  
 
[e]verywhere is penetrates further into private affairs than formerly; in its manner it regulates more 
actions, and smaller actions, and it establishes itself more every day beside, around, and above 
each individual to assist him, counsel him, and constrain him. (DA II, 4.5 p. 653) 
 
Tocqueville’s emphasis on local government and decentralization is evident in this setting. 
However, it is imperative (once again) to remind ourselves that the practice of political freedom 
Tocqueville promoted does not necessarily accommodate with the conventional understanding 
of ‘participation’ in contemporary social science. If the tendency is a process where participation 
is a part of a noticeably centralized and uniform course, where administrative efficiency, 
decision-making and planning are recognizable and dominant features, it diverts from 
Tocqueville’s understanding of participation. As Michael Hereth describes in his understanding 
of Tocquevillian participation and political freedom, local democracy must be genuinely political 
in its nature: 
 
Local self-government by citizens in a free community ensures the freedom of citizens to act in 
common with other citizens, to confer publicly with each other on their own affairs an to settle them. 
Its aim is to shape local living conditions and not just to fill areas that the central authorities have 
                                                  
42 Of course, there is wide acceptance of the fact, even among libertarians, that the state should provide some degree of security, 
internally through a police force and a penitentiary system, and externally through military defence. It is beyond this minimum that we can 
recognize ideological divergence as to which role the state should have regarding security and welfare.    
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left vacant and that the latter steadily restrict by public subsidies and by technical and legal 
supervision of communal administration, their instruments of manipulation (Hereth 1986:40) 
 
In order for democratic man to develop a consciousness of, at least a sense of responsibility 
to partake in the local political surroundings, and at best an awareness of the necessity of virtue, 
then local democracy cannot represent a prolongation of a centralized vision of uniformity and 
sameness. This reveals the weakness of theoretical models of ‘participation’ and 
‘implementation’ of democratic structure; if the premises of participation constitute involvement 
in an organizational structure which is set up to implement political and administrative goals 
previously undertaken centrally, then it is difficult to see how citizens can develop a sense of 
political attentiveness beyond “interest politics”. Thus, the hypothesis on the rational actor 
becomes empirically tautological; when selfishness is presupposed, as by Hobbes, and when 
the social sciences which are responsible for working out structural models of participation 
assumes that man ultimately is driven by rational and calculating self-interest, then political 
mentality becomes one of material interest (‘Left’ and ‘Right’ alike) and a focus on distribution of 
the material. Allan Bloom compares ancient and modern concepts of virtue and notions of what 
facilitates the motives of man;  
 
All interesting generalization must proceed form the richest awareness of what is to be explained, 
but the tendency to abstractness leads to simplifying the phenomena in order more easily to deal 
with them. If, for example, on sees only gain as a motive in men’s actions, then it is easy to explain 
them. To the extent that men begin to believe in the theory, they no longer believe there are other 
motives in themselves. And when social policy is based on such a theory, finally one succeeds in 
producing men who fit the theory […] Hobbes’s mercenary account of the virtue, which won out in 
psychology, needs to be contrasted with Aristotle’s account, which preserves the independent 
nobility of the virtue. Curiously, in a democracy, the freest of societies, men turn out to be more 
willing to accept doctrines that tell them that they are determined, that is, not free. No one by 
himself seems able to be, or have the right to control events, which appear to be moved by 
impersonal forces. (Bloom  1988:255) 
 
2.8.1 Centralization: Why Does the Democratic State Become so Powerful? 
Hence democratic individuals are at once pulled away form independent 
self-governing activities and pushed towards the acceptance of state 
regulation, even where formal civil and political rights exist. (Welch 
2001:78). 
 
The promise of freedom, sanctified as the keystone of liberal democratic society, and which 
was a prerequisite for the individuals ability to arrange a cohesive society of rights and 
responsibility, has transformed itself into an atomistic society of competitors and special interest 
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groups with claims to justice and rights in all segments of society. The apparatus for producing 
these good deeds – which are generally measurable financially – required a strong centralized 
state that could reproduce economic security on the political level. Reasonably, this state 
requires a multitude of public servants to execute the accumulating number of public 
responsibilities: 
 
In democratic peoples as in all others, the number of public posts in the end has bounds; but in the 
same peoples the number of the ambitious has none; it increases constantly by a gradual and 
irresistible movement as conditions are equalized; it is bounded only when men are lacking. (DA II, 
3.20 p. 605) 
 
  The centralized state in democracies will naturally become an arena where special interests 
groups seek out entitlements and support from the democratically elected representatives. The 
central issue in democratic conflict is ‘who gets what’, and this process is not regarded as illicit, 
since the government is professed as the extension of public will.  
 
Men who live in centuries of equality naturally love the central power and willingly extend its 
privileges; but if it happens that this same power faithfully represents their interests and exactly 
reproduces their instincts, the confidence they bring to it has almost no bounds, and they believe 
that all that they give they accord to themselves. (DA II, 4.4 p. 649) 
 
    Tocqueville portrays a democratic future where increasing materialism and centralization 
correspond with decreasing political interest and attentiveness: 
 
On the one hand, the taste for material well-being constantly increases, and on the other hand, the 
government takes hold more and more of all the sources of well-being. Men therefore come by two 
diverse paths of servitude. The taste for well-being turns them away from being involved in 
government, ant the love of well-being puts them in an ever stricter dependence on those who 
govern. (DA II, 4.4 p. 654) 
 
   The government of liberty proved itself too feeble and without sufficient appeal to breed and 
maintain a political culture, an arrangement of mores for a society of citizens, or a vibrant public 
space for debate of ‘ideas’ or ‘men’ rather than economic interest.  What concerned Tocqueville 
was not primarily that the central power easily becomes a commanding and penetrating force in 
its influence upon civil society, but that it transforms and alters active pattern of social interface, 
thus exhausting the citizenry of its capacity and will for self-government. While Tocqueville’s 
description of democracy gone awry in the first volume of the Democracy was painted by a state 
where the immense pressure for conformity of opinion by the majority, the second volume 
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outlines an even darker vision of democracy’s potentially devastating effects upon diversity and 
the subjugation of free will; democratic despotism.  
 
2.9 Tyranny of the Majority and Democratic Despotism 
 
Under the absolute government of one alone, despotism struck the body 
crudely, so as to reach the soul; and the soul, escaping from those blows, 
rose gloriously above it, but in democratic republics, tyranny does not 
proceed in this way; it leaves the body and goes straight for the soul.  
(DA I, 2.7 p. 244) 
 
The government of man will be replaced by the administration of things. 
 – Henri de Saint-Simon 
 
The distinction between the state and society can be said to have become distorted under 
the modern, democratic state. The sovereign king or aristocracy has ceased to symbolize the 
incarnate symbols of authority; now it has become anonymous, yet nonetheless commanding. 
“Its form is cultural, its agent the unconscious majority, its expressions intangible rather than 
material, its power more the conditioning result from simultaneity of belief rather that from self-
conscious concerted action.” (Wolin 2001:199) The private sphere that once constituted society, 
family, church, and work is at present, if not subjugated, profoundly influenced by governmental 
institutions and regulations. Democratic society is a mélange of political societies, where 
governmental and administrative decisions are all-encompassing in their consequences. 
As previously mentioned, tyranny of the majority was a predominant concern in the first 
volume of Democracy. In democratic nations, where all are formally and ideologically equal, and 
all may participate in public offices, the central power is perceived as a legitimate extension of 
the public will (expressed through the electoral process directly, and through polls indirectly). 
Tocqueville was not the first to recognize the phenomenon of tyranny of the majority. Aristotle 
observed it in ancient democracy, and his perception of democracy equates rule of the many, 
for their own advantage, with tyranny. However, Tocqueville did not equate tyranny with 
arbitrariness; he limited tyranny to the exercise of power not “in the interest of the governed”. At 
the same time, he finds the seed of tyranny in “the right and the ability to do everything”, 
presumably even in the alleged best interest of the governed.  
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2.9.1 The Concepts of ‘Tyranny of the Majority’ and ‘Democratic Despotism’ 
The essence of despotism turns out to be the evils of banality rather than 
Hannah Arendt’s ‘the banality of evil’. (Wolin 2001:342) 
 
As for me, when I feel the hand of power weighing on my brow, it matters 
little to me who oppresses me, and I am no more disposed to put my head 
in the yoke because a million arms present it to me. (DA II, 1.2 p. 410) 
 
Considering the conventional understanding and usage of the terms ‘tyranny’ and 
‘despotism,’ their employment in the contemporary theoretical debate on democracy seem 
somewhat surreal and instinctively contradictory. Tocqueville himself struggled to furnish an 
adequate linguistic description of the phenomenon: 
 
I think therefore that the kind of oppression with which democratic peoples are threatened will 
resemble nothing that has preceded it in the world; our contemporaries would not find its image in 
their memories. I myself seek in vain an expression that exactly reproduces the idea that I form of it 
for myself and that contains it; the old words despotism and tyranny are not suitable. (DA II, 4.6 p. 
662) 
 
 Tocqueville’s description of “mild despotism” in democracies is incontestably divergent in its 
inoffensiveness and mildness from a merciless and totalitarian regime. However, while the 
schoolmaster state that he describes does not tyrannize the people physically, its influence is 
nonetheless forceful and in attendance.  
   Now, the usage of tyranny and despotism has been common political terms since classical 
Greece. Aristotle’s description portrays passionate political activity by the Many - usually poor - 
in dissent against the unjust actions by the aristocrats or wealthy oligarchs, and hence the 
result of awakened political awareness.43 The modern despotism Tocqueville undertook to 
define was in many respects the reverse: the citizenry losing its ardour for political liberty and 
civic responsibility, resulting into a recessive mental state of indifference and disenchantment. 
(Wolin 2001:345) Accordingly, where tyranny and despotism in the ancient and Middle Ages 
was recognizable by activity and disorder, its modern version is distinguishable by inactivity and 
order.  
   In his time, Tocqueville was not the first to recognize the phenomenon of tyranny of the 
majority, but his reflections upon the matter adds a new perspective of it and his premises 
                                                  
43 “Thus suppose the poor use their numerical superiority to make a distribution of the property of the rich: is not that unjust? ‘No, by Zeus’ 
it may be said, ‘it has been done justly by a decision of the sovereign power’” ( Politics, 1281a 15-19) 
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diverges from the main current of philosophical and political thought. The Federalist describes 
majority tyranny as “a faction […] who are united and actuated by some common impulse or 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggravate interest of the community.” (The Federalist, No. 10, p.123) What Tocqueville focuses 
upon is not a specific faction as such, but more the mindset of the majority, i.e., the normative 
fundament in a democratic society that incorporates norms, mores, the commonly accepted 
‘conduct of thought’ as well as deliberation upon the democratic regime.44 In a democratic 
society the principle or doctrine behind this normative underpinning, which justifies its capability 
to execute its influence, is of course the sovereignty of the people. His fear was that this would 
signify a mentality of inertia and conformity where the citizens preferred political seclusion to 
political participation and public concerns, corresponding with the centralizing tendencies of 
state authority.  
   To discriminate democratic despotism from former historical classifications, he compared it 
with “the time of the greatest power of the Caesars”: 
 
[t]heir tyranny weighted enormously in some, but it did not extend to the many; it applied itself to a 
few great principal objects and neglected the rest; it was violent and restricted. 
It seems that if despotism came to be established in the democratic nations of our day, it would 
have other characteristics: it would be more extensive and milder, and it would degrade men 
without tormenting them. (DA II, 4.6, p. 662) 
 
   A comprehension of democratic despotism requires us to alter our image of what democratic 
despotism consists of; there is no despot in despotism, no tyrant who tyrannizes, it is faceless 
and nameless and cannot be located in the state directly. To discover it, we must turn our 
centre of attention towards society: the despotism Tocqueville struggled to describe was a 
condition that was a result of democracy gone awry and subsequently the people itself. 
“Democracy originates a new form of despotism, society tyrannizing over itself.” (Zetterbaum 
1987:770) It cannot be described in sheer institutional terms; its instruments are the 
omnipresent bureaucracy and the mediocre politician, which are set to administer an atomized 
society composed of content and inactive individuals who are ‘unburdened’ with the troubles of 
active political responsibility. However, these are merely indicators, not the cause. Rather, what 
                                                  
44 By ‘deliberation’ it means critique or questioning of the fundamental normative premises of democracy, such as its notions of justice (the 
principle of equality) or tolerance (respect for minorities). 
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is essential to understand its being and condition, is the effective evaporation of the culture of 
participation and intellectual attentiveness on freedom, and its substitution by “the culture of 
privatism, isolation, and what Tocqueville could not have foreseen, consumerism.” (Wolin 
2001:570) Thus, the preconditions of democratic despotism are not solely dependent upon the 
affirmative contributions that are empirically recognizable, but also a metaphysical element of 
loss – a condition where the citizens are deficient of meaningful identification with the political. 
Sheldon S. Wolin has described the sensation of democratic despotism in a perceptive 
Tocquevillian manner:  
 
But what if, instead of being enslaved, men were formally free; instead of economic misery and 
bleakness there was a vibrant economic life; instead of a single person indulging in his pleasures, all 
enjoyed the prospect of endless gratifications? What if, instead of cruelty, there was benevolence; 
instead of fear and uncertainty, there was security; and instead of personal caprice, there was order 
and predictability? How, amid such contradictory evidence, was it possible to declare despotism? 
Where was the despot, where the un-freedom and the invasion of private sanctities? Where was the 
oppression, if tyranny, instead of appearing as the opposite of the normal, appeared to be its 
embodiment – the tyranny of norm-all? (Wolin 2001:340) 
 
It is a state of intellectual conventionality, but not perceived as such by the people – on the 
contrary – individualism is considered as the prominent characteristic that expresses diversity 
and freedom. Furthermore, the ‘Right’, the political phenomenon that has been accredited as 
upholding personal freedom and the right to ‘choose’, has ideologically adopted individualism as 
a positive force. However, this realm of choice is generally condensed to freedom of choice in 
the economic sphere, as an essential criterion for the free marked and prosperity. Conversely, 
the ‘Left’ scorns individualism (perceived analogous to ‘egoism’), since it contradicts a vision of 
collectivism and egalitarianism. On both accounts, the understanding of individualism is 
commonly based on material terms, since both liberalism and socialism as ideologies has 
gradually lost their belief in ideas, and their relationship increasingly has become that of 
opponents in the field of economic distribution. 
   Democracy’s authority is not vindictive or brutal, but sedative and peaceful. What 
characterizes it is not austerity, but mildness. Its resemblance is closer to the lavishness and 
prodigality of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World than the bleakness and drabness of George 
Orwell’s 1984. Freedom comes to represent freedom from the burden of political responsibilities 
and duties, a state of tranquillity and order where the citizens are encouraged to public 
compliance and the pursuit of private and risk-free pleasures in which they can indulge. “Its evil 
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does not lie in the ethical or aesthetic shortcoming of ordinariness but in a mentality that 
individualism breeds and allows despotism to take hold insensibly, almost effortlessly.” (Wolin 
2001:342)  
Of the dangers democracy that embodies, is that good faith of its citizenry towards the 
democratic regime – which, according to its principles is an expression of public will – can be 
deluded and exploited by political actors; political populism is particularly dangerous in 
democracies because of the appealing promise of expanding popular rule. Individuals with little 
time – or interest – to reflect upon the consequences of increasing power of the majority’s will 
have difficulties in assuring its wisdom or justice. What he feared from this was that the will of 
the majority comes to exercise a kind of “moral empire”, previously unknown. (DA I 2.7) A strong 
advocate of intellectual freedom of the mind, Tocqueville dreaded democracy’s potential self-
censure, where unpopular truths and criticism will no longer be spoken, especially those that 
criticise the habits, opinion and tastes of the majority and the ‘people.’ 
 
No writer, whatever his renown may be, can escape the obligation of singing the praises of his 
fellow citizens. The majority, therefore, lives in perpetual adoration of itself. (DA I, 2.7 p. 245) 
 
The more conditions become equal, and the less men are individually strong, the more they easily 
let themselves go with the current of the crowd and have trouble holding alone an opinion that is 
has abandoned. (DA II, 2.6 p. 495) 
 
The concepts of democracy and centralization do not – rationally or ideologically – form a 
natural symbiosis; hierarchy, an austere and rigid structure, symbolizes the centralized state, 
which diametrically combats the logic of pluralistic and liberal democracy. The connecting 
attribute Tocqueville discovered between these two concepts was uniformity; equality of 
conditions as a normative imperative facilitates the state to administrate more resourcefully than 
would be the case if it were obliged to relate to genuine dissimilarities on the societal level, such 
as aristocracy, class, religious factions or tribalism. 
 
[t]he vices to which despotism gives birth are precisely those that equality favours. These two 
things complement and aid each other in a fatal manner. Equality places men beside one another 
without a common bond to hold them. Despotism raises barriers between them and separates 
them.  
Equality disposes them not to think of those like themselves, and for them, despotism makes a sort 
of pubic  virtue of indifference. 
Despotism, which is dangerous at all times, is therefore particularly to be feared in democratic 
centuries. (DA II, 2.4 p. 485-86) 
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There is no malignant and observable, concrete force which we can identify behind 
democratic despotism, rather the opposite; what separates it from all other forms of tyranny, is 
its abstractness and “apparent rationality and good intentions”. (Mansfield & Winthrop 1999:5) 
What defines the size of the government, is not the liberal notion of a government restricted by 
limited ends, but the universal promise of equal right to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
for all,’ which is logically limitless. If ‘happiness’ is materially defined in terms of a certain level of 
equal material well-being – politically defined or commonly supposed – it requires a powerful, 
resourceful and immense government.  
 
It would resemble paternal power if, like that, it had for it subject to prepare men for manhood; but 
on the contrary, it seeks to keep them fixed irrevocably in childhood; it likes citizens to enjoy 
themselves provided that they think only of enjoying themselves. It willingly works for their 
happiness; but it wants to be the unique agent and sole arbiter of that; it provides them for their 
security, foresees and secures their needs, facilitates their pleasures, conducts their principal 
affairs, directs their industry, regulates their estates, divides their inheritances; can it not take away 
form them entirely the trouble of thinking and the pain of living? 45 (DA II, 4.6 p. 663) 
 
2.9.2 The Abdication of Political Freedom 
Love of public tranquillity is often the sole political passion that these 
people preserve, and it becomes more active and powerful in them as all 
the others are weakened and die: this naturally disposes citizens to give 
the central power new rights, or allow it to take them; it alone seems to 
them to have the interest and the means to defend them from anarchy by 
defending itself. (DA II, 4.3 p. 644) 
 
Tocqueville predicted an entirely new genus of servitude, a society where citizens freely 
submitted their sovereignty to a common representative of their voluntary will, and this differs 
fundamentally from the well-known discussion of the relationship between individual and state.43 
The centralized state is not analyzed as a contrasting theoretical subject that opposes the 
freedom of the individual, but as its voluntary extension representing and protecting its interests, 
which Tocqueville identifies as the pursuit of material well-being and the guardianship of 
egalitarian justice. Alas, the Hobbesian state becomes self-fulfilling; as mentioned; democratic 
                                                  
45 Tocqueville’s conception of a paternalistic government resembles Kant’s description: “Under such a paternal government (imperium 
paternale), the subjects, as immature children who cannot distinguish what is truly useful or harmful to themselves, would be obliged to 
behave purely passively and to rely upon the judgement of the head of the state as to how they ought to be happy, and upon his kindness 
in willing their happiness at all. Such a government is the greatest conceivable despotism,” (Kant: “Theory and Practice: On the 
Relationship of Theory and Practice” in Political Thought. 1991:74) 
43 The transaction of freedom for security and welfare is generally not perceived as a dilemma, since – given the principle of sovereignty of 
the people – this transaction is deemed as voluntary. “Nowhere has the law left a greater part to arbitrariness than in democratic republics, 
because in them, what is arbitrary does not appear fearful.” (DA I, 2.5 p. 197) 
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man covets tranquillity and security provided by a benign Leviathan in order to enjoy a sheltered 
existence of material well-being and welfare. Political freedom has become a catchphrase, a 
democratic maxim whose original connotation as a valuable idea of individual consciousness 
and self-government that gradually has been hollowed out. What matters now, is personal 
freedom, the right to choose a ‘lifestyle.’ Unlike Hobbes’ rational and conscious transaction of 
freedom to the Leviathan for security, there are no attentive and recognizable actors that 
represent the state and the citizen in the current transaction. The democratic state is not, as 
described by the libertarians, a foe that cynically and rationally aims at depriving the people of 
their constitutional rights. The political rights of speech, organization and religion are accessible 
to all democratic citizens in the West, but what Tocqueville warns us is that these rights and 
freedoms needs attentiveness and consciousness from its citizens. It is the political priorities 
and ambitions of democratic man that decides whether rights are perceived as instruments for 
achieving entitlements and accomplishment of personal interests founded in materialistic 
desires, or as means to develop into an independent and freethinking political being. If 
democratic man chooses the former, the democratic future is dispiriting according to 
Tocqueville: 
 
Men who have a passion for material enjoyments ordinarily find out how the agitations of freedom 
trouble their well-being before perceiving how freedom serves to procure it for them, and the least 
noise from public passions that penetrate into the midst of the little enjoyments of their private lives, 
they wake up and become restive; for a long time, fear of anarchy holds them constantly in 
suspense and always ready to throw out their freedom at the first disorder. 
I shall acknowledge that public peace is a great good; but I nevertheless do not want to forget that 
it is through good order that all people have arrived at tyranny […] A nation that demands of its 
government only the maintenance of order is already a slave at the bottom of its heart; it is a slave 
to its well-being, and the man who is to put it in chains can appear. (DA II, 2.14 p. 516) 
            
Democratic despotism is perhaps the gravest and most pessimistic of Tocqueville’s fears of 
democracy’s latent perils. “His concern is not so much about the despotism hostile to liberalism 
as about democratic despotism.” (Mansfield & Winthrop 2000:35) The schoolmaster state he 
describes is overwhelming, and democratic citizens are likely to feel incapable on their own and 
therefore seek the protection of – while becoming its dependents – a state that gradually 
suffocates them with its mildness and a plethora of minute, detailed regulations, rather than 
oppressiveness and brutality. It will care for its citizens, always alert and attentive to satisfy their 
unsatisfiable and perpetually emerging material desires. However, by relieving individuals of the 
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necessity of thinking and acting on their own, it gradually “rob’s each of them of several of the 
principal attributes of humanity” and finally “reduces each nation to being nothing more than a 
herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd.” (DA II, 4.7 p. 
663) 
Underlying the train-of-thought in Tocqueville’s arguments is the fear that the passion for 
equality becomes particularly dominant, and that the exercise of intellectual freedom becomes 
dormant and redundant. Where the first volume of Democracy was concerned that the 
conformity of opinion held by the majorities would suffocate individual independence and 
intellectual diversity, the second volume paints a bleak, numb society of subservient sameness 
where the equal but an atomized and compliant citizenry is guided and nurtured by an 
apparently benevolent central state, and the pursuit of material well-being is the norm-for-all. 
The prerequisite for this potential despotism is the “new links between a society of equals and 
the forces of political centralization.” (Welch 2001:72) 
From the premise of representing a majority of sovereign individuals, it follows logically that a 
democratically elected government can declare itself the broadcaster of the majority’s will and 
the protector of its interest. The perception of the state apparatus as the natural representative 
of the people and that its inclination to formulate uniform laws and regulations are recognized as 
just and necessary to attain democratic justice, is truly unique in world history. This partially 
explains the stability and high level of ideological loyalty (towards the concept of democracy) in 
Western democracies; the government is the representative of the people, and although there is 
disagreement upon political issues, there is wide acceptance of democratic decisions.46 Bluntly 
expressed, this can be explained by allegiance to the democratic process and majority verdicts. 
However, when the people are merely content and comfortable with the polity that operates as a 
habitual and somewhat mechanical process, requiring only their consent by routinely elections, 
the separation of the private man from the political man becomes disconcertingly uncomfortable.  
The principal causes of this intellectually desolate and sedated society Tocqueville portrays 
can be located in the notions of individualism, materialism and excessive egalitarianism; a 
democratic society that has become disillusioned and disengaged by political life, where the 
citizenry’s principal focus is on security and material well-being. In this condition, the centralized 
                                                  
46 “[a]s long as the majority is doubtful, one speaks; but when it has irrevocably pronounced, everyone becomes silent and friends and 
enemies alike then seem to hitch themselves together to its wagon.” (DA I, 2.7 p. 243) 
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state provides order and welfare; order by securing the bourgeoisie’s necessity for stability in 
the creation of welfare and material progress, welfare by yielding the same class its desire for 
material security. The immediate effects of a strong centralized state are widespread and 
popular, but the hazard is that political dialect quickly becomes dominated by general truths of 
unity and consistency, and that this vernacular “comes naturally to efficient centralizers and 
administrative rationalizers.” (Welch 2001:78) The sources of the expanding centralized 
democratic state are located in internal and external causes. Internally, centralization is 
stimulated by the natural aspiration “of all governments to wish to enlarge its sphere 
continuously.” (DA II, 4.3 p. 644) Externally, the causes are more complex and intertwined; the 
democratic principle of equality facilitates uniformity, which eludes the government of “the 
examination of an infinity of details which it would have to occupy itself if it were necessary to 
make a rule for men, instead of making all men pass indiscriminately under the same rule.” (DA 
II, 4.3 p. 645) The principle of ‘one-man-one-vote’ renders that the government represents the 
majority, and can therefore be perceived as the legitimate arbitrator of the general will. Another 
reason is that the central government facilitates security and welfare; security in the sense that it 
is “the sole power that appears to them in itself strong enough, intelligent enough, stable 
enough to protect them against anarchy […] this general instinct […] bring[s] particular persons, 
more and more, to sacrifice their rights to their tranquillity.” (DA II, 4.4 p. 649) Ideologically, the 
raison d'etre of the Welfare State is not only located in the material desire of the people, but 
also in a notion of the individual as somewhat vulnerable and in need of assistance to manage 
the unjust hardships of modern society; 
 
As conditions are equalized in a people, individuals appear smaller and society seems greater; or 
rather, each citizen, having become like all others, is lost in the crowd, and no longer perceives 
(anything) but the vast and magnificent image of the people itself. 
This naturally gives men in democratic times a very high opinion of the privileges of society and a 
very humble idea of the rights of the individual. They readily accept that the interest of the former is 
everything and that of the latter, nothing. They willingly enough grant that the power representing 
society possesses much more enlightenment and wisdom than any of the men who compose it, 
and that its duty as well as its right is to take each citizen by the hand and lead him. (DA II, 4.2 p. 
641) 
 
What I believe to be the focal point of concern for Tocqueville, is not principally the 
institutional and structural effects of democratic despotism, but the loss of intellectual freedom, 
which is the prerequisite for the exercise of virtue.  
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One forgets that it is above all in details that it is dangerous to enslave men […] Subjection in small 
affairs manifests itself every day and makes itself felt without distinction by all citizens. It does not 
make them desperate; but it constantly thwarts them and brings them to renounce their wills. Thus 
little by little, it extinguishes their spirits and enervates their souls, whereas obedience, which is 
due only in a few very grave but very rare circumstances, shows servitude only now and then and 
makes it weigh only on certain men. In vain will you charge these same citizens, whom you have 
rendered so dependent on the central power, with choosing the representatives of this power from 
time to time; that use of their free will, so important but so brief and rare, will not prevent them from 
losing little by little the faculty of thinking, feeling, and acting by themselves, and this form gradually 
falling below the level of humanity. (DA II, 4.6 p. 665) 
 
Tocqueville’s rhetoric is severe and piercing, and although the critique of the administratively 
centralized state resembles criticism of the pessimistic traditionalist type, its object is to warn 
against the potential advance of conform individualism and materialism in democracies where 
“the taste for material enjoyments develops in one of these peoples more rapidly than 
enlightenment and the habits of freedom”. (DA II, 2.14 p. 515) “The description and criticism are 
designed to sharpen and win over the mind of the reader to the alternative of the democratic 
republic.” (Hereth 1986:69) Democratic despotism is not the product of any specific political 
configuration; its causes are located in the reigning democratic mores, and are not dependent 
upon any outline of majority in power. I believe that Tocqueville’s narrative of the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’ and even more of ‘democratic despotism’ revitalizes the discussion of the good man 
and the good citizen as discussed by Aristotle. What Aristotle argued, was that these two 
concepts are not analogous, since being a good citizen only necessitates obedience to the rule 
of beliefs that are dominant in the given political regime. This incorporates an instrumental  
notion of disregard to whether the regime is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, since the degree of acting in 
accordance with the rules of the regime logically defines whether the citizen is functionally 
‘good’ or ‘bad.’47 Opposite to the notion of the ‘good citizen’ is the idea of the ‘good man.’ The 
prospect of becoming a ‘good man’ calls for a free society and intellectual climate that facilitates 
and encourages the realization of man’s latent virtuous and moral potentials. 48 According to 
Aristotle,   
 
                                                  
47 For example, if there is a widespread consensus of paying a high rate of one’s income in taxes, doing so will be ‘good’, or if there is a 
prevalent accordance of a five-year compulsory military service, serving it is ‘good.’ These are banal examples, but what is attempts to 
demonstrate, is that the normative aspect of the ‘good citizen’ is defined by the common principles of the political regime, while the ‘good 
man’ is defined by his capacity for virtue. 
48 Of course, a good man can develop under an authoritarian regime, but this would in a Tocquevillian perspective be contradictory to the 
natural tendency of that political regime.  
 
 
81
[t]he virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are more kinds of 
constitution than one, there cannot be just one single and perfect virtue of the sound citizen. On the 
other hand we do say that the good man is good because of one single virtue which is perfect 
virtue. Clearly then it is possible to be a sound citizen without having that virtue which makes a 
sound man. (The Politics 1276b 31-38)  
 
Aristotle, then, considered that the type of citizen was largely dependent upon the politeia – 
the whole order of social and political relationships in a polis – in which the citizenship is held. 
‘Constitution’ is perhaps an insufficient translation of politeia, since politeia encompasses the 
entire social, political and economic organization of the state, as well as arête – virtue. A citizen 
can be ‘good’ by performing the anticipated functions of citizenship, a man can be can be ‘good’ 
only when he is ruling himself, that is, when he is using and developing his noble and 
intellectual faculties. Given the opportunity to use them, there is a moral imperative to do so. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Democratic Man and Democratic Mentality 
 
Initially, this thesis claimed that Tocqueville’s understanding of democracy has explanatory 
relevance, and that modern democratic society of the liberal form struggles with difficulties as 
examined and elaborated by Tocqueville. First, I think what needs to be addressed is what do 
we expect of a democratic political order?  
There seems to be a sense of disillusionment and increasing indifference towards the politeia 
among the citizenry in Western democracies, and the ambition of this chapter is to elucidate 
upon some of the problems I find central in the contemporary democracies by using a 
Tocquevillian perspective. As a preliminary observation, I believe that the cause of this 
apolitization is not primarily to be located within the political, but rather that the political reflects 
developments in Western society that can be traced internally in conflicting ideas of what 
democracy is and should be, and externally in the cultural and historical evolution of the West. 
The categorization of these causes is somewhat artificial, as ideas are constituted and 
developed within a historical reality, but what is emphasized here is nevertheless the 
importance of ideas and their impact on both the political and society. Ideas form the foundation 
of a society’s outlook on justice, meaning, political organization, the rights of the individual, and 
so forth. Ideas of justice that we recognize as natural and self-evident are not necessarily 
universal and eternal. Ideas are shaped and fought for within the framework of a specific 
historical and cultural evolution, an explicit philosophical tradition, and the interpretation of ideas 
in hindsight as normatively obvious truths does not inevitably make them so. An example of this 
is the claim that the liberty, value and rights of any given individual are self-evident and 
universal. If this were the case, one would think that this would be a natural feature of all human 
societies.  
 
The universality of the rights of man is originally not a political idea, but a philosophical and moral 
one, and it can be exemplified by Kant’s moral philosophy, who rationalized morality – proclaiming 
that every individual is capable of understanding morality, with the aid of knowledge – and that this 
universal morality is logically independent of circumstances and conditions (i.e. culture and 
history). (MacIntyre 1985:44-45) 
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These ideas are, historically, comparatively recent in their origin and dramatic in their 
consequences. However, this does not imply that democratic ideas are ‘relative’ or 
unsustainable.  I believe that the rights of man are defendable from a normative standpoint. On 
the other hand, this does not necessarily indicate that they are universally applicable through 
institutional implementation. Culture is given significant explanatory weight in this chapter 
regarding the metaphysical outlook of the West, and democracy will be understood as a specific 
philosophical and historical artefact of Western culture. The traditional and common social 
organization of other cultures and civilizations is more often than not authoritarian and 
hierarchic, and what needs elucidation is not so much why other societies are not yet 
democracies, but why the West is democratic.  
To describe democracy as a clear-cut and easily defined phenomenon would be overly 
simplifying; there are different and opposing interpretations of democracy and its meaning. In 
the West, the normative conflict-lines within democracy are not reducible to opposing party 
lines; there is a continual struggle to define the West’s culture and identity. This struggle is 
largely a struggle of ideas and definition: what is justice, what is the cause of democracy’s 
problems, what rights should the individual hold and why, what are the responsibilities of the 
state? To address this aspect one must turn to what constitutes the democratic idea and the 
normative basis of it. I argue that in order to understand Western democracy, Western culture 
provides essential insight. 
 
3.1 Culture Matters 
 
3.1.1 What is Culture? 
Culture is the unity of man’s brutish nature and all the arts and sciences he 
acquired in his movement form the state of nature to civil society. 
(Bloom1988:181) 
 
This thesis claims that Western democracy and its values and norms are closely linked to its 
cultural and philosophical past. First, I will discuss what culture is, secondly, I will attempt to 
shed light on what I perceive as an internal struggle in the West as to what part political culture, 
or mores – and thereby democracy – normatively should symbolize and represent.  
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   Culture is not an autonomous, independent variable; geographical circumstances and 
climate exerts influence. Political change through institutions can also influence a nation’s 
culture. Moreover, culture is a sensitive and difficult object to deal with in the social sciences; 
not solely because of the methodological difficulties in defining and measuring it, and “cause-
and-effect relationships between culture and other variables like policies, institutions, and 
economic development run in both directions.” (Huntington 2000:XXXII) Most importantly, 
culture is the frame of a nation’s values and outlook, and incorporating culture as a normative 
explanatory variable in this sense can activate allegations of prejudice and intolerance of other 
cultures. According to David Landes, culture  
 
[f]rightens scholars. It has a sulphuric odor of race and inheritance, an air of immutability. In 
thoughtful moments, economists and other social scientists recognize that this is not true, and 
indeed they salute examples of cultural change for the better while deploring changes for the 
worse. (Landes 2000:2) 
             
By emphasising culture as an underlying variable in a consideration of Western Democracy, 
i.e. that there are certain specific traits in the historical and philosophical development in the 
West that are not only particularly favourable towards the democratic regime, but also that 
democracy in its Western form is very much a product of its culture, implicitly addresses the 
validity of democracy’s universal claims. This is not to say that there is an unbridgeable divide 
between the West and ‘the Rest’, but that every civilization and culture embodies certain values 
and a normative outlook that transcend specific notions of justice, social organization, the idea 
of the individual and the rights of man. What I argue to be a Tocquevillian perspective is that in 
order for democracy to have any realistic ability of functioning in a given nation, there must be 
sufficient correspondence between this nation’s culture and the values and philosophical and 
anthropological view of the individual that democracy encompasses. Tocqueville had clear 
notions of different cultural traits between Western culture and other cultures, but he also made 
distinctions as to the shape democracy could take within the West; 
 
Among people who have lived free for a long time before becoming equal, the instincts given by 
freedom combat up to a certain point the penchants that equality suggests; and although the central 
power increases its privileges among them, particular persons never entirely lose their independence. 
But when equality develops in a people that has never known freedom or that has not known it for a 
long time, as is seen on the continent of Europe, the old habits of the nation come to be combined 
suddenly and by a sort of natural attraction with the new habits and doctrines to which the social state 
has given birth, and all powers seem of themselves to rush toward the center; there they accumulate 
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with surprising rapidity; and all at once the state attains the extreme limits of its force while particular 
persons let themselves sink in one moment to the last degree of weakness. (DA II, 4.4 p. 646) 
 
As previously mentioned, Tocqueville’s primary methodological tool was the social state, and 
particularly how mores and ideas influenced the political and social structure of a nation. 
Therefore, in order for democracy to wield a positive effect on the political and the social, there 
must be a culture that supports the proper implementation of a democratic constitution. An 
example of this is Tocqueville’s comparison between the United States and Mexico; 
 
The Constitution of the United States resembles those beautiful creations of human industry that 
lavish glory and goods on those who invent them, but that remain sterile in other hands. This is 
what Mexico has made visible in our day. 
The inhabitants of Mexico, wishing to establish a federal system, took as a model and copied 
almost entirely the federal constitution of the Anglo-Americans, their neighbours. But in transporting 
the letter of the law to themselves, they could not at the same time transport the spirit that 
enlivened it. (DA I, 1.8 p. 156) 
 
Nor do physical causes determine the political culture of a nation. It is true, says Tocqueville 
of the success of American democracy, that they did not have any enemies, blessed with an 
abundance of natural recourses, and were “alone in the midst of wilderness like an island in the 
ocean.” (DA I, 2.9 p. 292) However, this was also true of the “Spanish of South America” and he 
somewhat pessimistically describes the situation there as “no nations on earth [are] more 
miserable than those of South America.” (ibid.) Tocqueville concludes that  
 
[p]hysical causes therefore do not influence the destiny of nations as much as one supposes […] 
The laws and mores of the Anglo-Americans therefore form the special reason for their greatness 
and the predominant cause that I seek […] I am convinced that the happiest situation and the best 
laws cannot maintain a constitution despite mores, whereas the latter turn even the most 
unfavourable positions and the worst laws to good account. The importance mores is a common 
truth to which study and experience constantly lead back. It seems to me that I have placed in my 
mind a central point; I perceive it at the end of all my ideas. (DA I, 2.9 p. 292-95. Italics added) 
 
   Within the West, there are conflicting views on how democracy should be defined both 
internally and externally.49 The very term ‘democracy’ is employed extensively and habitually in 
a political setting that often aims to justify the intentions of the actor using it. ‘Democracy’ has a 
                                                  
49 By this I mean that there is a twofold conflict; internally, within the West, the debate is primarily concerned on specific and tangible 
issues; ‘just’ economic distribution through the state and society, public participation, voter confidence, the rights of the individual versus 
the rights of the state and so on. Externally, the conflict is centred upon whether democracy is universally applicable both as a political 
regime institutionally and morally, or if it is a specific expression of Western culture and history. Internally, the conflict lines are traditionally 
divided between the ‘Left’ and ‘Right’, while externally the conflict lines does not adhere to these characteristics, though proponents of 
universal democracy differs on how the world is to be made ‘safe’ for democracy. 
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sacrosanct aura of unquestionable justice; promoting it can, bluntly speaking, only be for the 
best. I believe that those who use ‘democracy’ indiscriminately as a normative good that should 
in its own right be implemented in all societies – ‘making the world safe for democracy’ – not 
regarding the current political culture, does so because democracy is regarded as universal and 
is based on a rational morality that is objectively unbiased.50  
The debate concerning the democratic moral principles of rights and justice evokes strong 
emotions and passionate arguments from its participants. If would be overly simplifying to 
present the varied notions in this debate as a divide between those that supports morality and 
virtue in the political and civic sphere, recognizable by a morally rich and meaningful philosophy, 
versus proponents of a utilitarian, rational actor or those who support a humanistic view where 
the subjective well-being of the individual is the ultimate standard. The conflict between 
adversaries of moral authority in the democratic debate is not a disagreement between a side 
that earnestly promotes ‘truth’ versus another that cynically or unknowingly practises a twisted 
or diluted version of that truth. The conflict is between groups that carry deep-seated and 
diametrically opposed views of the world. (Hunter 1991:63) The sincerity and good intentions of 
the opposing views are unquestionable; however, they differ fundamentally in their opinion on 
what the normative foundation of democracy is and what it should be. Moreover, the opposing 
views are not easily categorized into political labels of ‘Left’ versus ‘Right’, or socialism versus 
liberalism. As James Davidson Hunter points out, a ‘politization’ of the debate can lead to a 
situation where “one can easily forget that they trace back to prior moral commitments and more 
basic moral visions: we subtly slip into thinking of the controversies debated as political rather 
than cultural in nature. On political matters one can compromise, on matters of ultimate moral 
truth, one cannot.” (Hunter 1991:46) The struggle is in its essence a confrontation of 
diametrically contrasting notions of what constitutes moral authority, “over different ideas and 
beliefs about truth, the good, obligation to one another, the nature of community, and so on.” 
(Hunter 1991:49)  
We can attribute certain political and sociological features of thought to certain political 
regimes or forms of government; however, within democracy there is a growing disparity of 
views about what constitutes the common normative foundation of justice. This debate has 
                                                  
50 By ‘neutral’ I insinuate that the ‘inherent truths’ of democracy is perceived as ‘self-evident’, and given that the recipient of these truths is 
sufficiently enlightened, he can rationally discover the morality of them, independently of culture or prior political regime. 
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generally centred on the state vs. the individual, communitarianism vs. individualism, or 
socialism vs. liberalism. However, are these ‘conflict-lines’ sufficient in satisfactorily describing 
the dilemmas of democracy? A Tocquevillian perspective holds that it is the ideas and 
philosophy behind these opposites that we must turn our attention to. In the end, these are 
questions of virtue, justice, morality, of what constitutes our world-picture, and what gives us 
meaning and purpose, on both the political level and the social level. Politics conveys more than 
economic distribution; it is the arena where different conceptions clash regarding the outline and 
function of the state, society and the individual.  
A Tocquevillian perspective acknowledges that democracy is the political regime where the 
individual can optimally influence the ramifications that determine the boundaries and rights of 
his private and public sphere. However, whether this influence is primarily motivated by financial 
gains or by a genuine sense of obligation and civic duty can only be explained by examining the 
current mindset and mentality of the democratic age we wish to describe. I believe that 
Tocqueville’s relevance is significant in this respect, and a Tocquevillian analysis underlines that 
there are no uncomplicated solutions to the problems democracy faces; apathy, individualism 
and materialism are not solely mended by institutional or constitutional clauses, civic duty and 
public virtue cannot be ‘implemented’ by the government because they are ideas of what the 
political should be, and the democratic government itself mirrors the prevailing ideas. 
The current language of relativism and subjectivism makes it inherently difficult to impose a 
common sense of morality, since this conflicts with the democratic principle of the sovereign and 
rational individual who – in theory – is free to make his own choices for himself, and the fact that 
Western politics is the politics of compromise where no single political party has monopoly to 
shape society in its own image (as was, and is, the situation in totalitarian countries). 
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3.1.2 Conflicting Views on Culture and Democracy 
 
Liberal democracies do not fight wars with one another because they see 
the same human nature and the same rights applicable everywhere and to 
everyone. Cultures fight wars with one another. They must do so because 
values can only be asserted or posited by overcoming others, not by 
reasoning with them. Cultures have different perceptions, which determine 
what the world is. They cannot come to terms. There is no communication 
about the highest things. (Bloom 1988:202) 
 
There are both material and immaterial aspects of a culture. The material aspects include 
elements such as its technology (tools, weapons, and infrastructure), formal institutional 
organization, and mode of production. These aspects of Western culture ‘diffuse’ rather easily; 
meaning, they are commodities that are relatively easy to ‘export’ and can be implemented into 
a different culture without necessarily fundamentally altering its value-system. However, 
immaterial and religious elements are what gives a culture its “distinctive character” and these 
elements in the West consist of its “Christian heritage, its scientific outlook, its humanitarian 
elements, and its distinctive point of view in regard to the human rights of the individuals, rather 
than in such material things as firearms, tractors, plumbing fixtures, or skyscrapers.” (Quigley 
1966:12) If Western democracy is principally a result of its cultural and philosophical heritage, 
then ambitions of ‘exporting’ it as a just form of political organization may, by a reluctant 
recipient, be perceived as an attempt to force Western values and culture upon them.  
What constitutes the heart of disagreement in the West, are different conceptions of what 
freedom and justice are and should symbolize. Behind the rhetoric of just distribution, the role of 
government, equality and rights, I believe that there is an effort to achieve domination of 
definition, meaning the right to define moral authority and norms. This struggle goes beyond 
Realism’s explanation of power; it is not only the power to influence reality, but to define reality. 
Since culture encompasses normative guidelines that order our experience by attaching 
specifics and the empirical to meaning and purpose – and consequently composes a significant 
part of our identity – it is ultimately a struggle to define Western identity and who we are. James 
Davidson Hunter has described this struggle as one between ‘cultural conservatism’ and 
‘cultural progressivism’: 
 
Where cultural conservatives tend to define freedom economically (as individual economic 
initiative) and justice socially (as righteous living), progressives tend to define freedom socially (as 
individual rights) and justice economically (as equity) […] However true or false the account may 
 
 
89
be, history tends to be reduced to ideology, a means through which the social and political interests 
of each side of the cultural divide are legitimated.” (Hunter 1991:115-16) 
 
In the examination of culture, it is beneficial to discriminate between private and public 
culture. Private culture consists of meanings and symbols that constitute comprehensiveness 
within the domain of personal life, both inwardly as the self-understanding of individuals and 
outwardly as one’s personal social network. Public culture, on the other hand, encompasses the 
meanings and symbols of society altogether, from the community to the nation; it can be 
understood in our day and age as the “repository of the symbols of national life and purpose.” 
(Hunter 1991:55) The organization that conveys the society’s political culture, the state, 
articulates through formal judicial procedure and normative maxims its own limits and functions, 
but also the tolerable boundaries of individual conduct and individual rights. In addition, the state 
stipulates the character and scope of public responsibility, through its distributive system of 
economic subsidies and prerogatives.  
 
3.1.3 Faith and the Sacred in Democracy 
Rhetorical symmetry does not necessarily imply moral symmetry. One 
might argue theologically, philosophically, or politically that one side is 
morally superior to the other, but the truth of such claims cannot be 
established in a social scientific or an ethically neutral frame of reference. 
Such arguments can only be put forward in language that itself is 
vulnerable to the polarizing tendencies of the contemporary cultural 
division. (Hunter 1991:157-58) 
 
The very term ‘faith’ brings to mind religious connotations, but here it is used in a wider 
sense; as a formal system of belief in a comprehensive set of values, ideals and interests 
concerning man’s and society’s inherent function and purpose. Therefore, ‘faith’ includes 
political ideologies as Marxism, Fascism and more ‘pure’ philosophical views such as 
Humanism, and they call for alternation in how we perceive the individual, society and the state, 
and their functions and purpose. In addition, what all faiths have in common is an attempt to 
satisfy man’s requirement for meaning by claiming insight into truth about the world. By 
postulating the affiliation between the individual and society, and further between society and 
state, faiths represent “the fundamental link between public and private culture.” (Hunter 
1991:58) By placing the individual and society in a larger social order, systems of faith and 
beliefs provide normative vindication of their existential functionality, in addition to providing 
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moral guidelines on how they best can function meaningfully according to a set of rules and an 
understanding of reality and truth. The latter aspect explains phenomenon’s such as poverty, 
unemployment, social structure, conflict, economics, and politics, and stipulates principles of 
action that specifies “what should be done” to solve the perceived problems.  
 
[t]hese faiths lay out the moral significance of different social institutions and institutional 
arrangements. They set forth the social and moral meaning of marriage and the family, the needs 
and objectives of education, the principles of law, the role of government, and so on, and the 
interrelationships of these institutions. Here again, systems of belief not only define ‘what is’ but 
also ‘what should be.’ Faith and culture, then, are inextricably linked. (Hunter 1991:58) 
 
   In an analysis of public culture and its symbols, ‘faith’ reflects a nation’s identity, its meaning 
of citizenship and individual rights, its common ideas of public virtue and public good, as well as 
the normative and moral foundation it aspires to transmit. (Hunter 1991:55) A coherent public 
culture conveys shared paradigms that express its beliefs on justice, rights, and the role of the 
individual, morality and meaning. Emile Durkheim’s idea of the ‘sacred’ – the “life-orienting 
principles of individuals and larger community” – is constructive in this perspective. (Hunter 
1991:131) The ‘sacred’ does not necessarily symbolize divine faith, but it does represent a 
society’s shared myths that define its history, culture and values. Knowledge and understanding 
of the sacred provides insight into a society’s moral principles, both regarding what it approves 
and disapproves of as right or acceptable. Allan Bloom argues that the West has become 
uncertain of itself and its values: 
                  
A shared sense of what is sacred is the surest way to recognize a culture, and the key to 
understanding it and all of its facets [...] What a people bows before tells us what it is […] The West 
has been demythologized and had lost its power to inspire and its view of the future. Therefore, it is 
evident that its myths are what animates a culture, and the makers of myths are the makers of 
cultures and of man (Bloom 1988:204) 
             
The view set forth here, is that within the West the ‘sacred’ has not necessarily been lost, but 
there are ambiguities and conflicting views on what the sacred is, as well as disenchantment. 
Charles Taylor draws attention to the increasing “disengaged, instrumental mode empties life of 
meaning,” which “threatens public freedom [...] and practises of self-government.” (Taylor 
1992:500) What is at stake, are not merely difference of ‘opinions’, but profoundly different ideas 
about meaning and morality, while a significant part of the citizenry is at best tentative 
concerning their political identity, at worst indifferent or apathetic, the ‘anomie’ that Durkheim 
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described. However, while Durkheim believed that a new, modern social order would rise out of 
the ashes of traditional society, Tocqueville feared democracy’s potentiality of unravelling social 
structure, where common traditional sources of authoritative identification and beliefs would not 
habitually be replaced by new, shared beliefs. Instead, the materially fixed and independent 
democratic man would find it arduous to locate new beliefs whose source of authority originated 
outside him and the democratic regime. Accordingly, an authoritative and moral void would be 
filled by self-referential authorities, arbitrary to each isolated man and defined by his fluctuating 
‘emotions.’ The underlying motivation for Tocqueville was ultimately to warn democratic man of 
this development. The remedy? Consciousness of virtue. 
 
3.2 Virtue, Morality and Meaning 
 
Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wrenched 
situation. No theoretical checks – no form of Government, can render us 
secure. To suppose that any form of Government will secure liberty or 
happiness without any form of virtue in the people is a chimerical idea.                                    
– James Madison51 
  
3.2.1 Virtue 
There are no great men without virtue; without respect for rights, there is 
no great people: one can almost say that there is no society; for, what is a 
union of rational and intelligent beings among whose force is the sole 
bond? (DA I, 2.6 p. 227) 
 
The underlying dedication to virtue within traditional Liberalism stems from the idea that 
liberty is a way of life, concerning both conduct and thought. In addition, this liberty requires of 
individuals practicing it certain qualities of mind and character, considered as virtues. Examples 
of virtues that traditional Liberalism emphasizes as of the essence in an open, vibrant and 
liberal society are moderation, reflective judgement, practical intelligence, open-mindedness, 
ability to cooperate and valour. The potentiality for virtue is innate in human character, but must 
be developed through education and cultivation. The Aristotelian notion of happiness is “an 
activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue” which is synonymous with “the good for 
                                                  
51 Madison, James, ‘The Virginia Convention Debates, Friday, 20 June 1788,’ in The Documentary History of Ratification of the 
Constitution: Virginia, vol. 1o, edited by John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino (Madison, Wis.: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 
1993), p. 1417 (Quoted in Hunter 2000:236) 
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man.” (Ethics book 1.7) What traditional Liberalism also accentuates, is that the liberal state 
requires citizen’s that can 
 
[e]ffectively and fairly administer liberalism’s characteristic political institutions, who can keep 
government within limits, who can exercise their rights in a manner respectful of others and in 
harmony with the common good, and who can sustain the voluntary associations that compose 
civil society. (Berkowitz 1999:XI) 
 
 Virtue as a superior quality in the politeia was more prominent in classic and Christian 
philosophy, “where virtue, or the promotion of human excellence, was generally held to be the 
ultimate aim of politics.” (Berkowitz 1999:4) Tocqueville’s postulation that democracy was a 
matter of habits of heart and mind – as well as the mechanics of governance – is in my opinion 
another description of virtues, and unequivocally a petition for the requirement of insight into 
transcendent authority combined with freedom as necessary for a vibrant democracy: 
 
I expect people to serve the cause of democracy, but I want them to do so as moral and 
independent beings who, while pledging their support, retain the use of their liberty; that people see 
in the majority the most tolerable of powers, I understand; but I would like them to be its 
counsellors and not its courtiers…52 
 
Although Tocqueville accentuates the value of free will, he recognized that social structure 
and history exert influence on the reality and range of choices of the individual; “providence has 
not created the human race either entirely independent or perfectly slave. It traces, it is true, a 
fatal circle around each man that he cannot leave; but within its vast limits man is powerful and 
free; so too with peoples.” (DA II, 4.8 p. 676) Tocqueville thereby divides the human condition in 
(democratic) society into two dominions; one is exterior to democratic man, in the sense that 
man cannot determine its form; this is the inevitable progress in democratic societies towards 
equality, individualism and materialism. However, in the other dominion – which is interior – the 
qualitative shape and matter of democracy, meaning how democratic society and its citizenry 
will be comprised; there are explicit possibilities for democratic man to influence its outcome. By 
separating the inevitable democratic process and man’s capability of free will, Tocqueville 
establishes the necessity of virtues and accountability in the democratic process. Consequently, 
the focus of a Tocquevillian perspective is not so much a normative discussion of the 
                                                  
52 Unpublished manuscript in draft for the second volume of Democracy in America, entitled ‘Concerning the Particular Causes Which 
Might Be Harmful in America to the Free Development and to the Generalization of Thought’. (Quoted in Schleifer 2000: 229) 
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benevolence of a democratic regime per se, but how to establish its shape and function in a 
best possible manner. What Tocqueville accentuates, is the necessity of virtuous consciousness 
among democratic citizens in matters of influence and participation. “Only when citizens 
recognize this realm as their own sphere of action, if they accept the aforementioned progress 
toward equality and devote themselves completely to matters that can be influenced by their 
actions, will the practice of freedom be possible.” (Hereth 1986:108)  
The individual and society are mutually dependent upon each other. For the individual to 
become a self-governing and political being – in an Aristotelian teleological sense – it must 
exercise virtues in and through society, not in a utilitarian manner, but in a truly virtuous manner.    
Therefore, a vibrant and dynamic society is dependent upon individuals that claim responsibility 
and exercise their rights and obligations in society. If human nature is to transcend a socio-
biological, rational role-playing perception as consumers of goods – political or otherwise – then 
awareness of virtues and morality are indispensable values that cannot be dismissed out of 
hand. The Tocquevillian notion of democracy’s proper function is when citizens realize that 
freedom – available formally and normatively through the principle of sovereignty – must be 
exercised as a value in itself, and that this exercise in turn leads to accomplishing one’s own 
potentialities of human excellence as a political being. This is why democracy is ultimately the 
most ‘just’ political regime; not because of the material advantages and relative stability it 
inherently fosters, but because we are social beings that naturally form societies, rules, norms 
and organization, and democracy offers each social being – the individual – the opportunity to 
shape his own destiny in this society.  
 
3.2.2 Free Will or Determined Interests? 
Everyone now has a stake in preserving the status quo. No one is tempted 
to heroics because the stakes are Lilliputian: there is little that is worth 
snatching and all fear loss of their property. The paradox of a free society 
takes shape: individuals who are at liberty to form and express their own 
beliefs hold tenaciously to the same convictions while around them 
intellectual creations change as rapidly as fashions. (Wolin 2001:377). 
 
Many scholars have commented on Tocqueville’s emphasis on the importance of 
associations as a means for citizens to participate in the democratic process. However, 
Tocqueville renounced the idea that associations were an institutional universal remedy for an 
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indifferent and passive citizenry that democracy can invent if materialism and individualism 
becomes overly dominant. What is of importance, according to Tocqueville, is that “particular 
beliefs, practices, and institutions” determine the transcendent nature of associations. 
(Berkowitz 1999:187) If associations are to wield a positive impact on democratic citizens, it 
requires of them a consciousness of virtue and character. In addition, as Robert Putnam points 
out, citizens can, through interacting in ‘social networks’ create synergies of ‘social capital’; 
 
[s]ocial capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to 
what some have called ‘civic virtue.’ The difference is that ‘social capital’ calls attention to the fact 
that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. 
A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital. (Putnam 
2000:19) 
 
Consequently, practicing virtue through community not only develops virtue in democratic 
man, but also creates a ‘radius of trust’ and cooperation throughout society. Following Aristotle, 
what is good for the virtuous man, is also good for the politeia. Nevertheless, in order to create 
‘social capital’, there must be “moral capital.” (Berkowitz 1999:188)  
Development of virtue is achievable through the exercise of choice, and this requires the 
encouragement of the use of free will. It is by making choices of our own that we can develop a 
sense of fulfillment: if we transfer the responsibility of charity and ‘good deeds’ to the state, and 
focus exclusively on pleasures within the private sphere, it is difficult to see how virtue can be 
developed.  
 
On the left, a politics that in effect aims to impose a particular kind of character and a specific 
conception of the good life wants government to emancipate citizens from all kinds of oppression 
and all types of hierarchy. Ironically, by assigning the state responsibility for making life meaningful 
and guaranteeing that individuals become fully autonomous, this ambitious politics thrusts 
government back into the center of business from which liberalism first sought to remove it, the 
business of caring for souls. (Berkowitz 1999:190) 
 
The idea of virtue, as it is normally understood, presupposes that human nature has 
predisposed psychological and innate traits, which are not exclusively socially determined, and 
that the human mind is not a ‘tabula rasa’ arbitrarily and empirically filled with social norms and 
rules. Aristotle suggests that virtue is not something naturally bestowed in human nature, but it 
is not unnatural either; “none of the moral virtues is engendered in is by nature, since nothing 
that is what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation.” (Ethics 1103a14-
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b1) In other words, while man is not born inherently good nor bad, there are potentialities of 
becoming either. Given that man is properly introduced into an education of virtues, the 
opportunity for man to become a good man – by the use of his free will – increases. Of course, 
socialization influences the individual and his or her habits, but the individual is not 
sociologically determined by it. On the other hand, individuals are not atomized beings in a state 
of nature who rationally choose to participate in society; humans are brought up in society, and 
the reason for this, according to this line of thinking, is that we are social beings, it is our natural 
state. The Aristotelian concept of virtue, which influenced Tocqueville, differs from the 
perception of the radical Enlightenment that held man to be innately good, born free, but 
distorted, corrupted and enslaved by the suppressive and malignant institutions and 
conventions of society (illustrated by Rousseau’s statement that “man is born free, yet 
everywhere he is in chains.”); therefore, what needs improvement and adjustment, according to 
the philosophy of the Radical Enlightenment, in order for man to become emancipated from the 
evils of unjust and suppressive society, is social structure. Moreover, this is where pre-modern 
and modern conceptions of human nature divert on purpose and meaning for the individual.  
Central to the Aristotelian tradition of thought is an understanding of man as having an 
essential nature and an essential purpose. Aristotle’s basis for ethical enquiry is the correlation 
of ‘man’ to ‘living well’ corresponding to that of ‘harpist’ to “playing the harp well.” (Ethics, 
1095a16) What is to be improved is within man, i.e., the source of improvement is internal, while 
the source of the common good is external; this reflects a transcendent source of authority, well 
known in Christian philosophy. Furthermore, the achievement of human excellence cannot be 
regarded as ‘selfish’ (an expression that will be elaborated upon later), since education in the 
virtues teaches each individual that what is good for him is “one and the same as good for those 
others” with whom the individual is associated to in society. (MacIntyre 1985:229) The liberal 
thought of Tocqueville was in this sense teleological because the “values of liberty and 
individuality, and diversity were based on an idea of human nature in which these values were 
fundamental human needs.” (Kahan 2001:83) Incarnate in Tocqueville’s notion of human nature 
was the reflection that in order for a human being to achieve its uppermost and fullest 
potentiality, certain needs had to be satisfied. This accomplishment was a “factual criterion for 
defining the good and the virtuous.” (ibid.) Participation by the individual in society was one of 
the given needs, therefore meaningful participation was regarded as good in itself.  
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Hobbes’ introduction of the naturally egoistic and selfish individual represents a distinctly 
modern view on human nature, and it had significant influence on The Enlightenment. If one 
proclaims that the source of (principal) authority is within man himself, what needs improvement 
is external structure, i.e. by improving society man can live up to his fullest potential, and this 
humanistic philosophy was the anthropological underpinning of the French Revolution. 
  
3.2.3 Meaning 
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do 
exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow itself 
on all sides – John Stuart Mill 
 
Moral thinking […] is a branch of social thinking, articulating standards 
which necessarily arise on dealing with the chronic conflicts endemic to 
human life. (Midgley 2001:96) 
 
By meaning, I refer to both a psychological and philosophical understanding of the term; 
psychologically, meaning is “the way in which facts connect to form […] world-pictures – that is 
the underlying systems of thought by which we order our experience.” (Midgley 2002:15) 
Meaning is essential, since every individual needs to attach empirical impressions and 
occurrence (information, data, concrete experience) to a larger ‘world-picture’, and meaning is 
the theoretical ‘tool’ that serves as the intermediary in this process. By this, I mean that all 
humans order experience in a dispositional understanding of phenomena. Moreover, the facts 
that we assemble do not occur within a theoretical void, but within a comprehensible 
understanding of reality that serves to promote further apprehension of the world. If we do not 
have prior assumption to understand experiences, they become practically meaningless. 
Meaning can originate on a number of different levels; naturally, it is found in the social 
environment that is close to us – family, friends and work. However, “if we ask for a wider 
context we begin to build wider intellectual systems, either just for greater completeness or to 
reconcile clashing elements within the system which we have already.” (Midgley 2002:16) 
Meaning is vital because it provides the required motive to order and organize an understanding 
and reflection of our surroundings and the world. Therefore, separating human meaning from 
pure rational thought, dismissing it as prejudiced superfluous intrusion is explanatorily 
unproductive. Insight into values and morality is not attained in an abstract, theoretical vacuum, 
detached from the cultural background of a society’s common sense of justice and behind a ‘veil 
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of ignorance’; it only makes sense if we order them in a framework that makes values and 
notions of morality comprehensible. Without the required moral fabric to orchestrate meaningful 
sense of the world, we become incapable of managing common dilemmas, more so when they 
are profoundly moral ones. “Communal conceptual schemes are forged, by which we can carry 
on moral business. Though they are always inadequate and constantly need change of 
correction, they are workable.” (Midgley 2002:21) 
Now, the relevance of meaning that I intend to establish is that when we evaluate something 
as just or unjust, legitimate or illegitimate, right or wrong, we do not randomly take a normative 
stand, we do so because we have a consistent moral understanding and assertion. Politically, 
meaning is particularly necessary in democracies, since the democratic regime, in a 
Tocquevillian perspective, is dependent on loyalty and identification from its citizenry. 
Democracy encompasses more than its institutions, constitution and formal set of rules. 
Subsequently, since democracy ideologically postulates a set of normative ‘truths’ concerning 
justice – such as the principle of equality and the sovereignty of the people -  there should be a 
consistency between its postulations and practical implementation and the general 
understanding of justice of its citizenry in order to conserve the loyalty which it is dependent 
upon. If the democratic regime transcends normatively something else than what is regarded as 
justifiable or in juxtaposition with the perceived normative reality of the citizenry, it fails to 
provide meaningful political identification.53 Also of importance is the fact that if the normative 
principles are professed as obvious and unambiguous in the democratic regime and require no 
argument or contemplation, if they are taken for granted as self-evident, democratic man can 
easily overlook that these ideas were fought for and established with immense endeavour. A 
comprehension of the values central in democracy requires a sense of free will and intellectual 
capacity, but more crucially, they must be practically meaningful. This is achieved more easily if 
there is a reasonable connection from the theoretical postulations to a practical and ‘empirical’ 
substance of tradition, culture and history. This part of my thesis addresses conflicting 
normative principles within the democratic regime, and whether some of them fail or neglect to 
correspond to practicable actuality.  
                                                  
53 By ’democratic regime’ I do not refer to a specific political administration of a given nation, but metaphysically to the nature of 
democracy, its normative foundation and its principles of justice and rights. 
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The Tocquevillian perspective regards mores and culture as indispensable variables both in 
regarding what democracy is, and as determinants of whether democracy is universally 
practicable. In other words, culture matters.   
 
3.2.4 Materialism as Meaning 
What is replacing the classical and Christian outlook in the West is 
certainly a new Weltanschauung, often more rationalistic in appearance, 
but we miss its main source of power if we focus narrowly on abstract 
ideas. What most deeply shapes modern man and guides even his more 
strictly philosophical efforts is a new way of imagining the world. (Ryn 
1998:11) 
 
   Tocqueville’s deliberations on materialism are of relevance to democratic man’s pursuit of 
meaning. There are two levels of materialism: the physical and the psychological. Now, on the 
physical level, an aspiration to a certain standard of material well-being is not peculiar to 
democracies. What I want to address here is the psychological aspect of materialism and its 
connection to the notion of meaning. Tocqueville did not denounce or morally damn the pursuit 
of gain and love of material well-being. He only wanted to place it within the hierarchy of goals 
for human activity, which does not set affluence as the highest and all-determining goal. What 
Tocqueville criticizes is not the existence of the passion for gaining wealth; he knows that no 
society with dispassionate angels as citizens could serve as the premise for a critique of actual 
contemporary conditions. Rather, his criticism is directed against the fact that pursuit of wealth 
has completely eclipsed every other goal. The criticism considers the complete saturation of 
society by the thought of gain, which subordinates all virtues to calculating expense and 
attainment, and which makes individual benefit the citizen’s guiding rule and society’s dominant 
principle. The prerequisite of this development was the depolitizaton of society, whereby citizens 
no longer experienced political activity, as all powers of decision were gathered in central 
government. The citizens withdrew into their own private affairs, and were connected with 
politics solely through their own interests, which brought them into politics.  
   If materialism is the primary means to individual fulfilment, it seems rather naïve to expect 
people to participate in the democratic structure motivated by a sense of obligation. I believe 
that the criticism against materialism, generally from the ‘Left’ (anti-globalists, environmentalists, 
socialists), who oppose material consumption, do so primarily on the ‘physical’ level. The 
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material consumption in the Western democracies do not, in my opinion, by design pose a 
threat to the environment, its growth is not synonymous to extortion of the Third World, and it 
does not necessarily create misery among the working classes.54  
The philosophical heritage of Marxism is recognizable in how materialism has become an 
accepted reference point within political terminology; this linguistic materialism is employed in 
the definition of those who are “well-off” and those who are “unfortunate.” The philosophical 
consequence is that in our perception of what constitutes a ‘good life’, material well-being is the 
common determinant; a meaningful connection between ‘the good life’ and the ‘right life’ is 
decreasing; what we are left with is outward perceptions of different ‘lifestyles’ that are defined 
and recognizable by their unimpeded external characteristics – the persona – but gives little 
indication of the character.55  
Moreover, by defining the reality of democracies in materialistic terms, by defining the 
differences between people in economic terms of those who have and have not, by 
understanding individual behaviour by innately materialistic and egoistic motivations, there is a 
hazard that this thinking becomes the dominant lingua franca in the description of the political 
and the social. Tocqueville realized the coming tensions in the Western democracies; “Soon, 
the political struggle will establish itself between those who possess and those who do not; 
property will be the great battlefield, and the principal question will turn on the more or less deep 
modifications to be made in the rights of property owners.” (Souvenirs: 1970:37) 
By defining and understanding the conditions of the West in materialistic terms, we have 
become increasingly detached from the ‘culture of virtue’ and the notion of human nature as 
equipped with free will and the ability to improve itself through conscious choice and 
deliberation, not merely determined by social structures and biological functionalism.  
 
 
 
                                                  
54 For an critical overview that challenges extensively held beliefs that the environmental situations is getting progressively worse, see 
Bjørn Lomborg’s The Sceptical Environmentalist. Measuring the Real State of the World. (2001) Cambridge University Press 
55 It might be argued that the ‘Left’ criticizes materialism in the sense that it perceives material ‘abundance’ among groups that are high-
income earners as proportionately ‘unfair’ or ‘unbalanced’. However, this rather strengthens than weakens the argument above: the a priori 
classification of social groups is above all based on material terms, and a socialist understanding of justice is by large defined in 
materialistic notions of the individual, society, state and the world. 
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3.2.5 The Information Society and Meaning 
He who has confined his heart solely to the search for the good for 
the goods of this world is always in a hurry, for he has only a limited 
time to find them, take care of them, and enjoy them. His 
remembrance of the brevity of life constantly spurs him. (DA II, 2.13 
p. 512) 
 
Information and meaning are not synonymous; meaning is the process of connecting 
separate sections of experience into a larger, integrated relation, while information is the 
opposite. Information is ideally intermediated as logical, binary code, while meaning is 
intermediated symbolically. Information is ‘processed’ or managed while meaning is interpreted. 
It would be overly simplifying to claim that there is a given ‘contradiction’ between information 
and meaning; information is vital in the functionality of society, and as Tocqueville commented, 
it is impossible to interdependently assert if every ‘truth’ or information we receive is ‘factual’ or 
not. Rather, what is addressed here, is the claim that information in the technological age and 
consumerism may lead to individuals as passive recipients, and this contributes to a ‘deficiency 
of meaning. (Svendsen 1999:30-31)  
 
The Nobel laureate Czeslaw Milosz provides the definitive view on why [democratic man] degrade 
himself with mass culture: "Today man believes that there is nothing in him, so he accepts 
anything, even if he knows it to be bad, in order to find himself at one with others, in order not to be 
alone." Of course, it is because people find so little in themselves that they fill their world with 
celebrities. (Kaplan 1997) 
 
The philosophical and psychological consequences of materialism on meaning in modern 
society is a mental state previously unknown to man: boredom. Orin Klapp’s observations of 
boredom’s extensivity by the growth of ‘social placebos’ in the entertainment industry that aims 
to satisfy the need for personal meaning is relevant in this context. (Klapp 1986:24) Democratic 
man’s philosophical approach to phenomena is increasingly determined by an emphasis on 
whether it is ‘interesting’ or not, rather than if it has any ‘value’, this is to view the phenomena 
from an aesthetical perspective. The aesthetical view implies an external and superficial 
approach, and the externality decides whether phenomena are interesting or boring. (Svendsen 
1999:29) This is also increasingly the case with the portrayal of individuals in public life (e.g. 
politicians), with greater emphasis on personality rather than character. 
Information technology has provided a significant rise in the level of knowledge, and there 
are undoubtedly positive effects to be acknowledged. Nonetheless, most information we receive 
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can easily be termed irrelevant noise, a finished article whose purpose is not communication, 
but a monologue that aims to ease the recipient’s task of contemplating upon its message and 
thereby making it effortlessly ‘palatable’ and ‘consumerable’.  
 
Increasingly information is generated by those who wish to promote something or someone – a 
product, a cause, a political candidate or officeholder – without arguing their case on its merits or 
explicitly advertising it as self-interested material either. Like the post office – another institution 
that once served as to extend the sphere of face-to-face discussion […]it now delivers useless, 
indigestible information that nobody wants, most of which ends up as unread waste […] When 
words are used merely as instruments of publicity or propaganda, they lose their power to 
persuade. Soon they cease to mean any thing at all. People lose the capacity to distinguish one 
word form another. (Lasch 1996:174-75) 
 
The ‘meaningful’ solution to boredom has become sensationalism and the end-less and 
purpose-less infringement of a rapidly dwindling core of social taboos; as Robert Nisbet 
comments, boredom is potentially devastating for Western civilization; “Boredom may become 
Western man’s greatest source of unhappiness. Catastrophe alone would appear to be the 
surest and, in today’s world, the most likely of liberations from boredom.” (Nisbet 1982:28) The 
consequences of a decreasing lack of meaning and purpose with the polity pose, in my opinion, 
one of the gravest threats to modern democracy. Materialism and individualism in tandem 
render philosophically and psychologically the promise of self-fulfilment through externalities, 
but when the assurance of identity and meaning is achieved through consuming material 
products that by advertising promises individuality, and when these products becomes 
increasingly exchangeable and alike, genuine and substantial preferences are impossible. 
Reasonable decisions are conditioned by preferences, and preferences are conditioned by 
differences. When everything becomes levelled, it becomes significantly more important to 
create new differences. We are desperate for difference. Fortunately, or rather unfortunately, 
the advertising business is more than willing to distribute new distinctions. Advertising is in its 
nature conditioned by its necessity to create new qualitative differences that become real 
through unreal constructivism. (Svendsen 1999:48-49) Most consumer products are by nature 
the same, i.e. the inherent purpose of a watch is to show time, but advertising is not focused on 
the nature of things, but what they represent. Superfluous distinctions become what is 
meaningfully essential, because it is through the constant establishment of new differences that 
we hope to achieve meaningful existence and confirmation of our individuality.  
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   It has been argued that the world has increasingly become more complex in terms of political, 
social and economic progress, and therefore more difficult to navigate in for the individual. 
Technology and science has had an impact on the ways we conduct the interaction between 
ourselves, but these are changes in form; the matter remains the same. Our need for 
meaningful social interaction does not decrease with increasing complexity. This need is to 
some degree satisfied through our social interaction with family, work and friends. Politically, 
however, it seems that people need both convincing and conviction to participate, and this is in 
my opinion one of the greatest challenges Western democracies increasingly face.  
 
3.3 Tolerance, Rights and Relativism 
 
When every expression is equally permissible, nothing is true. (Lasch 1996:223) 
 
3.3.1 The Relativization of Truth 
The principle of the sovereign individual has in its theoretical universe become detached 
from cultural and political reality. In a way, this is required if democracy aims to become a 
universal principle of a just political regime, instead of a mere product of Western civilization and 
culture. As mentioned, this rationality can be employed to connect to the relativization of culture 
and tolerance. Francis Fukuyama reasons that in the West, 
 
[t]he word culture has come to be associated with the concept of choice […] we are taught, 
moreover, that in negotiating among these competing cultural claims, none can be judged to be 
better than any other. In the hierarchy of moral virtues, tolerance ranks high, and moralism – the 
attempt to judge people by one’s own moral and cultural rules – ranks as the vice among vices. 
This is a lesson taught not  just by proponents of multiculturalism on the Left, but by libertarian 
economists on the Right, who boil down all human behaviour to the pursuit of irreducible 
individual ‘preferences’. (Fukuyama 2000:16) 
 
However, by doing so, some philosophical consequences will be addressed here. Although 
Tocqueville did not explicitly contemplate on tolerance as a theoretical subject, I interpret his 
elaborations upon equality and democratic compassion as traits of a view that foresees moral 
relativism and where tolerance has become uncritical acceptance of nearly every conduct.56 In 
                                                  
56 In volume II, under the heading How Mores Become Milder as Conditions are Equalized, Tocqueville predicts that “In democratic 
centuries, men rarely devote themselves to one another; but they show a general compassion for all members of the human species. One 
does not see them inflict useless evils, and when they can relieve the sorrows of another without denying themselves much, they take 
 
 
103
some ways, not tolerating conduct on a moral basis has become synonymous with reactionary 
and narrow-minded thinking, someone incapable of ‘understanding’ or ‘accepting’ other people 
for ‘who they are.’  
The freedom of speech – the freedom independently to formulate thoughts and to 
communicate them – has been substituted by the freedom of expression; the freedom to say 
whatever one ‘feels’ like, and claim respect for it. Increasingly, there has ceased to be any 
common, primary source of authoritative accent where democratic citizens can debate on 
common ground. Truth has become relative, “not a theoretical insight, but a moral postulate.” 
(Bloom 1988:25) There are two modern notions of truth; ‘Enlightenment naturalism’ – scientific 
rationalism – whose supposition of truth is confined by the empirically verifiable through 
scientific method. The other is the heritage of the radical Enlightenment – subjectivism – where 
truth is progressive and subjectivist.57 While political science increasingly has been narrowed 
down to the empirically demonstrable and statistically probable, thoughts and elaborations on 
political philosophy and morality have been reduced to an ‘opinion’ that objectively holds no 
larger truth than any given meaning.  
Alasdair MacIntyre labels this philosophy ‘emotivism’, which is “the doctrine that all 
evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of 
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in 
character.” (MacIntyre 1985:17) Constructivism implies that the meaning of any word must be 
defined in the circumstance it is used; and since this circumstance is subjective to every 
individual, there can be no objective truth; it all depends on ‘how you look at it.’ Carroll Quigley 
observed that  
 
The old idea of communication as an exchange of concepts represented by symbols was junked. 
Instead, symbols has quite different connotations for everyone concerned simply because 
everyone had a different past experience. (Quigley 1966:1226) 
 
As Allan Bloom pointed out, the progressive and ahistorical trends of contemporary 
democratic mentality resembles the condition of the first men in the ‘state of nature’, “spiritually 
                                                                                                                                                           
pleasure in doing it; they are not disinterested, but they are mild [...] as peoples become more like another they show themselves 
reciprocally more compassionate regarding their miseries, and the law of the nation becomes milder.” (DA II, 3.1 p. 538-39) 
57 Relativism is not a novel philosophical ‘concept’; see for example the sophist Protagoras (411-80 BC) doctrine of homo mensura, holding 
that everything is relative to human apprehension and evaluation, nothing is absolutely or objectively good or bad, true or false, and that 
each individual is therefore his or her own final authority; this belief is summed up in his saying: “Man is the measure of all things.” (Also 
known as protagoreanism).  
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unclad, unconnected, isolated, with no inherited or unconditional connection with anything or 
anyone. They can be anything they want to be, but they have no particular reason to be 
anything in particular.” (Bloom 1988:87) Only lack of imagination and a declining core of 
‘bourgeoisie’ social conventions restrict the freedom of choice in the private realm of Western 
democracies. The way we choose to live – so-called ‘lifestyles’ – cannot any longer be asserted 
‘un-virtuous’ from a transcendent moral standpoint; only legally impermissible through positive 
law. The irony of it all is that while democratic man is ‘emancipated’ from all constraints on how 
to direct his life, the result is not the libertarian or radical dream of people blossoming into 
sovereign and free-thinking individuals, but an increasing level of conformity and sameness, 
both physically and psychologically. Physically, the trend is a consolidation of taste and 
preference; conformity can be recognized in the fact that we increasingly consume the same 
products in a market that, at least within some sectors, offers a decreasing variety of products 
from a dwindling number of multi-national corporations. Ideally, capitalism is in favour of the free 
marked and free access, but, in my opinion, there is in reality a tendency of decreasing variety. 
58 The capitalism of today seems further than ever before from Adam Smith’s theoretical 
universe where increasing competition resulted in increasing choice.59 It is this trend that 
politically correct ‘anti-globalists’ oppose, but for all the wrong reasons, according to this 
Tocquevillian perspective. By using the materialistic dialectic of Marxism and constructing 
capitalism into an ideology with a (negative) set of moral postulations of human value and social 
structure, it defines capitalism as an enemy of democracy and as a cause of poverty and lack of 
democracy and development in the ‘Third World.’ Socialists less often point out, or admit, that 
the existence of the extensive and expensive welfare state seems to depend upon a functional 
                                                  
58 Of the world's hundred largest economies, fifty-one are not countries but corporations. While the 200 largest corporations employ less 
than three fourths of one percent of the world's work force, they account for 28 percent of world economic activity. The 500 largest 
corporations account for 70 percent of world trade. (Kaplan 1997) The presentation of these facts does not aim at normatively 
‘condemning’ multi-national corporations per se, but to draw attention to the fact that diversity in consumer products are dwindling, and that 
the preferences of democratic man are increasingly alike. Furthermore, free trade and a free marked are not necessarily synonymous with 
capitalism; there are many variants of it. (For an example of different categorizations of capitalism, see Quigley 1966:33-77) 
59 I feel obliged to add some comments upon Adam Smith, given that he is often portrayed as a proponent of an unrestricted and amoral 
economic marked by the ‘Left’, while to the ‘Right’ he is often perceived as a source that warns against inefficient regulation and for the 
advantages of a free marked. However, I consider The Theory on Moral Sentiments (1759) as important as Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). Underlying Smith’s considerations on economy was a coherent moral philosophy that both 
emphasized the importance of virtue and cooperation. Ironically, he diverges from the utilitarian perception of both his critics and admirers;  
'How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it'. 'The usefulness of any 
disposition... is seldom the first ground of our approbation'; 'the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite 
distinct from the perception of utility' […] Justice is certainly useful to society, but it is not true that the rules of justice have been designed 
to benefit society. The designer is God, not man. (Smith 2001) 
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capitalistic mode of production and wealth; no socialist country outside the West, communist or 
in any other form, has been able to match the level of material welfare in the West, particularly  
among organized workers. 
 
3.3.2 Intolerant Tolerance 
In a society where there is no longer a shared conception of the 
community’s good as specified by the good for man, there can no longer 
either be any very substantial concept of what it is to contribute more or 
less to the achievement of that good. (MacIntyre 1985:232) 
 
However, this is a digression. The focal points here, regarding tolerance, are some 
tendencies distinctive in modern democracy. The ‘de-culturization’ of Western democracy’s 
normative foundation and the rationalization of man by the dissolution of moral authority outside 
him have rendered democratic man increasingly ambiguous and uncertain of his political identity 
and cultural heritage. When truth and values are increasingly restricted to a subjective sphere of 
interpretation, their purpose as common guidelines for interaction between citizens becomes 
abridged. Moreover, the idea of man’s innate selfishness logically implies usage of the terms 
‘good’ or ‘evil’ unsuitable as an explanatory motivating factor of human action. On the individual 
level, men’s motivation cannot scientifically or psychologically be labelled ‘evil’, because the 
cause of the evil action performed by man is outside him; the philosophical consequence of 
Hobbes’ selfish man and Rousseau’s innocent man is that what would be rendered ‘evil’ in 
Classical or Christian philosophy is now explained by fixed preconditions or an unjust social 
structure. On the societal level, when we are to explain horrid conduct against individuals in 
cultures outside the West, the cause cannot be cultural variables, since these contain normative 
guidelines of what a society accepts regarding the rights of the individual. Hence actions and 
conduct that are normatively rejected by the West, and that occur systematically outside the 
West, are explained and ‘understood’ by variables that are in a sense value-free and general: 
poverty, corruption, geographical position, unemployment, Western or/and capitalistic 
exploitation, or the condescending argument that they lack development and democracy. It is a 
matter of circumstance; ‘they’ are ‘unlucky’ or ‘unfortunate.’ Logically, when nothing actually can 
be labelled ‘evil’ then nothing is essentially ‘good’.  
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Now, in this respect it is necessary to emphasise that the political language of the West does 
not lack a moral dimension, on the contrary, normative denotations are widely used and notions 
of justice and right are employed to explain or justify certain political standpoints or decisions. 
What I am trying to call attention to, is the fact that in the political realm the moral source of 
authority is seldom to be located externally, i.e. in virtue. This is to say, that what is to be 
justified is understood through a structural and institutional perspective; examples would include 
a ‘just’ tax-reform, ‘fair’ trade, ‘solidaric’ distribution to the poor, ‘equitable’ subsidies to 
minorities, and so on. Of course, the justification of political action lies beyond its institutional 
setting, but in the end, what calls for explanation is why certain views are morally just. Equality 
and individual rights are expressions of a comprehensive moral order, not justice in their own 
right.   
Moreover, and most relevant in this setting, is that morality in the individual realm has 
become increasingly relative, in the sense that every individual is free to choose what is right for 
him or her. Given the necessity of identification and sense of belonging of the citizenry to the 
polity, it is this escalating gap of moral perceptive between the individual and political realm that 
is of concern in a Tocquevillian analysis of democracy. An illustration of this divergence is a new 
interpretation of the liberal principle of tolerance that has emerged in modern democracy. Simon 
Gregg has categorized three notions of tolerance that are characteristic of Western democracy; 
 
Sceptical tolerance – the idea that by evading any strong beliefs about good and evil, 
tolerance increases with increasing uncertainty 
Quantitative tolerance – the meaning of tolerance is tolerance; therefore, the more you 
tolerate, the more tolerant you are. 
   Apologetic tolerance – if you happen to have strong beliefs, the best expression of tolerance is 
to refuse to express or act upon it; therefore, the more reticent you are, the more tolerant you 
are. (Gregg 2000:41)  
 
 In a sense, the ‘traditional’ liberal tolerance, as elaborated upon by John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant, honours diversity, offering the individual the opportunity to pursue his or her 
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notion of a ‘good’ life, as long this pursuit does not infringe upon the rights of other individual’s 
to do the same or by violating distinctly defined laws.60  
However, tolerance is not synonymous with respect. As Christopher Lasch points out:  
 
Tolerance is a fine thing, but it is only the beginning of democracy, not its destination. In our time 
democracy is more seriously threatened by indifference that by intolerance or superstition […] We 
are determined to respect everyone, but we have forgotten that respect has to be earned. Respect 
is not another word for tolerance or the appreciation of ‘alternative lifestyles and communities.’ This 
is a tourist approach to morality. Respect is what we experience in the presence of admirable 
achievements, admirably formed characters, natural gifts put to good use. It entails the exercise of 
discriminating judgement, not indiscriminate acceptance. (Lasch 1996:89) 
 
The modern enterprise of relocating Western values and philosophical notions of justice to a 
universal level has contributed to creating a vacuum in Western society where democratic man 
is left ravenous for meaning and identification. The consequent substitution with the ideas of 
tolerance effectively obstructs the prospect of articulating a common understanding of 
guidelines which accentuate that democratic man is to improve himself through virtue, and that 
the nature of the polity is the responsibility of each citizen. Democratic man is either left to 
himself in the search for meaning, or to a society that increasingly identifies itself with ‘role-
models’ of the entertainment industry. Any serious debate about morality must – in order not to 
‘offend’ anyone – logically conclude with pointless statements such as ‘you have your values, 
and I have mine’, or ‘we’ll just have to agree to disagree.’ (Gregg 2000:41) Such statements 
would by most philosophers prior to the twentieth century have been perceived as pointless and 
meaningless, and regarded as a desertion of “any claim to be engaged seriously in the life of 
the mind.” (ibid.) G.M. Tamas observes a decline of political philosophy as a science that 
seriously deliberates upon the democratic regime:  
 
Philosophy could be a reasonable enterprise as long as the distinction between mere opinion 
(doxa) and true knowledge (episteme) was thought to be meaningful and relevant […] In the new 
dispensation, opinion will coincide with true knowledge, liberty is an condition rather than an idea. 
Agon, that is, concurrence, contest, competition, is now at the heart of the free individual, but 
success has no direct relationship to the human good […] There is no substantive criterion to 
decide which way of life is superior; philosophy “as a way of life,” as it was traditionally conceived, 
becomes incomprehensible. (Tamas 2000:108) 
  
                                                  
60 Kant’s description of freedom is an expression of liberal tolerance; “No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his 
conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the 
freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law – i.e. 
he must accord to others the same right as he enjoys himself.” (Kant 1991:74) 
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   True tolerance is an imperative element of Western culture, but it cannot be unbiased 
concerning what is good or evil; the principle of tolerance cannot be uncritical tolerance in itself, 
becoming a dogmatic principle where disapproval of any ‘lifestyle’ or cultural inclinations is 
condemned as excruciatingly intolerable, ironically becoming a moralistic brand of intolerant 
tolerance. This is not to say that the West should in some manner conduct itself intolerantly or 
‘narrow-mindedly’ towards other civilizations or cultures, but there should be a clear intolerance, 
at least with conditions in the West, of ideas and ideologies that incontestably oppose the 
central principles of individual right and freedom. Tolerance has become an end in itself, a virtue 
to be exercised without the necessary normative explanation of why something should be 
tolerated in the first place; it is the philosophical and intellectual reasoning preceding the 
conclusion of tolerance that is of moral and ethical significance, and that contributes to a 
stronger awareness about rights and liberty. The appeal of the West is not only its mode of 
production and the subsequent high level of material standards, but its ideals of pluralism, 
respect for individual rights and the opportunity to direct one’s own life. These ideals are what 
make true diversity possible, but open-minded political dialogue is steadily impoverished by 
inflation in the escalating demand for a positive notion of rights, a.k.a. entitlements.  
Where the liberal idea of rights constituted an ambition to guarantee the individual 
opportunity to direct his life responsibly, rights have increasingly become in the modern 
democratic regime an argument for claiming justice and compensation for unjust and unequal 
features in society. ‘Rights’ as an expression has progressively been affiliated with specific 
interest groups and politically defined minorities, while the ideals of diversity and pluralism are 
correspondingly fading, given the tendency “to frame every social controversy in terms of a 
clash of rights.” (Gregg 2000:40). Given that the principle of equality has developed into equality 
of material standard, and the subsequent opportunity of economic privileges, the temptation to 
seek retribution for articulated injustice or discrimination is quite understandable. According to 
Christopher Lasch we have become a “nation of minorities” and “the pressure to expand the 
category, with a consequent loss of precision, has proved irresistible.” (Lasch 1996:18) Political 
debate has increasingly been dominated by ‘rights-talk’, and the ensuing conflictual environment 
of opposing claims to economic justice has fragmented any sense of wholeness and common 
visions in the political.  
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3.4 Modernity, Rationalism and the Self 
These abstract words that fill democratic languages, and of which use is 
made at every turn without linking them to any particular fact, enlarge and 
veil a thought; they render the expression more rapid and the idea less 
clear. (DA II, 1.16 p. 456) 
 
3.4.1 The Politics of Modern Democracy 
There are only two alternative modes of social life open to us, one in which 
the free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign, and one in 
which the bureaucracy is sovereign. Precisely so that it may limit the free 
and arbitrary choices of individual. (MacIntyre 1985:35) 
 
Contemporary political debate concerning justice and rights in general encompasses the 
relationship between the Individual and the State. This reflects a political reality where the 
individual is defined politically in terms of its relationship to the state. Both those who are 
perceived as the traditional defendants of the state’s prerogative to achieve social justice 
understood as equality of conditions– the ‘Left’ – and those who are considered as the 
conventional protagonists of the individual’s right to achieve liberal justice through independent 
choice, understood as the sovereignty of the individual – the ‘Right’ – classify themselves 
respectively politically in categories of ‘commutarianism’ and ‘individualism’ that oppose each 
other ideologically on these perceptions of justice. Although there are real and tangible 
differences on a number of issues between these political adversaries in the West, there are 
also some common traits that separate them from pre-modern notions of justice and man.61 
What I wish to attend to, are some aspects of political thought that are distinctly modern, 
meaning that their theoretical and philosophical outlook are idiosyncratic heirs of the 
Enlightenment. The most illuminating example of this is perhaps the principles of equality and 
liberty, both doctrines of which the internal relationship and conflictual nature have been the 
main centre of attention for political theorists since the Enlightenment. This was also the case 
with Tocqueville. While Tocqueville can rightly be described as a modern political thinker, there 
are some distinctions that separate him from his contemporaries. He was astutely aware of the 
fact that he witnessed a period of transition; the nineteenth century symbolized not only the 
advent of democracy, but also a major philosophical shift in political thought, a new economic 
                                                  
61 A common philosophical factor of both the ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ in this regard, is the belief in the pure rationality of man and a critique of 
reality outside man; while the left want s to liberate man from the conventions of society by altering its defective and unjust structure, the 
‘Right’ wants to set man free from the inhibiting structures of the state.  
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mode of production, the abdication of one dominant class – the aristocracy – and the arrival of a 
new – the bourgeoisie – which signalled a new outlook in values and social structure, rendering 
all individuals equal in rights and proclaiming its logic self-evident and universal. What 
Tocqueville recognized, was that the impending democratic movement was in essence different 
from previous political regimes, and that it broke with the past; it was indissolubly conjoined 
normatively, psychologically and philosophically to the modernity of the Enlightenment. This 
symbolized an alternation of the West’s identity and its premise for justification; it became 
progressive, optimistic, scientifically rational, individualistic and secular.  
 
3.4.2 The Promise of Modernity and Rationalism 
There is considerable resistance still to changing the seductive notion of 
‘modernity’ which ruled early in this century and still does rule in many 
areas – a notion of a single dark past, described vaguely as ‘medieval’, due 
to be destroyed and give way once and for all to a ‘modern’ present which 
will be final and never need changing. (Midgley 2002:29-30) 
 
There is, in my opinion, a divergence in the deliberation on justice and morality between 
traditional and modern liberal thinkers that symbolizes a change from the concrete to the 
abstract. Though Modernity as a philosophical outlook considers itself as a progressive 
movement that breaks with the past, it is not a cohesive intellectual outlook; as mentioned, we 
can in general speak of two interrelated, but separate outlooks. First, there is what can be 
considered “Enlightenment naturalism” – of Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes 
and the Encyclopaedists. 62 Regarding moral truth, this outlook suggests – in concurrence with 
contemporary irreligious humanism – that moral truth can to some extent be regarded as a 
human edifice and consequently both provisional and relative. Accordingly, the functionality of 
                                                  
62 This argument requires further explanation. The mentioned philosophers’ relation to religion is indeed complex and in some way 
divergent from one another, but it would be erroneous to claim that their works were based in an irreligious outlook on man or morality. In 
Novom organum IV, Francis Bacon states that “Only let the human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine 
bequest, and let the power be given it; the exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion.” (quoted in Briggs 
1996:177) On the other hand, Bacon was a protagonist of modern science and rationality, and wanted to “replace the Aristotelian image of 
science as a contemplation and organization of eternal truths long since discovered with a conception of science as a discovery of the 
unknown.” (Peltonen 1996:14) Thomas Hobbes, whose Leviathan and De Cive were burned in Oxford 1683 on charges of atheism, defines 
religion as “Feare of power invincible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, 
SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.” (Leviathan, chap. 6 p. 42) Patricia 
Springborg suggests that the evaluation of the early modernists are influenced by secular science itself: “Commentators on Hobbes, 
religious doctrine have focused largely on the internal consistency of Hobbes’ view in Leviathan and between Leviathan and De Cive, 
without consulting his more personal reflections. In this way Hobbes is rendered more congenial to the modern secular mind, but at 
considerable cost to the facts.” (Springborg 1996:177) Even René Descartes, regarded by many as perhaps the prime advocate of 
rationality in his time, declared in the preface of the Principles of Philosophy that “The fist part of philosophy is metaphysics, which contain 
the principles of knowledge, including the explanation of the principal attributes of God, the non-material nature of our souls and all the 
clear and distinct notions which are in us.” (quoted in Sorell 1996:52-53) 
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moral truths should be articulated in ethical principles that have the human good as their highest 
end, “the inner sources of moral authority can be based in what could be called ‘self-grounded 
rational discourse’.” (Hunter 1991:125) What justifies moral principles is verification of the 
human condition, given that this verification is logical and constant. James Davidson Hunter 
elucidates that  
 
[n]ot only are the nature of reality and the foundations of knowledge established by the adequacy 
of empirical proofs uncovered and the quality and coherence of the logic applied, but in this frame 
of reference, autonomous rationality and the empirical method became the decisive criteria for 
evaluating the credibility and usefulness of all moral claims as well. In the more extreme scientist 
formulations, it is argued that there is no reality except that which science has shown to exist; no 
truth except that which is established by the scientific method. (Hunter 1991:125) 
 
The second intellectual outlook – ‘Enlightenment subjectivism’ – bases moral authority in 
personal experience; this experience is ordered and moral judgements are made “according to 
a logic rooted in subjective intuition and understanding.” (ibid.) Hence, the focus here is on the 
emotional needs or psychological temperament as discerned by the individual and a pragmatic 
view on moral and ethics. In order to make a moral judgement, the individual should be aware of 
its subjective orientation and emotions. 
Modern thinkers such as Richard Rorty are representative of the latter perspective, which in 
contemporary philosophy is the heir of existentialism, known as ‘pragmatic philosophy’ or 
‘expressive individualism.’ Rorty stipulates the senselessness of the search for transcendent 
knowledge or truth. As an alternative, he proposes an  
 
[e]difying philosophy [that] aims at continuing a conversation rather than at discovering truth […] 
and thus the cultural role of the edifying philosopher is to help us avoid the self-deception which 
comes from believing that we know ourselves by knowing a set of objective facts. (Rorty 1980: 
373) 
 
John Rawls represents the first outlook, where abstract principles of legal or political 
philosophy are examined to arrive at a convenient and universally justifiable rationalization of 
“equal rights for everyone squared with the equal liberty of everyone.” (Gress 1998:460) Its 
philosophical tool is moral rationalism, and it stipulates that if people were provided with a 
universally valid ethics, they would in an ideal setting acknowledge its truth and consequently 
follow its logic, independently of irrational human traits such as compassion, envy, devotion, or 
spontaneity. Where the rights of man as formulated by liberalism was concerned with protecting 
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the individual from oppression, the modern liberalism of Rawls constructs  a conceptual model 
where the principles of justice are equivalent to those that could be chosen by a rational agent 
“situated behind a veil of ignorance.” (Rawls 1971:136) In order to guarantee an outcome of 
justice, the rational agent is ignorant of any prior characteristics that constitutes an individual 
situated in the real world; status, talents, preferences and ability, “what his conception of the 
good or his aims in life will be, what his temperament will be or what kind of economic, political, 
cultural or social order he will inhabit.” (MacIntyre 1985:247) Behind this ‘veil of ignorance’, a 
rational agent will delineate a just distribution of goods, “in any social order in terms of two 
principles and a rule for allocating priorities when the two principles conflict.”63 (ibid.) Rawls’ 
philosophical premise that a rational agent would choose just principles of justice and liberty can 
be deemed invalid for two reasons; first, an individual deprived of any preferences or knowledge 
of the culture he is accustomed to, would not choose these principles of justice founded on a 
devotion to liberty, but out of fear and uncertainty; in a word: security. Second, as Charles 
Taylor points out, Rawls proposal that we evolve a notion of justice starting with merely a ‘thin 
theory of the good’ is philosophically incoherent: 
              
If we are to articulate what underlies these intuitions [that make us recognize the principles of 
justice as good] we would start spelling out a very “thick” theory of the good. To say that we don’t 
“need” this to develop our theory of justice turns out to be highly misleading. We don’t have to 
spell it out, but we have to draw on the sense of the good that we have here in order to decide 
what are adequate principles of justice. (Taylor 1992:89) 
 
The chief obstacle to a scientific, universal and rational analysis of justice is the individual. 
Unfortunately, it is not the rationalist individual of the Enlightenment, endowed with pure reason 
and calm objectivity, but the individual that is culturally socialised, with convictions, judgments, 
and attitudes that are influenced by varied messengers of social meaning – family, work, school, 
neighbourhood, church, and community. What obstructs abstract liberalism is the individual 
burdened with “excess meanings. The Cartesian discipline aimed to unburden it, reduce the self 
to mind, and then persuade it to submit to an order in the form of procedure and techniques. 
                                                  
63 The first principle is: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all.” The second principle is: “Social economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the 
greatest benefit to the least advantaged, consistent with the joint saving principle, and (b) attached to offices and parties open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” Internally, the first principle has precedence over the second, and justice over efficiency. 
Conclusively, Rawls stipulates that “all social primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – 
are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured.” (Rawls 
1971 302-03) 
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Accordingly, the self had first to purge itself of the beliefs that were the source of its errors – and 
of its identity.” (Wolin 2001:80).  
John Rawls theory of justice is in essence a Kantian declaration of the individual’s ability to 
arrive rationally at a set of universal, moral principles. However, as I interpret Rawls, in order to 
do so, the individual must be depleted of all characteristics that constitute human nature except 
bare rationality. I therefore perceive his theory as the logical result of the Enlightenment 
understanding of morality as a denouncement to the predicaments generated by the selfish 
individual, and that “the content of morality came to be largely equated with altruism.” 
(MacIntyre 1985:229) The concurrent philosophical idea of man as inherently egoistic by nature 
– as proposed by Hobbes – provided for the belief that altruism provided by the state becomes 
necessary to combat individual selfishness. As MacIntyre points out – given that selfish interest 
drives man, altruism is logically impossible, and when it takes place, it is inexplicable. (ibid.) 
 
3.4.3 The Creation of the Innately Selfish Individual 
What bias then, is now misleading us? I am suggesting that it is an 
unbridled, exaggerated individualism, taken for granted as much by the left 
as by the right – an unrealistic acceptance of competitiveness as central to 
human nature. People not only are selfish and greedy, they hold 
psychological and philosophical theories which tell them they ought to be 
selfish and greedy. (Midgley 2002:164) 
 
The selfish individual has been adopted by sociobiologists through the idea of the selfish 
gene; the predisposition to maximize one‘s own gene representation in future generations.64 
Mary Midgley, who critically exposes the illogical logic of ‘philosophical science’, explains the 
irrationally of the commonly assumed theory of selfishness: 
 
The fact that ‘selfishness’ in its ordinary sense makes things much worse. To widen the 
imputation of selfishness is to alter people’s view of the human race. This widening had of course 
already been deliberately undertaken by various thinkers who have developed theories of 
psychological egoism, and had given a special political function by Hobbes and his followers in 
social-contract theory. People in society were then held not to have any motive in their 
interactions other than self-interest. If this bizarre story had been true, the notion of selfishness 
could never have arisen. (Midgley 2002:136) 
                                                  
64 Richard Dawkins, the author of The Selfish Gene, provides an illuminating example; “we, and all other animals are machines created by 
our genes […] If you wish […] to build a society in which individuals co-operate generously towards a common good, you can expect little 
help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.” (Dawkins 1976:2-3) Likewise, 
altruism is described as calculating behaviour. Edward O. Wilson claims that altruism is “ultimately selfish. The ‘altruist’ expects 
reciprocation from society for himself or his closest relatives. His good behaviour is calculating, often in a wholly conscious way.” (Wilson 
1978:155)  
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The argument set forth here, is that the rationalization of human nature has contributed to a 
view of man as naturally indisposed of virtue, and in order to provide ‘happiness’ for man, 
society needs to be purged of conventional restraints. This organizing principle, labelled 
‘triumph of the therapeutic’ by Christopher Lasch and ‘emotivism’ by Alasdair MacIntyre, is 
derivative of the faith in science and clinical rationality.65 The social disciplines that support this 
faith are psychoanalysis, psychology, educational pedagogy and sociology.66 No “non-
anthropocentric good”, not anything that is transcendently external to the individual perception 
of goods, no ‘reactionary conventionality’ are accepted as moral guidance in the pursuit of 
‘happiness’ and ‘self-realization.’ (Taylor 1992:507) However, as described by Lasch, 
‘happiness’ is not a prominent feature in modern society; 
 
Plagued by anxiety, depression, vague discontents, a sense of inner emptiness, the 
“psychological man” of the twentieth century seeks neither individual self-aggrandizement nor 
spiritual transcendence but peace of mind, under conditions that increasingly militate against it. 
Therapists, not priests or popular preachers of self-help or models of success like the captains of 
industry, become his principal allies in the struggle for composure; he turns to them in the hope of 
achieving the modern equivalent of salvation, “mental health.” Therapy has established itself as 
the successor both to rugged individualism and religion; but this does not mean that the “triumph 
of the therapeutic” has become a religion in its own right. Therapy constitutes antireligion, not 
always to be sure because it adheres to rational explanation or scientific methods of healing, as 
its practitioners would have us to believe, but because modern society “has no future” and 
therefore gives no thought to anything beyond its immediate needs. (Lasch 1991:13) 
 
In this scenario, the vernacular of moralily and politics becomes reduced to relativist 
subjectivism and self-preferential talk of ‘values.’ Where Aristotle and the ancients understood 
passions in their relevance to virtue, and the Enlightenment’s endeavor was to submit it to 
reason alone, modernity increasingly surrenders passions to emotions; we are to feel what is 
wrong or right, submitting our source of normative authority to fluctuating moods and desires.67 
As portrayed by Charles Taylor;  
                                                  
65 The expression employed by Lasch originates from Philip Rieff (1966) The Triumph of the Therapeutic. New York: Norton  
66 Considering the scientific community itself, the following sentiments of Albert Einstein is representative of a scientifically naturalistic 
attitude of mind. He states: “Scientific research can reduce superstition by encouraging people to think and view things in terms of cause 
and effect […] This firm belief, a belief bound up with deep feeling, in a superior mind that reveals itself in the world of experience, 
represents my conception of God. In common parlance this may be described as ‘pantheistic’. Denominational traditions I can only 
consider historically and psychologically; they have no other significance for me.” (Einstein 1954: 262) 
67 An extreme example of the radical Enlightenment’s view on virtue and justice is provided by Marquis de Sade: (nihilism pre-dating 
constructivism and relativism) “Justice has no real existence, it is the deity of every passion. So let us abandon our belief in this fiction, it 
no more exists that does the God of whom fools believe in the image: there is no God in this world, neither is there virtue, neither is there 
justice; there is nothing good, useful, or necessary but our passions, nothing merits to be respected but their effects. (From Marquis de 
Sade’s Juliette. Quoted in Hunter 1991:313) 
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To find the meaning to us of ‘our job, social class, family and social roles’, we are invited to ask 
questions like this: ‘in what way are our values, goals, and aspirations being invigorated or 
violated by our present life system? How many parts of our personality can we live out, and what 
parts are we suppressing? How do we feel about our way of living in the world at any given time? 
(Taylor 1992:507) 
 
What both outlooks of the Enlightenment embody, is in my opinion a theoretical 
presupposition of the individual and society that signifies a detachment from culture and 
practical politics. The notion of the selfish individual is perhaps the gravest, since this holds that 
there can objectively be no genuine action which is good in itself, untainted by some vicarious or 
cynical motive. Knowledge has become a rational goal in itself, disconnected from the 
Aristotelian idea that it is in the nature of the soul to “reach out through contemplation to 
something greater than itself; knowledge simply was that contemplation.” (Midgley 2002:99)  
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Chapter Four 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cruel ages are put on their guard against Sentimentality, feckless and idle 
ones against Respectability, lecherous ones against Puritanism, and 
whenever all men are really hastened to be slaves or tyrants, we make 
Liberalism the prime bogey – C. S. Lewis 
 
The Consumerist Society 
 
Private life is so active in democratic times, so agitated, so filled with 
desires and work, that hardly any energy or leisure remains to each man 
for political life. (DA II, 4.2 p. 643) 
 
   The development of modern democracies in the West reveals Tocqueville’s elaborations as 
substantial and relevant; the governance of economic effectiveness in the minds of the 
governed and the governors does not provide a satisfactory guide for the configuration of a 
political order that allows democracy to realize its fullest potential. Centralization that is primarily 
motivated by goals of administrative and bureaucratic efficiency may increase revenue in the 
short run, but in perspective its effect may contribute to a passive and indifferent citizenry, 
relieved of wearisome and time-consuming political participation. Jack Lively posed the 
uncomfortable question over forty years ago whether Western societies are in danger of 
becoming existential welfare states, where a well-meaning paternal bureaucracy relieves us 
from responsibility, while its citizenry inactively approves at periodic intervals through the voting 
franchise. (Lively 1962:222) The political vote is increasingly becoming tantamount to a rational 
and economic exchange of support for financial gains, the citizens’ relationship to the polity that 
of the consumer to the economy. The political is surrendering to consumerism and economic 
rationality; economic models of analysis are the favoured tools to understand politics, where 
interest rates and the stock market has become the barometer to measure political wisdom.68 
                                                  
68 The psychological egoism of Thomas Hobbes has been amalgamated with the rational actor of economic language, rendering that the 
motivation behind individual behaviour is purely competitive and maximizing. An example of this view is brought by M. T. Ghiselin; “The 
evolution of society fits the Darwinian paradigm in its most individualistic form. The economy of nature is competitive from beginning to 
end. Understand that economy, and how it works, and the underlying reasons for social phenomena are manifest. They are the means by 
which one organism gains some advantage to the detriment of another. No hint of genuine charity ameliorates our vision of society, once 
sentimentalism has been laid aside. What passes for co-operation turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and exploitation.” (Ghiselin 
1974:274) 
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The oracles that provide insights of ‘sound’ politics are today economists and stockbrokers, 
while the GNP represents the measurable expression of political accomplishment.  
   Sovereignty of the people as a philosophical notion of justice has collapsed into “theories of 
‘rational choice’ and ‘voter preferences’, while voter surveys become indistinguishable from 
consumer research.” (Wolin 2001:571) Equality of conditions as a normative determinant among 
the majority has in its economic adaptation become the tyranny of the minorities. Self-
proclaimed or politically defined minorities are now the principal advocates in demand for 
democratic justice; political rights within the West are no longer defined in the perspective of the 
universal individual, but of the specific minority group. By classifying oneself as a member of a 
minority who claims ‘just distribution’ referring to the principle of equality and unjust treatment, 
one can demand some form of compensation for this injustice, usually measurable in financial 
terms. Only imagination sets limitation to what defines a minority – gender, ethnicity, geography, 
income, occupation, sexual preference, disability, education, etc. – and given that bona fide 
equality is unattainable and that the notion of ‘justice’ is an infinitely flexible term in 
democracies, the only restrictions are determined by economic productivity.69 The logic of 
economic justice completes its full circle.  
Equality has become tantamount to an abstract notion of justice; the justification used by the 
various interest groups (including political parties) is a reference to an intangible and ‘imagined’ 
conception of a fixed, ‘median’ equality that the given interest group appeals to. This equilibrium 
of justice is attained by defining one’s own minority in comparison to the defined adversary that 
possess the unfair advantages that this minority is deprived of. Therefore, women define 
injustice in comparison with men, homosexuals compare themselves with heterosexuals, the 
poor with the rich, immigrants with the general population, children with adults, and so on.70 
There is always someone that is comparatively ‘better off,’ and this conflict with an unrestrained 
definition of equality. 
                                                  
69 Economic analysis demonstrates that significant increase in government consumption and expenditure throughout the 20th century 
within the West – where welfare reforms constitutes the chief expense – occurred not during recessions, but during times of rapid 
economic growth and relative political stability. Furthermore, as the British economist Julian Le Grand showed, expensive welfare reforms 
in the West are not – as one might expect – chiefly directed at the poor, but at the voting middle-class. (The Economist 1997:25) 
70 Of course, this does not imply that all ‘members’ of these ‘minorities’ perceive themselves or their rights as described here, but rather 
that this notion is habitually employed in a self-referential manner. Furthermore, I do not deny that these traits constitute a significant 
influence on the identity of individuals; what I am trying to point out, is that the different traits on the private or social level tend to become 
‘politicized’. In a Tocquevillian perspective, this does not necessarily imply something negative: Tocqueville condemned racism and 
discrimination of others solely based on their given characteristics. However, there is a substantial difference between the claims of equal 
treatment as a human being to the claim of special treatment as a member of minority.  
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Forcing Democratic Man to be Free? 
I know of no safe repository of the ultimate power of society but the people. 
And if we think them not enlightened enough, the remedy is not to take 
power from them, but to inform them by education. – Thomas Jefferson 
 
All ideologies originate from philosophical ideas about man and society. An ideology does 
not only systematise and coordinate these ideas into a coherent scheme that explains man and 
society, but also advocates how man and society should be organized. We can label ideologies 
that hold a positive view of rights and liberty, i.e. propose concrete ideas of action executed 
through the state to achieve their vision of justice and liberty in an active manner, as 
authoritarian.71 This view is recognizable in Rousseau’s notion of ‘forcing men to be free’, 
meaning, that though this collides with their interests and virtue, they must be forced to act for 
their good, given the fact that they are not (yet) aware of it. The practical consequences of this 
theory are most visible in the (former) Communist countries. Through command, humankind 
can be forced to follow particular paths of conduct and thought that correspond to the given 
authority’s notion of what is for their own good and ipso facto according to their ‘real’ will. (Lively 
1962:224) Tocqueville’s notion of negative liberty proclaims that no authority – though it can 
provide the constitutional framework for it – can implement individual liberty unless the individual 
is given the opportunity to freely exercise and develop an independent idea of it. It is in this 
context that Tocqueville’s emphasis on participation in public life must be understood:  
 
His deepest fears for the future were embodied in one of his most striking images, that of the 
individual as ‘a colonist’ in society, enjoying its benefits, following its rules, obeying its government, 
but without wish or hope of affecting or controlling the terms on which his social life was conducted 
and without the ability to stamp a personal pattern on his relations with others. (Lively 1962:225) 
 
Tocqueville recognized that materialism and individualism are salient features of modern 
democracy. Their influence upon democratic man is located in the economy, administrative 
bureaucracy, culture and sociological arrangement, as well as in institutions oriented toward 
                                                  
71 This characteristic may seem extreme. Apart from ‘pure’ anarchism or libertarianism, most ideologies have some notion of a 
governmental state that reflects principles of just organization both in its form and towards society. The ideologies of National Socialism 
and Communism are obvious examples of totalitarian regimes that were justified by notions of justice and liberty for man. In the political 
system of the West, it is practically difficult to define a clear-cut line between ideologies that promote a ‘pure’ positive notion of justice and 
liberty through the state versus those that are inspired by ‘natural rights’ or traditional liberalism, and hence a negative notion of liberty and 
rights. The elaboration above aims to illustrate a fundamental difference of principle, and while these principles are recognizable in the 
practical politics of the West, no political movement within the moderate political climate can be attributed as pure proponents of either 
view.  
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freedom. It is convenient to advise that men should exercise intellectual and political 
independence to attain a sense of freedom through social and political experience, which will 
both develop the virtuous potentialities as well as a more profound perception of their own 
society and polity. However, every proposal that aims at achieving this must be founded in a 
tangible political reality in order to subsist. The Gordian knot is how to develop a genuine 
political culture in a society where the strongest preferences of its citizenry are economic, and 
where its focus of interest and concern are centred zealously towards the private and economic 
and not the public sphere. This underlines the paradox of liberty; the individual is free to enter 
the economic world of finance, industry or commerce. This is what we may define as the 
objective pursuit of interests. The other sphere is the subjective and private: our freedom to 
cultivate the concerns and pleasures of private and social life. The third sphere, the political and 
public, has developed into an arena where the concept of ‘rational economic behaviour’ has 
become the paradigm, where competition for public subsidies and legalized advantage is the 
sine qua non. “Politics serves to transmute, materialized interests into immaterial ideals, which 
can be directed at divided and largely privatized selves in the hope of attracting both ‘material’ 
contributions’ from ‘private’ citizens and ideal support from ‘public’ citizens.” (Wolin 2001:414). 
There are no guarantees that freedom of speech will hinder the proliferation of nonsense, that 
the freedom to act hinders subjection of others or that democratic man’s primary source of 
leisure will not be intellectually degenerating ‘reality-TV’, a rather depressing tribute to the 
blissful ignorance of sensationalism. The rights of man offer no assurance for its proper use, 
and a democratically elected legislative is not by its own force a guarantee against unjust laws. 
Religion can be misused to promote fundamentalism and hostility, freedom of the press does 
not necessarily generate a public arena of thoughtful communication instead of mindless, ready-
made digested information. The motivations of the citizenry to participate in the public sphere is 
not always based on a sense of civic duty or intellectual curiosity, and ‘deliberation’ in the public 
debate is no warrant for reason and common sense; interests and passions are inherently 
human traits and they influence the outcome of political debate. (Hereth 1986:169) 
Nevertheless, these limitations do not invalidate the principles of liberalism; rather they 
signify that liberalism and its principles and goals, “like those of any structure of political 
doctrines”, do not guarantee that its outcome is sensible politics. (ibid.) Modern liberalism has 
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become detached from its philosophical and cultural heritage, by turning to the state as an 
instrument in the imposition of justice and equality.  
 
In an attempt to restrict the scope of the marked, liberals have therefore turned to the state. But the 
remedy often proves to be worse than the disease. The replacement of informal types of 
association by formal systems of socialization and control weakens social trust, undermines the 
willingness both to assume responsibility for oneself and to hold others accountable for their 
actions, destroys respect for authority, and thus turns to be self-defeating. (Lasch 1996:98) 
  
   Material well-being is an important feature in the overall well-being of people’s lives. 
Material well-being is not solely restricted to material comfort, but to education, infrastructure, 
technological innovation and health-care. In the achievement of these ends, capitalism 
effectively serves as the mode of production that provides the ‘best’ way to accomplish material 
ends and prosperity. It is rather naïve and utopian to propose that people should devote their 
lives to a vita contemplativa, intellectually detached from the ‘conventional’ necessities of 
material life; what needs to be addressed is not the material standard of living in the West, but 
materialism as a dominant way of thinking; a mindset. Tocqueville’s heritage is that we must 
look for democracy’s strengths to remedy democracy’s weaknesses; the principle of equality is 
just, but we must have clear notions of what democracy aims at achieving politically. A 
Tocquevillian perspective on democracy apprehends that its problems originate not from 
deficiency of proficient arrangements, but from the diversity of inability of ends.  For democracy 
to function as a political regime, it must have clearly defined limits.  
 
The Necessity of Freedom and Virtue 
Whenever I encountered in our forefathers any of those manly virtues 
which are most necessary in our time have almost disappeared, I have 
highlighted them: true independence of mind, high ambition, faith in 
ourselves and in a cause. (The Old Regime and the Revolution: 1998:87) 
 
   Ideally, in order for a political regime to function optimally, there should be a high correlation 
between the normative values it postulates and the normative values of the culture of which it is 
embedded in. Certainly, there is a high degree of support in the West concerning the central 
principles that democracy encompasses; equal political rights, respect for fundamental human 
rights, tolerance and pluralism are maxims that remain incontestable values. However, I think 
that there is a growing disparity between the practical realities of Western democracy internally 
 
 
121
and how it aspires to present itself externally as a universal political regime based on justice. 
First, I believe that there is an inconsistency between the abstract and universal principles 
democracy wishes to symbolize and how the political regime is actually perceived among its 
citizenry in the West. Given the current system of financial entitlements, what matters for 
democratic man is not so much estimation as a human being with indissoluble political rights, 
and the freedom to accomplish one’s potentialities as a political being, but respect and rights as 
members of a particular minority. I believe that there is a worrying political tendency within the 
West; this concerns democratic man’s relationship to the political within the politeia. The identity 
of democratic man as a political being is gradually evaporating, and the relationship with the 
political is increasingly becoming a relationship to the political. By this, I mean that democratic 
man’s identity is steadily drained of the political and it becomes something outside him, 
something that he relates to, an externality where the political and economic spheres have 
amalgamated. It is becoming a relationship based on reason and interests, not values and 
identification. Thus, the political has become means to an end, and not an end in itself.  
   Tocqueville supports the idea that men are politically equal by nature, and that political 
equality is a necessary basis of justice. Therefore, Tocqueville, somewhat reluctantly, 
acknowledges that the just commonwealth is undeniably democratic; 
 
It is natural to believe that what most satisfies the regard of this creator and preserver of men is not 
the singular prosperity of some, but the greatest well-being of all: what seems to me decadence is 
therefore progress in his eyes; what wounds me is agreeable to him. Equality is perhaps less 
elevated; but is more just, and its justice makes for its greatness and its beauty. (DA II, 4.8 p. 674) 
 
However, in order for democratic man to realize his potential, the justice of equality is not 
satisfactory by it’s own force; he must actively exercise his opportunities for freedom. The 
freedom that Tocqueville emphasises in particular is freedom of the mind, which necessitates 
not only absence of bureaucratically minute restrictions, but also the existence of alternative and 
atypical thinking. Jack Lively elaborates that  
 
The most successful tyranny is not the one that uses force to assure uniformity but the one that removes 
the awareness of other possibilities that makes it seem inconceivable that other ways are viable, that 
removes the sense that there is an outside. It is not feelings or commitments that will render the a man 
free, but thoughts, reasoned thoughts. Feelings are largely formed and informed by convention. Real 
differences come form difference in thought and fundamental principle. Much in democracy conduces to 
the assault in awareness in difference. (Lively 1962:249) 
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It is expedient to blame politicians for their insufficiencies and failings to satisfy the 
expectations of the citizenry. However, the politicians in Western democracies are overall a 
representative reflection of the public will, and the opinions and convictions that reign in politics 
are in general those of the electorate. As a result, I believe that what calls for greater attention in 
the debate on democracy are the underlying thoughts and ideas that support the current political 
system, and an attentiveness of the historical and cultural heritage of the West. The 
philosophical traditions that views man either as an innately selfish individual or as a purely 
emotional being has in this regard contributed to a detachment from and disenchantment about 
our past.  
 
After having believed ourselves capable of transforming ourselves, we believe ourselves incapable of 
reforming ourselves; after having had an excessive pride, we have fallen into a humility that is no less 
excessive; we believed ourselves capable of everything, today we believe ourselves capable of nothing, 
and we like to believe that from now on struggle and effort will be useless and that our blood, our 
muscles, and our nerves will always be stronger than our will and virtue. This is simply the great malady 
of the time, a malady completely opposed to that of our fathers. (Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, 
December 20, 1853 Boesche 1985:303) 
 
Democratic man has increasingly become a political nomad in the politeia that he dwells in, 
benefiting from its profits, lawfully obliging its rules and regulations, faithfully abiding to its 
opinions, but faithless in democracy’s normative dimension or simply indifferent about 
influencing the conditions that these seemingly autonomous and self-directed forces wield on 
his existence as a political being. He has been brought up to believe that he is the result of 
social forces outside and beyond him, and that his identity is to be located in externalities and 
that his individuality is the sum of these objects.  
While Tocqueville cautioned against this modern idea of individualism as well as the 
philosophically interrelated idea of the conform masses, he also rejected the idea of the 
naturally noble man and the obstruction of his nobleness by corrupted society; the democratic 
institutions requires active attention from its citizenry, and this attention must be rooted in social 
mores and a sense of obligation. Democratic man cannot look to society to change himself, but 
must look within himself in order to change society. Most importantly, in a Tocquevillian 
perspective, true diversity is not quantitatively measured by defined ‘life-styles’ or minorities; 
what is of the essence to a vibrant democracy is intellectual freedom, diversity and audacity.  
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Freedom of the mind requires not only, or even especially, the absence of legal constraints but the 
presence of alternative thoughts. The most successful tyranny is not the one that uses force to 
assure uniformity but the one that removes the awareness of other possibilities, that makes it seem 
inconceivable that other ways are viable, that removes the sense that there is an outside. It is not 
feelings or commitments that will render a man free, but thoughts, reasoned thoughts. Feelings are 
largely formed and informed by convention. Real differences comes form difference in thought and 
fundamental principle. (Bloom 1988:249) 
 
However, the prospects are regrettably ominous; liberalism began with worries about mixing 
ultimate moral questions with politics, and a desire to limit government and make it responsible 
to the people. If we are to take Tocqueville’s worries seriously, we could say that it is about to 
end in a system that cares less about such things. 
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